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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the highest command relationships that existed in the Soviet 
Union's Red Army and in the German Army just prior to and during the Second World 
War. The roles of Hitler and Stalin as supreme military commander are considered in 
relationship with their higher generals and how these relationships bore significantly on 
the course of the war. Hitler's increasing micromanagement of the German war effort, 
and Stalin's belated willingness to delegate military authority make up the central themes 
of this work. 
A variety of secondary sources, as well as generals' memoirs and diaries, point to 
the conclusion that Hitler and Stalin were both military amateurs who possessed grand 
strategic visions, but lacked the competent operational understanding of the trained 
military technician. After the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler inserted himself 
further and further down into the chain of command and directed tactical movements 
from hundreds of miles away. By contrast, Stalin began the war dominating the Red 
Army but gradually came to respect the abilities of his military specialists. Hitler's 
disdain for his generals and Stalin's respect for his proved a major factor in the Soviet 
victory in the Second World War. 
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The relationships between Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin and their respective army 
leaderships played an important role throughout the course of the Second World War in 
Europe. How the dictators exercised command and worked with their senior generals, 
General Staffs, and higher field commanders had major consequences on the battlefield. 
These relationships, colored as they were by the dictators' personality traits, military 
preferences, and political considerations directly influenced the outcome of the war. 
How did the dictators deal with their army leaderships both before and during the 
war? In what ways did these relationships shape military policy and operations? To 
what extent did the dictators, steeped in political dogma, use political institutions and 
controls to dominate their militaries? 
Even a cursory review of events suggests that Hitler increasingly micromanaged 
the German Army as the war progressed. Stalin's control over the Red Army shifted 
back and forth between tight political control, and greater responsibility and authority for 
military officers. Understanding the way in which the dictators meddled in operations or 
allowed greater freedom for their officers is of paramount importance when considering 
the course of the Second World War in Europe. This interpretation is very much a 'Great 
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Man' approach to history, as it is difficult to imagine World War II playing out in a 
similar fashion without the dominating personalities of Hitler and Stalin. 
Emphasis in this study is on the relationships between the dictators and their army 
leaderships, as opposed to the leaderships of other services. Both Germany and the 
Soviet Union were primarily land powers where the German Army and the Red Army 
enjoyed a leading status among the various military branches. The Nazi-Soviet war was 
a battle of massive land armies engaged in a life or death struggle for the regimes they 
served. The fight between these two European powers was the central theatre of the 
Second World War. Battles and events which played out on this front profoundly 
affected the dictators' views and actions with regard to their military leaderships. For 
this reason the Russian front is given priority in this study over military events in 
Western Europe. 
Following this introduction, the second chapter considers the armies of Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union as political institutions and their roles in German and 
Soviet societies are reviewed. The years leading up to the conflict are evaluated, as 
Hitler prepared his military to launch a war of aggression and Stalin asserted political 
domination over the Red Army through ruthless purges. 
Chapter 3 looks at the years of Hitler's military success as Poland, France, and the 
Low Countries fell to the Wehrmacht. This is contrasted with the Soviet setback in 
Finland and the renewed attempt make the Red Army a formidable military force. 
The fourth chapter begins by examining the theory that Stalin was preparing to 
launch an invasion against Germany in late 1941 or early 1942, and therefore Hitler's 
invasion of the Soviet Union was a preemptive war. The preparations for 'Operation 
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Barbarossa' the German invasion of the Soviet Union as considered, as are Soviet actions 
at the time. Detailed attention is paid to Stalin's concentration of military power in the 
weeks following the invasion, as is Hitler's leadership in.the drive toward Moscow. 
The dictators' roles in key battles are considered in Chapter 5. Stalin's foolhardy 
offensives in early 1942 are looked at, as are the significant Soviet victories at Stalingrad 
and Kursk. Chapter 6 examines the Soviet offensive 'Operation Bagration', as well as 
the military consequences in Germany following the failed attempt to murder Hitler in 
1944. The battle for Berlin in 1945 is also considered. 
The examples offered will demonstrate that the relationships between the dictators 
and their army leaderships were never fixed and immutable, but were in a constant state 
of flux. These relationships were processes in which the supreme military power of the 
state sought to achieve victory in conjunction with military technicians using both new 
and established military and political institutions. The way in which these processes 
evolved had the most serious consequences and shaped in no small degree the outcome of 
the Second World War. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ARMIES AND POLITICS ON THE EVE OF 
THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
The Armies as Political Institutions 
Though they both functioned as the primary defense institutions of the state, the 
Red Army and the German Army were decidedly different in their political character and 
in their relationship to the regimes they served. One was a new creation, a child of the 
Russian Revolution. The other had existed in one form or another for centuries and had 
been a dominating influence on Prussian and German politics. 
In early 1918 the Soviet state required a fighting force to protect it from the 
lingering threat of German aggression and the emerging danger of White, anti-Bolshevik 
military units. The Tsar's army had virtually disappeared by this point as a cohesive and 
disciplined military structure. Lenin's new Commissar for War, Leon Trotsky, succeeded 
in creating a wholly Bolshevik military force to suit the needs of the revolutionary 
regime. Many younger officers who had served the Tsar were allowed to join the Red 
Army, but were kept on a tight reign by political commissars, party members who shared 
military responsibility with the officers but who reported directly to political leaders. 
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brought stability to the new state and ensured the success of the revolution during the 
Russian Civil War.1 
The Bolshevik Revolution delivered the death blow to the Russian provisional 
government, society, and their remaining Tsarist institutions. It also swept aside what 
was left of the Imperial Army and Russian officer corps. In their place a communist 
military institution had been created which was interconnected with the regime through 
an iron net of political oversight to ensure its loyalty. The Bolsheviks considered the Red 
Army as a necessary tool within the larger framework of organizations whose ultimate 
goal was to build a true communist state. It was not viewed as an independent and 
professional institution as militaries in other European nations were generally regarded. 
The Red Army generals with whom Stalin fought the "Great Patriotic War" generally 
emerged from humble origins and most saw front line experience fighting against the 
Central Powers or in the Civil War. For instance Semon Timoshenko had been an 
Odessa farmer and Georgy Zhukov had been a cobbler from Moscow until they were 
drafted into the Tsar's Army.3 Though many senior officers came from the lower classes 
some, like Boris Shaposhnikov, had been career military men in the Tsar's army who 
made the transition from imperialist to communist.4 
In its attempt to mirror the classless society of the Soviet state, the Red Army 
allowed ordinary peasants and workers not only to serve, but to climb as high as their 
1
 Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 75-6. 
2
 Richard Overy, Russia's War, A History of the Soviet War Effort: 1941-1945 (New York: Penguin Books, 
1998), 3. 
3
 Catherine Merridale, Ivan's War, Life and Death in the Red Army, J939-1945 (New York: Picador, 2006) 
35-6. 
4
 Robert Conquest, Stalin, Breaker of Nations (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), 240. 
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ambition and ability allowed. This would have been unthinkable in the rigid, class-
conscious officer corps of the Tsarist Army. The Russian Revolution had created a new 
role for the national military. The Red Army was not designed to be the personal military 
of an exalted Emperor; rather it was to serve as part of a great social experiment. In the 
years leading up to the Second World War the Red Army would constantly reexamine 
this role against the practical needs of state defense. Within Stalin's USSR this balancing 
act of political vs. practical roles for the Red Army led to a devastating purge of the Red 
Army officers in the late 1930s and disaster in 1941 as an unprepared Soviet military 
faced Nazi invasion. 
The German Army, and before it the Prussian Army, had existed as a powerful 
and independent military organization for centuries. The Prussian Army and its 
backbone, the Prussian officer corps, played an essential role in the German unification 
with its military campaigns against Denmark, Austria, and France. By the time of the 
First World War the German Army was a central pillar of the German Reich and, with 
the Kaiser's collusion, dominated national politics. 
For instance, at the outbreak of World War I Germany had no civilian political 
leadership over its military; indeed, there was not even a national office of Minister of 
War. Rather, the Kaiser exercised military control over the German Army through the 
Prussian Minister of War, himself a serving general.5 Just over twenty years earlier 
Count Alfred Graf von Waldersee, Chief of the Great German General Staff, had 
5
 John Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, The German Army in Politics, 1918-1945 (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 1953) 12 & n. 
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7 
participated in the political machinations to get rid of Bismarck as Imperial Chancellor.6 
During the last two years of World War One the German Army leadership ruled the 
nation itself, selecting and firing civilian political leaders, at its leisure. 
The German Army leadership continued to influence national politics throughout 
the Weimar era. This meddling by the German officer corps in politics culminated in the 
appointment of General Kurt von Schleicher to the post of Chancellor in December, 
• 8 
1932, just weeks before Adolf Hitler was to succeed him in that post. 
The dominant role of the German Army in national politics is clear when one 
considers that the second president of the Weimar Republic was none other than the First 
World War hero, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg. A pillar of German conservatism 
and a cautious advocate for the restoration of the monarchy, Hindenburg reluctantly 
appointed Hitler to the post of chancellor in January, 1933.9 By the time of his death 
nineteen months later the military hero and political leader left no doubts as to his faith in 
National Socialism. In final his political testament, which may have been altered after his 
death, Hindenburg wrote, 
My Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, and his movement have together led the 
German nation above all professional and class distinctions, to internal 
Unity- a decided step of historical importance.1 0 
6
 Walter Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff: 1657-1945 (Brian Battershaw, Trans.), (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1953) (see Chapter V). 
Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War, The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (New York: 
Military Book Club, 1977) 167. 
8
 Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, 266. 
9
 John Wheeler-Bennett, Hindenburg, The Wooden Titan (London: Macmillan & Company Limited, 1936) 
433-4. 
1 0
 Ibid, 470-3. 
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Unlike the Soviet generals of the Second World War, Hitler's senior military 
leadership was made up mostly of officers from aristocratic or upper middle class 
families. The noble preposition 'von' was common among German officers, though not 
universal. Franz Haider and Heinz Guderian, two of Hitler's Chiefs of the General Staff, 
were both from middle class families with long military traditions1 1. The General Staff 
itself, once a firm bastion of nobility, had drawn fewer and fewer and titled officers into 
its ranks during the Weimar Republic. To give the organization back its old imperial 
luster Hitler's first Chief of the General Staff, Ludwig Beck, recruited titled officers once 
again. By 1938, 50 out of 187 General Staff officers were titled compared with only 10 
12 
percent of the Army as a whole. 
While the Red Army was very much a creature of the Bolshevik Revolution and 
dominated by the Soviet political leadership since its creation, the German Army had a 
long established military tradition as well as an important, although dubious, role in 
German politics. The German Army remained a bastion of traditional German 
conservatism and, unlike the sweeping away of old institutions in Russia Hitler had had 
to make an alliance with its leaders in order to secure his regime. Hitler recognized in the 
German Army a formidable force that could either block his path to power through armed 
might, or serve as his basis for future military conquest. For the German Army's part 
Hitler promised the one thing all officers wanted- rearmament and a chance to rectify the 
faults of the Versailles Treaty. It was a symbiotic relationship in which both parties 
believed that the promise of political alliance outweighed the perils. Out the outset of 
1 1
 Dupuy, A Genius for War, 248; Russell A. Hart, Guderian, Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker? (Dulles: 
Potomac Books, Inc., 2006), 5. 
1 2
 Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff, 292-3. 
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this relationship the German Army enjoyed an independence and political leverage over 
the regime that was not present with the Red Army. This of course would change. 
The Road to War 
The evolution of command systems and the tightening of political control over 
both the Red Army and the German Army during the 1930s began a process of 
political/military relations that was still unresolved during Second World War. 
Restructuring of military commands in relation to the dictators and the purging of various 
officers determined which generals had Hitler and Stalin's ear during the war. 
At the heart of the German Army was the German General Staff, an operational 
planning and senior command organization. The General Staff had been created in the 
wake of Prussian defeats during the Napoleonic Wars by German officers who sought to 
"institutionalize military excellence." It was a school and a service that created technical 
expertise in the field of military science in its officers. The General Staff rose to 
prominence under Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke during the Wars of 
Unification and the post of Chief of the General Staff became the premier military office 
under the Kaiser.1 4 The loss of the First World War and the subsequent bureaucratization 
of the military leadership under the Weimar Republic served to separate the Chief of the 
General Staff, re-titled Chief of the Troop Office, from the President.1 5 
1 3
 Dupuy, A Genius for War, 5. 
1 4
 Kenneth Macksey, Why the Germans Lose at War, the Myth of German Military Superiority (New York: 
Greenhill Books, 1966), 39-41. 
1 5
 Dupuy, A Genius for War, 198, 212. 
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By the time of the Third Reich the General Staff was producing first rate 
technicians in the art of war, but few real leaders. These were men who clearly 
understood the operational and tactical levels of warfare,- but did not fully appreciate the 
strategic level. As English professor and historian John Mosier has stated, the officers 
produced at this time were great captains, but not great generals. Their plans called for 
winning the next battle or campaign, but not necessarily the war. Further, Mosier states 
that they were dominated by Hitler not only because of their own political naivete, but 
because the Fuhrer was the only true strategic thinker in the German military. 
This lack of strategic vision began with the failure of Erich Ludendorff to see 
beyond the next big push. By the time of his Western Front offensives in early 1918 he 
incorrectly assumed that the presence of black colonial troops in the Allied lines meant 
that those powers were on their last legs. So the offensives went grinding forward with 
the Chief of Staff Hindenburg and his First Quartermaster General Ludendorff convinced 
that the next blow to the allies would win the war for Germany. Once again, this 
reflects the limited strategic thinking of two leaders. With America in the war the 
resources and manpower pouring into Europe were boundless and Allied morale greatly 
improved. Thus, even as Hindenburg and Ludendorff found themselves as virtual 
dictators of Germany, the decline of the Great General Staff had begun with their failure. 
This lack of strategic vision among Hitler's generals and Hitler's increasing 
meddling with operational and tactical details proved to be critical setbacks for the 
German Army during the Second World War. Hitler's own experience as a corporal on 
1 6
 John Mosier, Cross of Iron, The Rise and Fall of the German War Machine, 1918-1945 (New York: 
Henry Holt & Company, 2006), 44. 
1 7John Lee, The Warlords, Hindenburg and Ludendorff '(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), 169. 
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the Western Front during World War One hardly prepared him for the technical military 
operational planning that was the hallmark of the General Staff. As Fuhrer, Hitler often 
wore a plain SA uniform that reflected his status as the political army's Commander-in-
Chief. After his appointment as chancellor in 1933 he mostly wore standard suits, but 
after a meeting the next year with Mussolini, in which the Italian dictator was decked out 
18 
in military style dress, the SA uniform was seen more and more often. 
When Hitler publicly announced German rearmament in 1935 Ludwig Beck, the 
Chief of the Troop Office and General of Artillery, formally assumed the traditional title 
of Chief of the General Staff.19 It is useful to view the evolution of Hitler's command 
structure through this office. During the First World War the Chief of the General Staff 
had been the premier Army officer serving under the Kaiser. Unlike in the days of the 
empire, however, the Chief of Staff under the Third Reich no longer had direct access to 
the Head of State. 
In the office of Fuhrer, Hitler had amalgamated the posts of Chancellor and 
• 20 
President, thus giving him the role of Commander-in-Chief of Germany's armed forces. 
Directly beneath him in the chain of command was the War Minister, a post held until 
1938 by Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg. The War Minister had authority over the 
heads of the three services branches, the Army (Heers), the Air Force (Luftwaffe), and the 
Navy (Kriegsmarine). Between the War Minister and the Commanders-in-Chief of the 
services, the War Minister employed a personal military command staff, the 
1 8
 Richard Overy, The Dictators, Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2004), 441; Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Vintage Books, 2004), 216. 
1 9
 Ibid., 236-7. 
2 0
 Article 47 of the Weimar Constitution reads in part, "The President... has supreme command over the 
whole of the defense force of the Federation." 
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Wehrmachtamt, or Defense Office. The officer commanding this office, usually Wilhelm 
Keitel or Walther von Reichenau, was responsible for coordinating the commands of the 
services with the orders of the War Minister. 
With the High Command of the Army, Oberkommando des Heers, or OKH, the 
highest post was that of Commander-in-Chief, held until 1938 by General Werner von 
Frtisch. It was only at this level, separated from the Head of State by three other officers 
that the Chief of the General Staffs authority began. In fact, Beck only met with Hitler 
22 
in his formal capacity on two occasions. The days had passed when the Chief of the 
General Staff acted as the de facto Commander-in-Chief of Germany's armed forces 
while the Head of State was content to merely look the part. 
Despite the military command structure that had evolved through the Republic 
into that which served the Third Reich, Beck saw the General Staff under von Moltke as 
the model to emulate. Panzer specialist Heinz Guderian, himself a later Chief of the 
General Staff, described Beck as a disciple of Moltke who strove to recreate the 
organization as it existed under his idol. Indeed, so great was Moltke's influence on 
Beck that the Polish military attache in Berlin reportedly remarked of him, "C'est 
Moltke, lui-meme," ("It's Moltke, he's the same.")2 4 
Beck's desire to see the General Staff attain a status similar to that of its earlier 
incarnation rested on a fundamental assumption that proved a major source of contention 
2 1
 Joel Hayward, Adolf Hitler and Joint Warfare (New Zealand Defense Force Military Studies Institute, 
2005), 7, www.joelhayward.org/adolfhitlerandjointw.htm. 
2 2
 Robert O'Neil, Fritsch, Beck, and the Fuhrer (From Hitler's Generals), (Corelli Barnett, Ed.), (New 
York: Grove Press, 1989), 28. 
2 3
 Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (Constantine Fitzgibbon, Trans.), (New York: De Capo Press, 1952), 32. 
2 4
 Gorlitz, Keitel, Jodl, and Warlimont(From Hitler's Generals), 155. 
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in his formal capacity on two occasions. The days had passed when the Chief ofthe 
General Staff acted as the defacto Commander-in-Chief of Germany's armed forces 
while the Head of State was content to merely look the part. 
Despite the military command structure that had evolved through the Republic 
into that which served the Third Reich, Beck saw the General Staff under von Moltke as 
the model to emulate. Panzer specialist Heinz Guderian, himself a later Chief of the 
General Staff, described Beck as a disciple of Moltke who strove to recreate the 
organization as it existed under his idol.23 Indeed, so great was Moltke's int1uence on 
Beck that the Polish military attache in Berlin reportedly remarked of him, "C'est 
Moltke, lui-meme," ("It's Moltke, he's the same.,,)24 
Beck's desire to see the General Staff attain a status similar to that of its earlier 
incarnation rested on a fundamental assumption that proved a major source of contention 
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in German military circles throughout World War Two. Beck's assumption was that in 
any future conflict the German Army would be the supreme war authority. Beck, along 
with other senior officers such as Franz Haider and Walther von Brauchitsch, believed 
that as a European continental power the Army was the most important branch of the 
armed services. These officers saw the Navy and Air Force as simply "auxiliary forces" 
to the Army. 2 5 In the event of war Beck wanted the supreme operational command for 
the Army. Not every officer, however, agreed with this point of view. 
During the First World War the problems of planning, operations, and command 
between the army and navy became evident. By the time of Hindenburg's term as Chief 
of the General Staff civilian political authority over control of the war was beginning to 
wane. As Hindenburg's deputy, Ludendorff had championed the naval plan to launch 
unrestricted submarine warfare against England, despite the wider political and 
diplomatic ramifications to Germany. Being an army officer, Ludendorff s faith in the 
navy's plan was based on hope instead of a real understanding of the naval strategy.2 6 In 
the mid 1930s many German officers felt that a supreme interservice military executive 
authority needed to be constituted. Such an authority would be better suited to war 
planning and operational command than simply having the army, admittedly the most 
important branch in central European Germany, elevated to an executive role over the 
Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine. Alfred Jodl, another artillery man, was one of these 
officers. 
Ibid., 146. 
Macksey, Why the Germans Lose at War, 51. 
 
     '   
 i t     
  rs   l      
        
 rs      
?5       
t  . t  i r, ,  it  t i  i t  i . 
      
    '   
  ff       
'  dor f    
      
   r, dor f
       t y.26 
   rs     
      
      
     
t affe  I    
i . 
25 I i ., . 
26   ans e  ,  I
14 
Jodl believed that the role of the General Staff had significantly changed from the 
organization that had served the Kaisers. Planning for future wars was the purview of the 
General Staff, Jodl judged, but once war began another authority should provide 
command and direction. Under this authority the General Staff would become a sort of 
'Leader's Assistant' which had no independent command authority. Hitler seemed to 
lend weight to this concept as he reportedly told intimates that the General Staff was "just 
9 7 
a club of intellectuals." 
Even Blomberg, the Defense Minister, believed that there was a need for an 
executive military power in the event of war. Like Jodl he felt that the days of the army 
9 S 
dominating warfare were over. Together with Keitel, the chief of the Wehrmachtamt, 
Blomberg advocated the creation of a Wehrmacht Operations Staff to act as a single 
overall command for all three branches. These officers liked the idea of a military 
generalissimo over this new staff, a sort of interservice Commander-in-Chief, who would 
9 0 
be responsible directly to the Head of State during wartime. 
While receptive to the idea of a Wehrmacht Operations Staff, Hitler rejected the 
concept of a generalissimo, perhaps because he saw in the proposed position a potential 
rival. Memories of the Kaiser being sidelined by Hindenburg and Ludendorff during the 
last war were still fresh. Hitler preferred the vagueness in spheres of command that a 
new Operations Staff would share with the traditional General Staff. In running the 
military with the same feudal approach he'd taken in governing the party, Hitler ensured 
2 7
 Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff 29 A. 
2 8
 Gorlitz, Blomberg (From Hitler's Generals), 135. 
2 9
 Gorlitz, Keitel, Jodl, and Warlimont (From Hitler's Generals), 146. 
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Even Blomberg, the Defense Minister, believed that there was a need for an 
executive military power in the event of war. Like JodI he felt that the days of the army 
dominating warfare were over.28 Together with Keitel, the chief of the Wehrmachtamt, 
Blomberg advocated the creation of a Wehrmacht Operations Staff to act as a single 
overall command for all three branches. These officers liked the idea of a military 
generalissimo over this new staff, a sort of interservice Commander-in-Chief, who would 
be responsible directly to the Head of State during wartime.29 
While receptive to the idea of a Wehrmacht Operations Staff, Hitler rejected the 
concept of a generalissimo, perhaps because he saw in the proposed position a potential 
rival. Memories of the Kaiser being sidelined by Hindenburg and Ludendorff during the 
last war were still fresh. Hitler preferred the vagueness in spheres of command that a 
new Operations Staff would share with the traditional General Staff. In running the 
military with the same feudal approach he'd taken in governing the party, Hitler ensured 
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Germany's armed forces would never attain a truly unified interservice command 
structure.3 0 
Undoubtedly the officers who supported the Operations Staff concept were 
correct. In an age that was rapidly approaching mass bombing raids, extended U-boat 
campaigns, and intercontinental supply and support missions, to say nothing of battlefield 
coordination, an interservice command authority only made sense. Beck's romantic idea 
of the General Staff as the supreme military authority under the Head of State had been 
overtaken by new technology and new strategic concepts in the application of that 
technology, as well as the political realities of the Third Reich in which departmental 
ambiguity was a central feature of Hitler's rule. 
For Hitler's part he came to resent his officer corps for their caution, their 
political conservatism, and their power as a potential rival to the regime. In an address to 
young men aspiring to become army officers Hitler said, 
Every German with the privilege of bearing arms, who is 
physically and mentally healthy, and has not been punished by law, 
has all the qualifications necessary for becoming an officer.31 
Nowhere in this statement does Hitler mention intelligence, discipline, talent, or hard 
work- hallmarks of German military professionalism. Instead Hitler offers as criteria the 
bare minimum of standards- you must be German, healthy, and not a criminal. 
While Hitler's contempt for the officer class perhaps went back to his days as an 
enlisted man in World War One, it no doubt increased after his decision to remilitarize 
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France would not go to war over the move, generals like Fritsch and Beck strongly 
advised against it. After this event Hitler believed that his senior generals were all 
hopeless pessimists who lacked courage. 
The year 1938 proved to be a critical year in the development of Hitler's 
command relationship with his Army. A major crisis rocked the military structure early 
in the year that ended with two of its leaders toppled. Shortly after Defense Minister von 
Blomberg's wedding in January, Hermann Goring found evidence that his much younger 
and lower-class wife had been a prostitute. This was doubly embarrassing as the Fiihrer 
and Air Minister has been witnesses to the wedding.3 3 Within days of this bombshell, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army von Fritsch found himself falsely accused of 
homosexuality, a criminal charge under paragraph 175 of the Reich criminal code and 
grounds for dismissal from the service.3 4 Within weeks of the revelations Blomberg had 
resigned and Fritsch stepped down pending an army inquiry. 
The Blomberg-Fritsch Affair, as it came to be known, was completely unexpected 
by the Nazi leadership and Hitler dreaded the public relations implications. With the 
vulgar reasons for the two generals' dismissals Hitler gained a new level of contempt for 
the army leadership. The army as a whole felt the same way and thus Hitler was able to 
tie the army rank and file more closely to him. Guderian wrote in his memoirs that 
Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1956), 486. 
3
"' Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff 312. 
3 4
 Heinze Hohne, The Order of the Death's Head: The Story of Hitler's SS (Hamburg: Verlag der Spiegel, 
1966), 247; Williamson Murray, Werner Freiherr con Fritsch- Der Tragische General (From Die 
Militarelite Des Dritten Reiches) (Ronald Smelser, Enrico Syring, Eds.), (Berlin: Verlag Ullstein GmbH, 
1995), 166-7. 
3 5 Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1936-1945, Nemesis (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), 57-60. 
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given the circumstances Blomberg's treatment was entirely appropriate but that Fritsch 
had been railroaded. 
Fritsch's dismissal was more complicated as the Chief of the General Staff stood 
behind him. Beck, whose early admiration for Hitler had since turned to contempt, urged 
Fritsch to resist when Hitler demanded the Commander-in-Chiefs resignation. Beck 
pressed Fritsch to arrest the Fiihrer and promised him the support of the General Staff, 
regardless of its oath to Hitler. Fearing that a coup would not be successful, as well as 
37 
attaching himself to the odium of mutiny, Fritsch refused Beck's entreaties. Fritsch 
resigned and was never reinstated to his former position. He was killed by sniper fire 
during the Polish campaign in September, 1939. 
Hitler was left with a dilemma as Fritsch had been the obvious replacement for 
Blomberg. Most likely it was Goebbels who suggested that Hitler take over the post of 
Defense Minister himself. With this advice the Propaganda Minster no doubt hoped to 
block his rival Goring from taking over the Defense Ministry. Hitler took the advice, 
naming himself head of the new Wehrmacht, and raised each of the heads of the service 
branches to a ministerial position. For the sake of public relations Hitler stated that he 
had intended to do this all along but the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair had hastened his 
timetable.3 9 
On February 4, 1938, Hitler issued a decree concerning the leadership of the 
Wehrmacht, (Erlass iiber die Fuhrung der Wehrmacht): 
Guderian, Panzer Leader, 47-8. 
Dupuy, A Genius for War, 243. 
O'Neill, Fritsch, Beck, and the Fiihrer (From Hitler's Generals), 35. 
Kershaw, Hitler, 1936-1945, Nemesis, 57-60. 
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attaching himself to the odium of mutiny, Fritsch refused Beck's entreaties. Fritsch 
resigned and was never reinstated to his former position. He was killed by sniper fire 
during the Polish campaign in September, 1939.38 
Hitler was left with a dilemma as Fritsch had been the obvious replacement for 
Blomberg. Most likely it was Goebbels who suggested that Hitler take over the post of 
Defense Minister himself. With this advice the Propaganda Minster no doubt hoped to 
block his rival Goring from taking over the Defense Ministry. Hitler took the advice, 
naming himself head of the new Wehrmacht, and raised each of the heads of the service 
branches to a ministerial position. For the sake of public relations Hitler stated that he 
had intended to do this all along but the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair had hastened his 
timetable.39 
On February 4, 1938, Hitler issued a decree concerning the leadership of the 
Wehrmacht, (Erlass uber die Fuhrung der Wehrmacht) : 
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I shall personally assume command of the entire Wehrmacht henceforth. 
The present Chief of the Wehrmacht Office in the Reich Ministry of War 
shall assume its responsibilities as the 'High Command of the Wehrmacht" 
(Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW). As my military staff it shall be 
placed under my immediate control.... On my behalf, the Chief of the High 
Command of the Wehrmacht shall be granted authority previously accorded 
to the Reich Minster of War.. . 4 0 
With this decree Hitler assumed the powers of the Reich Minister of Defense. Keitel, 
Chief of Staff of OKW, now achieved a ministerial post, though he only served 
essentially as a glorified adjutant to Hitler. The OKW itself was now Hitler's personal 
military command staff.41 Over the course of the war that began the next year, OKW and 
OKH (High Command of the Army, which included the General Staff), would be pitted 
against each other in Hitler's Byzantine power structure. 
The creation of OKW as Hitler's direct military staff represented perhaps the 
greatest blow to the status and power of the General Staff since the Treaty of Versailles. 
Now competing with this rival agency, on paper at least the General Staffs influence had 
grown. The chain of command now went from Hitler as Head of State, to Hitler as Chief 
of the Wehrmacht, to the newly appointed Walther von Brauchitsch as Commander-in-
Chief of the Army, to Beck as Chief of the General Staff. Now only one office stood 
between the Chief of the General Staff and Hitler. For all that the creation of OKW 
blunted the superficial advantages. 
The rest of the year 1938 saw Hitler attaining bloodless victories over Austria and 
the Czech Sudetenland. Those generals who found Hitler's foreign policy adventures 
reckless were cowed by each such coup. One exception, the Chief of the General Staff, 
40
 Max Domarus, Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932-1945, The Chronicle of a Dictatorship, Volume 
II (Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 1992) 
4 1
 Dupuy, A Genius for War, 276. 
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Ludwig Beck, resigned during the Munich Crisis over fears that it would lead to war with 
England and France. Beck had been flirting with opposition to Hitler and eventually 
became one of the Army's principle figures of resistance. In 1938, however, if Beck 
hoped his resignation would encourage other officers to follow in protest, he was 
disappointed. Instead, Hitler continued to dominate his generals.4 2 
As these events were playing out in the German Army officers like Heinz 
Guderian and his superior Oswald Lutz were developing mobile armor tactics for the next 
war. Their hope was to reintroduce mobility onto the battlefield after the disastrous 
attrition of World War One. 4 3 This desire to create a new Bewegungskrieg, or war of 
movement, came to be called in modern parlance Blitzkrieg.44 
Similar ideas for mobile warfare and armored tactics were being floated in Soviet 
military circles. For a time, the Soviet doctrine, called Glubokii boi, Deep Battle or Deep 
Operations, was embraced by Stalin. Before long, however, chief proponents of this new 
warfare were consumed in the fires of the Soviet leader's purges. 
As Secretary General of the Communist Party, Stalin had no direct authority over 
the Red Army during the 1930s. Nevertheless Stalin was certainly the leader of the 
Soviet military as he was the undisputed head of the Communist Party and the Soviet 
state. At this time Stalin held no military rank, nor did he have the same Commander-in-
Chief status that Hitler enjoyed towards his military, yet still his word was law within the 
Dupuy, A Genius for War, 246. 
4 j
 Hart, Guderian, 28-9. 
4 4
 Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht, The German Campaigns of1942 (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2007), 4-5. 
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20 
Red Army. With the Red Army supposedly part of the larger Soviet experiment, Stalin 
interfered unapologetically in military matters. Unlike Germany under the Nazis, the 
Soviet Union in the 1930s was a society where most citizens were completely isolated 
from the outside world. A central part of this isolationism was the idea that Stalin could 
do no wrong. The idea of Stalin's moral supremacy had a devastating result within the 
Red Army. 4 6 
Stalin had a love/hate relationship with the Red Army during the 1930s. He 
valued the institution as a political force for communist education, and perhaps even 
looked upon it with the traditional pride of the statesman toward his military. Like Hitler, 
however, Stalin also harbored a deep distrust of his generals. This came about as a result 
of his experiences during the Civil War with former Tsarist officers that Lenin had 
insisted were necessary to build Soviet Communism, at least in the short term. 
During the Civil War Stalin had served as a political officer attached to major 
formations of the Red Army and had gained a reputation as an inflexible and harsh figure 
with little regard for the lives of soldiers. He often ordered ill prepared counter-attacks 
and called for the dismissal of commanders less reckless than himself. His careless use 
of Red Army troops drew ire from Lenin and the Central Committee in Moscow, but his 
results ensured his continued position. From 1918 Stalin affected a military style dress 
John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, Stalin's War with Germany, Volume One (London: Cassell, 
1975), 15. 
4 6
 Merridale, Ivan's War, 30. 
4 7
 David M. Glantz & Jonathan House, When Titan's Clashed, How the Red Army Stopped Hitler 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1995), 6, 11; Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, 75-6. 
4 8
 Overy, Russia's War, 2. 
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21 
and began carrying a gun. Though he had no technical military training, Stalin enjoyed 
playing the part of general.4 9 
One such commander who resented Stalin's recklessness with Red Army troops 
was Mikhail Tukhachevsky, a brilliant officer who drew Stalin's ire when, during the 
Soviet invasion of Poland in 1920, the army under their joint command failed to take 
Warsaw. Each man blamed the other for the lack of cavalry units and the subsequent 
disaster.5 0 
During the late 1920s and early 1930s Tukhachevsky and other officers began to 
develop a new theory of armored warfare that closely paralleled the German 
Bewegungskrieg tactics. Drawing on lessons from the 1920 failure in Poland and 
Ludendorff s failures in 1918, Tukhachevsky and Soviet military theorist V. K. 
Triandafillov created the concept of Deep Operations. This new form of warfare called 
for massive penetrations of the enemy line by infantry and armor in concert with artillery 
and planes. With projected penetrations of over one hundred kilometers, the Soviet force 
would then exploit the enemy's disarray and confusion and deny it the opportunity to 
reform their lines. Perhaps the important idea within the concept of Deep Operations was 
the theory of Operational Art. Operational Art proposed, in a practical, command-
oriented way, that senior officers interpret the means to achieve strategic results through 
military operations and battle tactics. This theory gave a new importance and power to 
senior officers that eventually put the Red Army leadership at odds with Stalin.5 1 
Robert Service, Stalin, A Biography (Cambridge: Belknap Harvard, 2004), 167, 170. 
5 0
 Ian Kershaw, Fateful Choices, Ten Decisions that Changed the World, 1940-1941 (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2007), 247. 
5 1
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Stalin initially supported this concept and diverted much of the Soviet Union's resources 
to defense, particularly tank production.5 2 Indeed, Stalin was so taken with the necessity 
of rearmament that he appointed Tukhachevsky Chief of Armaments, a position in which 
he surrounded himself with military modernizers and believers of Deep Operations/ 
Stalin's paranoia and fear of potential rivals came to full flower in mid 1936 when 
mass arrests of citizens in the upper strata of Soviet society began. For the next two years 
senior and mid-level communists alike shared the fear of denunciation, arrest, prison, 
torture and death.5 4 Of the 1,966 delegates to the 17t h Party Congress in 1934, the so-
called 'Congress of Victors' for its achievement in the field of industry, 1,108 were shot 
only a few years later.5 5 Stalin was liquidating anyone that posed a threat to his 
stranglehold of power, and no institution posed a greater potential threat to Stalin's rule 
than the Red Army. 
The mid 1930s had witnessed a growing institutional independence for the Red 
Army. In early 1934 dual command between military commanders and political 
commissars was abolished. The need for rigid oversight of former Tsarist technical 
experts was no longer deemed necessary, relegating the commissar to a mere advisory 
role. Additionally, old army ranks were reintroduced, excluding that of general, in 
193 5 . 5 6 This new independence for the Red Army produced a powerful and dangerous 
rival for Stalin and the Soviet dictator included the military in his wider program of 
repression and terror. 
Overy, The Dictators, 469-70. 
Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution, 165. 
Robert Conquest, The Great Terror, A Reassessment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 31. 
Ibid., 185-6. 
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In 1936 Tukhachevsky and Stalin's crony Kliment Voroshilov were promoted to 
the new rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union along with three other officers. 
Tukhachevsky was named First Deputy Commissar of Defense, serving under the 
incompetent Voroshilov. When Tukhachevsky's circle of military followers attempted to 
oust to Voroshilov from his position that same year, it represented an entirely new level 
of military initiative and power in relation to the party. Stalin recognized this. 
As in all important matters of state, Stalin believed that his ideas must be pre­
eminent within the Red Army. He resented Tukhachevsky's encouragement of creative 
thinking and the Operational Art among officers, seeing in it the seeds of treason. At one 
point in 1934 Stalin even refused Tukhachevsky permission to teach his new theories to 
other officers. Tukhachevsky's outspokenness and his public views about an eventual 
German invasion of the Soviet Union further angered Stalin and ensured that when the 
58 
Soviet dictator moved against the Red Army the marshal would be the first to suffer. 
Toward the end of 1936 the NKVD began the preparatory work for the purge of 
the military. Arrests and torture were common in the quest to link officers with 
treasonous plots. On May 22 of the following year Tukhachevsky was arrested and, with 
Stalin's instruction, tortured. Over the next few days nearly one thousand senior officers 
and political commissars were arrested.5 9 
Unlike the previous purges against the regime's supposed political enemies, the 
purge against the Red Army leadership came in a sudden, shocking blow, without any 
5 7
 Overy, The Dictators, 470. 
5 8
 Shimon Naveh, Tukhachevsky (From Stalin's Generals), (Harold Shukman, Ed.), (New York: Grove 
Press, 1993), 266-7. 
5 9
 Robert Gellately, Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler, The Age of Social Catastrophe (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 
2007), 275. 
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Toward the end of 1936 the NKVD began the preparatory work for the purge of 
the military. Arrests and torture were common in the quest to link officers with 
treasonous plots. On May 22 of the following year Tukhachevsky was arrested and, with 
Stalin's instruction, tortured. Over the next few days nearly one thousand senior officers 
and political commissars were arrested. 59 
Unlike the previous purges against the regime's supposed political enemies, the 
purge against the Red Army leadership came in a sudden, shocking blow, without any 
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propaganda buildup. The sudden announcement of treachery among the senior officers 
and their speedy executions lent itself to the rouse that there had been an actual and 
imminent military coup that required quick, decisive act-ion. In addition to 
Tukhachevsky, victims of the purge included the commanders of two military districts, 
the head of the Military Academy, the head of the Red Army Administration, the head of 
the Red Army Political Administration, and many others.6 0 Mid-level victims included 
virtually every one of sixty-seven corps commanders. In many cases the families of the 
executed victims were also tried and shot. In all over 33,000 officers were relieved of 
ft 1 
command, with at least 7,000 of them arrested. 
A few weeks before Tukhachevsky's arrest the principle of dual command had 
been reinstated. The Red Army's move toward a more independent institutional status 
was curtailed as political commissars were once again given shared responsibilities with 
military commanders. This, in concert with the purges, firmly placed control of the Red 
Army back into the hands of Communist Party, which itself was firmly in the hands of 
Josef Stalin. For the next few years the purges continued on a much smaller scale as a 
reminder to those officers who still longed for greater institutional independence for the 
Red Army. 6 3 
Thus we see by the time of the outbreak of the Second World War Stalin had 
effectively gutted the Red Army of those with combat experience and military education. 
The force that was left was entirely cowed and lived in fear of Stalin's dreaded NKVD. 
Conquest, The Great Terror, 182, 187. 
6 1
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6 2
 Conquest, The Great Terror, 194. 
6 3
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A few weeks before Tukhachevsky's arrest the principle of dual command had 
been reinstated. The Red Army's move toward a more independent institutional status 
was curtailed as political commissars were once again given shared responsibilities with 
military commanders.62 This, in concert with the purges, firmly placed control of the Red 
Army back into the hands of Communist Party, which itself was firmly in the hands of 
Josef Stalin. For the next few years the purges continued on a much smaller scale as a 
reminder to those officers who still longed for greater institutional independence for the 
Red Army.63 
Thus we see by the time of the outbreak of the Second World War Stalin had 
effectively gutted the Red Army of those with combat experience and military education. 
The force that was left was entirely cowed and lived in fear of Stalin' s dreaded NKVD. 
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As a political body tied to the great Soviet experiment, there was not room in the Red 
Army for true military talents like Tukhachevsky. Stalin's purges created a crisis in 
higher military leadership that would not be corrected until well into the Great Patriotic 
War when the Soviet Union was fighting for its very existence. 
The practical applications of Deep Operations, which in fact were not only 
mirrored in Germany but also to a lesser extent in France and England, took a backseat to 
Stalin's political considerations. At the time of the purges Stalin either didn't feel that a 
German attack was imminent or he believed that Soviet defenses were strong enough to 
repel an invader without Tukhachevsky's military innovations. The marshal's arrest 
occurred over two years before the German Blitzkrieg victories in Poland and France. 
Given his lack of military technical expertise, his own amateurish performance during the 
Civil War, and his willingness to execute his most brilliant military leader, Stalin perhaps 
believed that the next war would be not terribly dissimilar from World War One and the 
Civil War in terms of battlefield operations. 
Years before Stalin was executing the officers behind the new armored tactics, 
Hitler was telling his armored specialists, "That is what I need."6 4 Like the Soviet Union, 
the Nazi regime had its tensions with the Army, and though Hitler may have rhetorically 
ranted about doing away with his generals, in fact only two, the erstwhile chancellor von 
Schleicher and his compatriot Kurt von Bredow, were murdered before the war. 
The conditions under which these two generals were killed bear some resemblance to the 
conditions under which Tukhachevsky and the Soviet officers were executed. Schleicher 
Hart, Guderian, 32. 
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and Bredow were gunned down by SS execution squads during the 1934 Knight of the 
Long Knives, Hitler's settling of accounts with Ernst Rohm and the SA leadership. Hitler 
justified his actions under the pretence that the SA was preparing for an imminent coup 
and therefore swift action had to be taken to protect the state. Stalin's sudden arrest and 
execution of the Red Army leadership in 1937 was explained exactly the same way, with 
Tukhachevsky playing the role of Rohm. 
To be sure, there were important differences between the Soviet and Nazi military 
murders. Just as in the Soviet case, the murder of Schleicher and Bredow took place 
within the larger context of Nazi political housecleaning. The Nazi move, however, was 
directed against the SA, a major rival of the German Army. In fact, Hitler's purge of the 
radical wing of his own party was a conciliatory move toward the Army. For the most 
part, German Army officers accepted the deaths of the two generals as the price of doing 
business and gave it no more thought. Two exceptions were the aged Field Marshal von 
Mackensen who believed the honor of the Army was at stake, and former Army 
Commander-in-Chief General Hammerstein-Equord, who was a friend of the murdered 
officers. The two men objected loudly to the killings until Hitler admitted privately to a 
select group of generals that the murders had been a mistake.6 6 
By contrast, the Soviet purge was directed against the Red Army leadership in a 
move to subordinate the military to the party and recreate the political/military 
relationship of the Civil War era. This was not a move to placate the Red Army, but to 
Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power, 322-4. 
Laffin, Jackboot, 172. 
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dominate it. Additionally, no figures such as Mackensen and Hammerstein-Equord 
appeared in the Soviet Union to speak up for those unjustly murdered. 
This tells volumes about the two regimes and their relationship to their militaries. 
Before the war both dictators walked a tightrope with their military leadership. Both 
required the power of strong armies for purposes of defense, real and perceived, and to 
prepare for their aggressive adventures. Where Hitler's regime negotiated an alliance 
with the German Army, however, Stalin's regime simply smashed those elements in the 
Red Army that it feared. For all their differences, however, both the Nazi purge and the 
Soviet purge bound the militaries much tighter to the dictators. 
With the arrival of the Second World War these political/military relationships 
had profound consequences. Hitler's co-opting of the German Army allowed him to 
conquer virtually all of continental Europe despite his divide-and-conquer methods of 
command. Stalin's decapitation of the Red Army led to military disaster in Finland and 
catastrophe two years later as German panzers rolled across Soviet plains. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PRELUDE TO THE EASTERN FRONT 
Hitler's Victories 
The relationship of the two dictators to their military leaderships intensified in 
1939 as both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union embarked upon wars of aggression. 
For Hitler this meant military triumph in Poland and Western Europe despite his divided 
command arrangement with his generals. For Stalin it meant military humiliation at the 
hands of a small arctic nation which everyone expected to quickly surrender. The first 
two years of World War Two had a profound impact on the later war in Russia and 
illustrate the evolving command systems that would come head to head in 1941. 
General Franz Haider became Chief of the General Staff after Beck's departure in 
1938. As a Bavarian, and therefore thought to be a Catholic, Hitler had only reluctantly 
allowed Haider to be Beck's deputy on the General Staff. A General of Artillery, like so 
many others in the army leadership, Haider soon proved himself and intelligent and 
capable Chief of the General Staff.67 
Haider shared many of Beck's critical views of Hitler's military policies. Indeed, 
he told Brauchitsch after the Commander-in-Chief had asked him to take on the post that 
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he was just as opposed to Hitler's reckless foreign policy as was Beck, and like his 
predecessor he intended to fight it. 
On March 24, 1939 Britain and France issued their guarantee to Poland. One 
week later Haider was ordered by Hitler to oversee the preparation by the General Staff 
of a plan for the invasion of Poland.6 9 The army ran the Polish campaign with minimal 
interference from Hitler. On occasion Hitler made suggestions to Brauchitsch and 
Haider, but never gave direct orders. In fact Haider reported that during the operation he 
70 
never had one telephone conversation with Hitler or OKW in an operational capacity. 
For Haider this was as it should have been- the General Staff engaged in its traditional 
role of war planning and execution. This showed little of the problems that were to 
develop the next year as OKW began its expansion into war planning at Hitler's order. 
For the first time and the last time in the war an operation was to be handled exclusively 
71 
by OKH, not to some degree by OKW. 
In his memoirs Field Marshal Erich von Manstein noted that it was after the fall 
of Poland that OKH and the General Staff, were eclipsed by OKW as Hitler's primary 
war policy agency. This stemmed from Hitler's desire to attack France before winter and 
79 
the little enthusiasm that OKH showed for the decision. By the conclusion of the Polish 
campaign Hitler ordered the invasion of the west as a directive not through OKH, but 
through OKW, though the newly created agency was not prepared to plan an operation of 
this magnitude. This represented a humiliating downgrading of standing for Brauchitsch, 
6 8
 Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff 331. 
6 9
 Moiser, Cross of Iron, 123. 
7 0
 Brian Bond, Brauchitsch (From Hitler's Generals), 80. 
7 1
 Gorlitz, Keitel, Jodl, & Warlimont (From Hitler's Generals), 158. 
7 2
 Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (St. Paul: Zenith Press, 1955) 71. 
     
 68 
   -   ·
  l        
     69      
        
l    l     
never had one telephone conversation with Hitler or OKW in an operational capacity.7o 
For Halder this was as it should have been- the General Staff engaged in its traditional 
role of war planning and execution. This showed little of the problems that were to 
develop the next year as OKW began its expansion into war planning at Hitler' s order. 
For the first time and the last time in the war an operation was to be handled exclusively 
by OKH, not to some degree by OKW.71 
In his memoirs Field Marshal Erich von Manstein noted that it was after the fall 
of Poland that OKH and the General Staff, were eclipsed by OKW as Hitler's primary 
war policy agency. This st mmed from Hitler' s desire to attack France before winter and 
the little enthusiasm t at OKH showed for he decision.72 By the conclusion of the Polish 
campaign Hitler ordered the invasion of the west as a directive not through OKH, but 
through OKW, though the newly created agency was not prepared to plan an operation of 
this magnitude. This represented a humiliating downgrading of standing for Brauchitsch, 
68 arlitz, istory f the er an eneral Staff, 331 . 
69 oiser, ross f Iron, 123. 
70 rian ond, rauchitsch ( ro  itler 's enerals), 80 . 
71 arlitz, eitel, Jodi,  arli ont ( ro  itler's enerals), 158 . 
72 rich von anstein, ost ictories ( t. aul : enith ress, 1955) 71. 
30 
and by extension Haider. The two went from being senior military advisors to mere 
functionaries charged with carrying out another agency's war plans. Hitler's frustration 
grew into outright disdain for the army leadership. At one meeting Hitler remarked to 
those around as Brauchitsch entered the room, "Here comes my Coward number one." 
When Haider followed Hitler said, "Number two." He also lectured the officers on the 
defeatist "spirit of Zossen."7 4 By this time clearly the Chief of the General's Staffs star 
was beginning to fall with Hitler. 
About this time General Stiipnagel, a Hitler resister of the Beck school, 
approached Haider about joining the clandestine opposition. Haider, perhaps seeking a 
neutral way to decline, refused to join without the complicity of Brauchitsch. He also 
refused Stiipnagel's advice to arrest the Commander-in-Chief of the Army if he failed to 
go along with the conspirators. By early November Haider had lost his stomach for 
serious intrigue against Hitler. At a meeting on the 5 t h Hitler singled out the General 
Staff for its timidity, which he no doubt equated with treason. Hearing this Haider 
burned incriminating documents and fired Nazi resisters on the General Staff. Manstein 
wrote in his memoirs that Haider's flirtation with the resistance worked against his 
professional abilities as Chief of the General Staff, and that while it may not have 
• • • • • 76 
compromised his position in peacetime, it did once the war began. 
Haider's flirtation with the resistance to Hitler was easily severed, perhaps 
because he was never a truly dedicated opponent of the regime. His opposition, such as it 
Bond, Brauchitsch (From Hitler's Generals), 81-2. 
Ibid., 82-3. 
Miiller, Witzleben, Stiipnagel, and Speidel (From Hitler's Generals), 53-4. 
Manstein, Lost Victories, 80-1. 
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was, probably stemmed more from his battles with OKW and other military and political 
agencies within the Third Reich than it did from any high minded ideological decency. 
After Haider's neutral reaction to the atrocities committed in Poland, it is safe to say that 
his opposition to Hitler was not based on disgust over the mass killings perpetrated by the 
77 
SS and German police units. 
Manstein said that Haider and Brauchitsch were equals in ability and tended to 
agree with one another out of a sincere belief in each other's judgment. He goes on to 
write of the Chief of the General Staff, 
Haider had a remarkable grasp of every aspect of staff duties and 
was a tireless worker into the bargain. A saying of Moltke's 'Genius 
is diligence,' might well have been his motto. Yet this man hardly 
• • 78 
glowed with the sacred fire that is said to inspire really great soldiers. 
In preparing for the advance into France Haider offered a plan that, on the surface, 
looked much like Schleiffen's. In fact Haider's plan, titled Gelb (Yellow), differed in 
many ways, not the least of which was its northern advance route and less dynamic 
scope. Serving as von Rundstedt's Chief of Staff for Army Group A, Erich von Manstein 
offered an alternative plan that called for armor units penetrating the Ardennes forest 
region of Belgium and France. This plan was eventually named Sichelschnitt (Sickle 
79 
Cut). Initially Haider opposed the idea, believing the Ardennes impassable to armor 
forces, and had even rejected a similar proposal from Hitler himself. However, 
meticulous technocrat that he was, Haider ordered the plan to be studied. 
Ronald Smelser & Edward Davies II, The Myth of the Eastern Front: The Nazi-Soviet War in American 
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In January, 1940 a chance crash landing by two Luftwaffe officers in Belgian 
territory led to the Allies obtaining the plans for Gelb and requiring Germany to rethink 
its strategy. By early the next month Hitler, who had been impressed with Manstein's 
ideas, officially backed Sichelschnitt.S] Haider, the Chief of the General Staff, had 
watched as his plan was set aside by Hitler in favor of what appeared to be a reckless, 
risky strategy by a junior staff officer serving in the field. 
Meanwhile Hitler's eyes were fixed on Norway. For this operation, slated for 
April, he kept OKH largely out of the loop. In addition to the work of the OKW 
Operations Staff, a single army corps HQ was used. Perhaps Hitler selected OKW to 
plan and carry out this operation precisely because it would require not only army and air 
force units, but navy as well. After all, OKW was created to act as a supreme inter-
service command staff under Hitler. This move was a slap in the face to OKH and Hitler 
no doubt entrusted OKW with the mission no less for their supposed interservice 
authority than as a way to insult Brauchitsch, Haider, and the General Staff for their foot 
dragging the previous fall over the French attack. With bitterness Haider wrote in his 
diary, "Not a single word passed between the Fiihrer and the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army on this subject. Get that on records for the war historians." 
The triumph over France was undoubtedly Germany's greatest victory of the 
Second World War and it occurred about the same time that Brauchitsch authored a 
decree calling for closer ties between the Army and the Nazi party. The campaign cost 
Home, To Lose a Battle, 160-1, 192. 
Bond, Brauchitsch (From Hitler's Generals), 84. 
Overy, The Dictators, 533. 
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the Germans only 156,000 causalities, and around 30,000 dead. By the time of France's 
fall Haider had already begun planning for a peacetime army of twenty-four panzer 
85 
divisions, twelve motorized divisions, and between thirty and forty other divisions. In a 
speech to the Reichstag on July 19, 1940 celebrating the new conquest Hitler elevated 
twelve officers to the rank of Field Marshal, among them Brauchitsch, Leeb, Keitel, 
Reichenau, and Rundstedt.8 6 Conspicuously absent from the promotions was Chief of the 
General Staff Haider. In fact, of the four principal Chiefs of the General Staff during the 
Third Reich none would rise higher than Colonel-General. 
While Haider had not lost the complete confidence of Hitler the relationship 
between the two was undoubtedly strained. From the Fiihrer's point of view Haider had 
delayed attacking France immediately following the conquest of Poland, had written off 
Manstein's plan as unworkable, and was pessimistic about Britain's surrender after the 
fall of France.8 7 
Manstein himself was critical of both Brauchitsch and Haider after the fall of 
France for not providing a clear strategic plan for ending the war- either through a 
OO 
diplomatic offensive to win the peace, or through military options. To top it off many 
younger officers within the General Staff felt that Manstein, whose plan had defeated 
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France and who had proved his superior ability with armor operations, should replace 
Haider.8 9 
So even before the great test of Russia, Haider's star was beginning to fade. 
Haider was undoubtedly a technical expert who competently orchestrated the military 
will of Hitler. Lacking in a superior strategic vision, however, Haider was dependent 
upon the one man who began to hold him in such contempt. 
Hitler undoubtedly began the war as a strategic thinker, someone who looks at the 
larger dimensions of the conflict and seeks to win the war, not just the next battle or 
campaign. Hitler's generals were, by and large, men of great operational talent, but not 
strategic thinkers in the sense of a Napoleon, an Alexander, or even a Schlieffen. This is 
a main theme of John Moiser's 2006 book, Cross of Iron, The Rise and Fall of the 
German War Machine, 1918-1945. For the most part Mosier makes a compelling 
argument, but leaves out the fact that at the time Hitler could be just as prone to wishful 
thinking and unfounded optimism as Ludendorff. Indeed, after the fall of the Sixth Army 
at Stalingrad in early 1943 Hitler's strategic sense had seemed to abandon him almost 
entirely. 
Hitler did show a grand strategic view that few if any of his generals possessed. 
For instance in early 1940 when Guderian briefed Hitler on the plans for his panzer 
corps' crossing of the Meuse River, long considered the major obstacle in the campaign, 
Hitler asked, "And then what are you going to do?" This illustrates that Hitler's thinking 
B. H. Liddel Hart, The German Generals Talk (New York: Quill, 1948), 114. 
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was already moving beyond the next battle or the next campaign, but indeed was fixed on 
crushing France.9 0 
Additionally Guderian notes a dinner celebration shortly after the fall of Poland 
where he was awarded his Knight's Cross. There Hitler quizzed him about his feelings 
regarding the non-aggression pact with the USSR. Guderian stated that he felt relieved 
that Germany would not be fighting a two front war. Hitler was visibly disappointed at 
this answer.9 1 Even then Hitler was looking at the invasion of the Soviet Union as the 
only sure road to building his empire and removing all European threats to it. And as is 
demonstrated later many of Hitler's decisions during the war in Russia illustrate his 
strategic understanding of the situation. 
Hitler also thought out of the traditional box when it came to strategy. It was 
Hitler who backed officers who were innovators in their fields. Even before Manstein's 
Sichelschnitt Hitler had come up with a similar idea. In fact Hitler had backed 
Guderian's ideas in panzer operations since early 1934. He had even encouraged 
General Kurt Student's attempts to use airborne troops as a way to overcome the Maginot 
Line and Belgian defenses in the west. 9 4 In his desire to win the next war, Hitler was 
open to new ideas that the technical experts were advocating, and he alone was able to 
merge them into effective new directions. 
Hitler was perhaps Germany's greatest strategic thinker, but he lacked the 
technical brilliance of the trained specialist officer. While he was consumed with the big 
9 0
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picture, he could not see the smaller details with the clarity of a Beck, Haider, Zeitzler, or 
Guderian. Although his political intuition had served him well in the past, it proved 
wildly inconsistent during the war. Hitler's belief that one good kick would bring the 
whole rotten structure of the Soviet Union crashing down begins to sound more and more 
like Ludendorff s confidence that the western Allies were on their last legs by early 1918. 
Both men based their political assessments on their hopes, not the reality. 
So it appears that Hitler was a strategist and not a technician. Even he was not a 
strategist of the caliber of Schlieffen, or even Moltke the Younger, however. Hitler was a 
flawed strategist who, as will be shown, increasingly meddled in the realm of the 
technician and the specialist with disastrous results. 
During the Weimar period von Seeckt selected the officers for the 100,000 man 
army. In seeking to create a technically competent army along General Staff lines Seeckt 
had picked officers that were technical specialists in their fields. Often this meant that 
these officers weren't merely apolitical, but were in fact politically naive. This was one 
of the major reasons why Hitler was able to dominate the officer corps as a class so 
effectively. Nietzsche's concept of die Herde adequately describes Hitler's feelings 
toward those officers who blindly followed him. 9 5 
Hitler's relationship with the army was always tinged with caution- the army 
remained throughout the Third Reich the one institution that could conceivably 
overthrow him. Another way that Hitler bound his generals to him was through outright 
bribery. Out of a secret Chancellery account Hitler 'rewarded' many of his generals with 
Mosier, Cross of Iron, 43-4, 136. 
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cash gifts. Brauchitsch himself received 80,000 Reichsmarks from Hitler, allowing him 
to obtain a divorce quietly and marry a new wife and avoid a repetition of the personal 
drama that had sealed Blomberg's fate.9 6 Guderian received an even larger amount for 
his service to the Third Reich, perhaps the largest single bribe of any general during the 
97 
war. Promotion itself was used as a form of bribery. By the end of the war Hitler had a 
Q O 
total of no less than fifty-three field marshals and colonel-generals. 
So in addition to their oath, outright bribery kept Hitler's officers bound to the 
regime. And also, lingering in the shadows, there was the threat of Gestapo action- if not 
outright arrest then a Fritsch-like blackmail. 
Stalin's Setbacks 
In addition to the Red Army purge another factor seriously hampered the 
efficiency of the Soviet military before its entrance into the Second World War- an 
enormous expansion that was not properly prepared for. In the two and a half years 
before the German invasion 161 new Red Army divisions had been created. The rapid 
increase in the number of units meant that by 1941 three-fourths of Red Army officers 
had held their commissions for less than a year, and ensured that roughly eighty percent 
of the officers purged three years earlier were reinstated. The Soviet military was one of 
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quantity, not quality. 
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war. Promotion itself was used as a form of bribery. By the end of the war Hitler had a 
total of no less than fifty-three field marshals and colonel-generals.98 
So in addition to their oath, outright bribery kept Hitler's officers bound to the 
regime. And also, lingering in the shadows, there was the threat of Gestapo action- if not 
outright arrest then a Fritsch-like blackmail. 
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As he had no formal command mechanism as yet, Stalin commanded the Red 
Army in 1939 informally through the People's Commissar of Defense, Kliment 
Voroshilov. Like Wilhelm Keitel in Germany, Voroshilov was a crony of the dictator 
without much real military talent. 1 0 0 Khruschev reportedly said of him years later that he 
was "the biggest bag of shit in the army." 1 0 1 The Soviet dictator had first met Voroshilov 
when the two men were delegates to the Fourth Party Congress in Stockholm in 1906 and 
boarded together at the Hotel Bristol. Essentially, Voroshilov served as Stalin's 
number one Red Army yes-man in a system that valued political orthodoxy and complete 
compliance to the dictator's will more than military ability. 
During the 18 t h Party Congress in March, 1939, Voroshilov cited the works of 
Lenin, Stalin, and von Clausewitz when he made the declaration that the Red Army was 
• • 103 • 
invincible. About the same time Voroshilov concluded, based on the experience of 
Red Army volunteers in the Spanish Civil War, that there was no need for separate 
armored units. Rather, tanks were split up among the infantry. Voroshilov concluded 
that this would increase the defensive capabilities of the Red Army just as the German 
Army was about to prove its dreaded panzer divisions in the field.1 0 4 This flew in the 
face of Tukhachevsky's theory of Deep Operations and ensured military disaster later that 
year. Though the Red Army no doubt gained some prestige by occupying eastern Poland 
David M. Glantz, Colossus Reborn, The Red Army at War, 1941-1943 (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2005), 386. 
1 0 1
 Overy, Russia's War, 57. 
1 0 2
 Service, Stalin, 61 . 
1 ( b
 John Erickson, The Soviet High Command, A Military-Political History, 1918-1941 (London: Frank 
Cass Publishers, 1962), 511. 
1 0 4
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in September in conjunction with the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, it was far from 
invincible. 
In November 1939 the Red Army went to war. Using border clashes with Finland 
as a thinly veiled excuse for aggression, the Soviet Union declared war and prepared to 
demonstrate that in military operations it was every bit the equal of Hitler's Wehrmacht. 
Shaposhnikov objected to the invasion of Finland on the grounds that the necessary 
weapons and units were not readily available for the assault. Shaposhnikov's sober 
concerns were brushed aside by Stalin, who at this point showed no real military 
understanding at all. Instead, Stalin listened to his crony Voroshilov who insisted that the 
Leningrad Military District, the military command unit bordering Finland, contained 
everything the invasion required.1 0 5 The district's commander, Kirill Meretskov, agreed 
with Shaposhnikov, stating: 
The terrain of coming operations is split by lakes, rivers, swamps, and 
is almost entirely covered by forests.... The proper use of our forces will 
be difficult. It is criminal to believe that our task will be easy, or only like 
a march. . . 1 0 6 
Even in the light of competent military argument favoring caution from 
Shaposhnikov and Meretskov, Voroshilov defiantly told Stalin that Soviet tanks would be 
in Helsinki within a week. 1 0 7 Khrushchev later stated, "He (Stalin) was sure all we had to 
1 0 5
 William R. Trotter, A Frozen Hell, The Russo-Finnish War of1939-40 (Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books 
of Chapel Hill, 1991),34. 
1 0 6
 Ibid. 
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do was fire a few artillery rounds and the Finns would capitulate. Instead, they rejected 
our terms and resisted." 
The war against Finland was a military disaster, a sharp contrast to Germany's 
lighting victory over Poland only a few months earlier. Voroshilov planned the operation 
along with another Stalin crony, Lev Mekhlis, who was a party propagandist and not a 
military man. 1 0 9 The two men had not even consulted Soviet intelligence for maps of the 
invasion area. 1 1 0 The Soviets attacked Finland with nearly 1.2 million men, 1,500 tanks, 
and 3,000 aircraft. The Finnish defense was much tougher than the proponents of the 
attack expected and leadership of Red Army units in the field left much to be desired. 
Coordination between Soviet formations was dreadful. Casualties were high and the 
Finn's Mannereheim Line was nowhere breached.1 1 1 
Stalin was appalled. He said, 
Why aren't we advancing? Ineffective military operations may hurt our 
policies. The whole world is watching us. The authority of the Red Army 
is the guarantee of the USSR's security. If we get bogged down for a long 
time in the face of such a week adversary, we will encourage the anti-
119 
Soviet forces of the imperialist circles. 
Khrushchev recalled a scene in late December where Stalin and Voroshilov hurled blame 
for the debacle toward each other. The argument culminated in the Defense Commissar 
• • 113 
throwing a platter carrying a stuffed pig across the table. Stalin quickly took charge of 
William Taubman, Khrushchev, The Man and His Era (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2003), 
141. 
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 John Lukacs, The Last European War, September 1939- December 1941 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1976), 270. 
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1 1 1
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the military situation by dismissing Voroshilov from overall command of the operation 
and appointing Semon Timoshenko to crack the Finnish defenses. Meretskov was 
demoted to command the 7 t h Army. January was a month for regrouping and preparing a 
new mass assault with a half a million soldiers. 1 1 4 The attack commenced in mid-
February and the Mannerheim Line was breached, compelling Finland to sue for peace. 
Stalin's hopes of spreading Soviet style communism were dashed when the 
Finnish Communist Party abandoned its solidarity with Moscow and joined the struggle 
against the USSR. Stalin was forced to create a new Finnish Soviet government that he 
hoped to put in place in Helsinki. Stalin was forced to abandon installing his puppet 
regime in Finland because he feared this would stiffen Finnish resistance and protract the 
struggle, giving Britain and France or even Germany time to intervene in what he hoped 
to keep a localized conflict.1 1 6 
The fighting was costly and exposed the weakness of the Red Army to the world. 
One Red Army officer supposedly lamented that just enough land had been won from 
117 
Finland to bury the Soviet dead. Khrushchev later said of the Winter War in Finland, 
118 
"A victory at such a cost was actually a moral defeat." 
Stalin's actions during the Finnish war tell us much about him. For instance, 
Stalin was only too ready to accept Voroshilov's arguments for an attack. This is no 
doubt because the People's Commissar was only telling Stalin what he wanted to hear. 
Michael Antonucci, Thermopylae Every Day, World War II Magazine (Leesburg: Primedia, April, 
2004), 30. 
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Stalin's desire to demonstrate the Red Army's power to the world was his paramount 
consideration. In his view this was to be the Soviet equivalent of Germany's rapid 
conquest of Poland. Given the always present memories of the Allied invasion of the 
newly born Soviet state in 1918, Stalin wished a quick demonstration of Soviet power to 
dispel any thoughts by the Western nations of another anti-Soviet adventure. In this 
sense, we see the Finnish war as a move by the Soviet leader to prevent an even greater 
conflict, most likely on Soviet soil, later on. 
This was a political decision to demonstrate the might of the Red Army. It was a 
decision Stalin reached on the strategic level- a small war now to prevent a large war 
later. As Hitler would learn years later with the Wehrmacht mired in the Russian steppes, 
however, strategic plans require operational feasibility. This is the realm of the military 
technical specialist. Stalin had no time for questions of logistics or supply, mobility or 
tactics. Unwilling to listen to the sound advice of Shaposhnikov or Meretskov, Stalin's 
wishful thinking doomed the adventure and proved the exact opposite of what he had 
hoped- that the Red Army was an effective and efficient military giant. 
Stalin learned from his mistake. As the situation before the Mannerheim Line 
grew critical, he replaced his political crony Voroshilov with the militarily competent 
Timoshenko. This illustrates a theme that was to characterize Stalin's command over the 
Red Army during the Second World War. While at peace he felt it entirely appropriate to 
place politically reliable nonentities in key Red Army positions, no doubt to ensure the 
institution's loyalty. Once the fighting had commenced, however, Stalin was willing to 
put men of real ability in positions of power in the interests of defeating the enemy. 
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Though publicly Stalin was the ultimate military genius, he knew he was no technical 
specialist and sought out those who were. 
What else is telling about Stalin's behavior in this episode is his subsequent 
behavior toward Voroshilov. After the failure to achieve a quick victory over Finland, 
Voroshilov was replaced in command by Timoshenko, and later removed as People's 
Commissar for Defense. He was not arrested and put on trial, nor was he quietly 
executed. One would expect after the colossal failure of the Red Army before the 
Mannerheim Line that Voroshilov would have suffered the fate of Tukhachevsky. If 
Khrushchev's account of Voroshilov's argument with Stalin is to be believed, the fact 
that Voroshilov was not arrested seems even more bizarre. 
In fact Stalin continued to use Voroshilov throughout the Second World War in 
various capacities. This illustrates that Stalin, ever the paranoid cynic, perhaps felt a 
touch of loyalty to some of his officers, or, much more likely, felt he had nothing to fear 
from them. The arrest and execution of Tukhachevsky may have had a personal 
dimension to it, the memory of the failure before Warsaw in 1920 still in Stalin's mind. 
At the end of the day, however, the purge against the Red Army was a political assault on 
a part of the Soviet experiment which was in the process of moving away from political 
control. To move against Voroshilov or other supporters of the attack on Finland, was 
not necessary. Other figures could be written off as scapegoats. Stalin did not admit his 
mistake in the manner that Lenin did after the Polish debacle in 1920 when he stated, "I 
absolutely do not pretend in the slightest fashion to knowledge of military science." 1 1 9 
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Finally, the Finnish war illustrates that Stalin was willing to abandon communist 
orthodoxy when necessary. The creation of a Finnish communist puppet government fit 
in well with Soviet aspirations of spreading socialism abroad. When the real possibility 
of Western intervention in the Soviet-Finnish war materialized Stalin was willing to 
discard his Finnish government in waiting and create a separate peace with Finland. 
When practical considerations clashed with Soviet ideology, Stalin showed his ability to 
120 
do what was necessary instead of blindly holding the party line. 
The German victory over France and the Low Countries in 1940 gave Stalin much 
to think about. "Couldn't they have put up any resistance at all," said Stalin to 
Khrushchev, referring to France. "Now he's going to beat our brains in!" Khrushchev 
notes that Stalin was severely agitated over the German triumph in the West, cursing the 
121 
British and French for allowing his ostensible ally such a complete victory. 
At the same time German panzers were rolling into northwestern France, 
Meretskov was openly complaining of the command problems at all levels that the Red 
Army was dealing with. "Our people are afraid to say anything directly, they are afraid 
to spoil relations and get in uncomfortable situations and are fearful to speak the truth." 
Only the month before a special session of the party's Central Committee together with 
the Main Military Council, a mixture of political and military figures, was held. Stalin 
122 
officially replaced Voroshilov with Timoshenko as People's Commissar of Defense. 
Within a month the ranks of general and admiral were reinstated for the first time since 
1 2 0
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the Civil War. 1 2 3 Also at this time, two months before Hitler's promotion of twelve 
officers to the rank of Field Marshal, Stalin elevated Timoshenko, Shaposhnikov, and 
Grigory Kulik to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union, returning the number of 
Marshals to five for the first time since the purge. 1 2 4 
By August Timoshenko again abolished the system of dual command, helped to 
rebuild the officer corps by promoting 1,000 officers to general or admiral, brought back 
traditional uniforms to build morale and promote command, and rescinded the junior 
officer right to criticize their immediate commanders. In August Timoshenko promoted 
Meretskov to the position of Chief of the General Staff. 
Stalin's views on proper use of armor changed dramatically at this time. Seeing 
the effect that Hitler's panzers had made in France, the Soviet leader authorized the 
return of independent tanks corps and saw to it many new units of this type were 
commissioned. During this period Stalin approved plans for tank, plane, and gun 
production that would provide the industrial basis for war production in the years to 
come. Konstantin Rokossovsky, an officer arrested and tortured during the purge, was 
swept up in the wave of promotions to major-general at this time. Not long after he took 
127 
command of a new mechanized corps. 
The disaster in Finland and the victories of Hitler lit a spark under Stalin and the 
Soviet military/political leadership. These twin shocks to Soviet military complacency 
ensured change. What had been the operating norm for the Red Army in terms of 
1 2 3
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command, operations, tactics, use of armor, and morale were proven to be ineffectual. 
As stated above, Stalin replaced the top military leadership with proven military 
specialists. He reconsidered his ideas regarding the employment of armor to better 
coincide with Germany's proven methods and the trappings of military tradition such as 
rank and uniforms were allowed to trump notions of Soviet military dogma. 
As the Soviet Union enjoyed peace in the mid-1930s Stalin had felt inclined to 
assert tighter political control over the Red Army. Once that level of political control had 
proven disastrous to the institution's raison d'etre, its operational military function, 
however, the Soviet leader was willing to compromise and encourage reform. Certainly 
Stalin went back and forth on these issues. Indeed, the battles between political control 
and military reform formed a major characteristic of Stalin's wartime leadership and, as 
we will see, many of these reforms were abandoned after the disaster of June 22, 1941. 
It is the very fact that Stalin was flexible rather than dogmatic that allowed for the 
necessary improvisation once the war began. It was his willingness to listen to his 
military technical specialists, at least a good deal of the time, and support their 
institutional calls that set him apart from his eventual adversary, Hitler. Certainly Hitler 
backed his military innovators before the war, and would yield the occasional point to his 
generals. As we shall see, however, once the war between Germany and the Soviet 
Union began it was Hitler's rigidity and the absolute belief in his superior judgment, 
particularly after 1943, that led to the downfall of the Third Reich. While Stalin 
demanded the same level of authority that Hitler did, the Soviet leader was at least 
willing to admit that his generals could know something that he did not. 
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CHAPTER 4 
BARBAROSSA 
Barbarossa, A Preemptive War? 
On June 22, 1941, as German panzers began rolling into the Soviet Union, Adolf 
Hitler issued a proclamation to the German people that accused the Soviets of, among 
other things, violating German airspace and building up a massive army along the 
n o 
common border. The inference was that this massive Red Army force had been 
placing itself in a position to strike at the Third Reich in the near future. 
Beginning in the early 1990s, the idea that Hitler had attacked the Soviet Union as 
a defensive measure against an impending Soviet invasion had gained credence among 
some historians. Historians such as Viktor Suvorov, Heinz Magenheimer, Constantine 
Pleshakov and others fall firmly into this camp. The acceptance of this view casts 
Stalin in the role of aggressor in 1941 and, while not exculpating Hitler from blame for 
his brutal methods and savage war in the Soviet Union, at least partially presents him as a 
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Volume /^(Wauconda: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2004), 2444-51. 
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victim. At any rate this position has the potential to alter our perceptions of both men and 
their strategic views of the war. 
The theory of Barbarossa as a preemptive war is -essentially brought down to three 
arguments. The first deals with the offensive rhetoric of Stalin and the offensive-oriented 
operational doctrines of the Red Army in the years leading up to 1941. The second 
concerns the offensive posture of Red Army units toward Germany in the year leading up 
to Barbarossa. Finally, there existed Soviet war plans for an attack upon Germany. 
These three factors, though offering circumstantial evidence, do not prove that 
Stalin was preparing a major offensive against Germany. Rather each of these factors 
can be explained within the context of the traditional view of Barbarossa as Hitler's 
ultimate gamble to win decisively the Second World War. 
Stalin and the Red Army leadership did indeed see the Soviet military as 
primarily an offensive force. After the purges Soviet military doctrine elevated the 
operational art of the offensive. Plans and training for defense, long a major factor in 
Soviet war preparations, were downplayed, as were preparations for partisan warfare in 
the event of a Western invasion. As Catherine Merridale wrote, "The notion that the 
enemy would be repelled and beaten on his own soil was not just a romantic dream; from 
• 130 
the late 1930s it was the centerpiece of Stalinist military planning." 
Stalin liked offensive-minded officers. Dimitry Pavlov, who would later be shot 
for his failure to hold Minsk while commanding the Western Military District in 1941, 
was one such officer who was often heard telling his subordinates to "Think 
Merridale, Ivan's War, 27-8. 
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offensive."1 3 1 Stalin himself stated in 1940 that a modern army with armor, heavy 
artillery, and planes must be an offensive army. At the end of that year Timoshenko 
offered a speech to the Red Army High Command in which he offered his views on 
Soviet military strategy. His statements primarily dealt with problems of offense though 
he did note the failure of Poland and France to defend against modern weapons. He 
noted that a modern defense needed to be one of depth, with many operational areas. He 
was clear to state, however, that wars were not won through defense and attack was 
always preferable. 
The Soviet offensive mindset was not limited to operations and tactics. Even tank 
design bore a peculiar hallmark of this Soviet cult of the attack. The gas pedals of the 
famous T-34 main battle tank operated in reverse of the standard. Once in gear the driver 
would press down the pedal to remain stopped, then let up gently to increase speed. This 
possibly explains the high number of T-34s involved in collisions with other tanks during 
the war. At any rate a killed or wounded driver ensured an acceleration of the tank rather 
than a stop. 
The Red Army was indeed operationally offensive oriented. This is very 
different, however, from being strategically offensive oriented and actively seeking a 
war. If and when war came to the USSR, Stalin expected to hurl the Red Army at the 
enemy and push them back onto its soil before annihilating it. All things being equal this 
makes sense. As Timoshenko noted defense does not win wars. The very word 
'offense' has a positive connotation, while 'defense' is negative. If Stalin wished to build 
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an army of winners, they must be attackers, not defenders. The propaganda use of these 
terms was very important, both for instilling the Red Army and citizens of the Soviet 
Union with a sense of security and confidence, and in dissuading foreign powers from 
aggressive intentions toward the USSR. 
The Soviet obsession with offense at this time is not so different from the French 
Army's spirit and doctrine of elan before 1914. 1 3 4 The Red Army expected that sudden, 
immediate attacks at the outbreak of hostilities would ensure victory just as the French 
did. Though many in the French military and government prior to World War One were 
no doubt eager for a settling of accounts with Germany, it was not the active policy of 
France to seek a war. Both the French before 1914 and the Soviets before 1941 
maintained operationally offensive minded militaries, while on the strategic level their 
governments sought a continuation of the peace, at least for the foreseeable future. 
Essentially, Stalin favored a strategic defense even as his generals favored a military 
offensive. These two concepts were at odds and helped to contribute to the disaster of 
June, 1941. 1 3 5 
The second argument for the preemptive war theory, that of the Red Army's 
offensive military posture toward Germany before Barbarossa, can be largely attributed 
to Stalin's unwise desire to defend the Soviet Union at its borders instead of taking the 
advise of his officers and prepare for a defense in depth. 
By the summer of 1940, perhaps prompted by fears of the relatively easy Nazi 
success in Western Europe, Stalin ordered that the bulk of the frontier defense be moved 
1 3 4
 Ibid., 44. 
1 3 5
 Roberts, Stalin's Wars, 71. 
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up to the new border with Germany, abandoning the Stalin Line along the old border with 
Poland. Not heeding Timoshenko's call for a defense in depth, Stalin also rejected the 
136 
advice of another rising star in the Red Army constellation, Georgy Zhukov. Even 
Shaposhnikov, the military specialist who had warned Stalin of the dangers before the 
invasion of Finland, could not persuade the Soviet leader to defend East Poland and the 
Baltic States with only a token force while the bulk of the Red Army remained further 
east . 1 3 7 
Stalin's movement of troops into the newly acquired Soviet territories was indeed 
a political decision perhaps intended to give Hitler pause. Even as both dictators enjoyed 
the fruits of the nonaggression pact, they also viewed an eventual military showdown 
between them as a certainty.1 3 8 Stalin, however, was playing for time and hoped to dispel 
any illusions that Germany and the West might have that an invasion of the Soviet Union 
would be a walkover. Even as his overall strategic and diplomatic policies called for 
peace, Stalin wanted foreign nations to know that the Soviet Union was prepared for war. 
Tens of thousands of Red Army troops visible across the border from Germany was a 
major calculation in Stalin's desire to maintain the peace for as long as he could. For 
this, he was willing to sacrifice defense in depth. 
The third preemptive war argument deals with the existence of Soviet war plans 
for the invasion of Germany. Constantine Pleshakov, whose work regarding the 
beginning of the war on the Eastern Front is otherwise very good, notes that is there is no 
"smoking gun" or definitive proof that ties Stalin conclusively to an imminent attack on 
1 , 6
 Overy, Russia's War, 65. 
U 1
 Oleg Rzheshevsky, Shaposhnikov (From Stalin's Generals), 229. 
1 3 8
 Overy, The Dictators, 441. 
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Germany. No documents or testimony that this was Stalin's plan exist. However, 
Pleshakov cites the war plans prepared between August 1940 and May 1940 as proof that 
• • ] 39 
Stalin was preparing for an invasion of Germany by the-summer of 1942. 
Did France's Plan 17, the pre-1914 war plan for an attack on Germany, constitute 
a strategy of French aggression? Did Germany's Schlieffen Plan? Or were these rather 
part of preparations for the possibility of war? The idea that a nation preparing war plans 
against a potential rival necessarily intends a war is ludicrous. In the 1930s the United 
States drew up a war plan in the event of conflict with the British Empire in which an 
invasion of Canada played a central role . 1 4 0 How many war plans does the United States 
now possess in the event of war? 
Marxist ideology demanded that communist states spread the revolution to other 
nations through any means possible. Given this it seems probable that Stalin would have 
attacked Germany had the possibility of victory appeared likely. However, with the 
strength of Nazi Germany after the fall of France Stalin would not have risked the 
complete collapse of the Soviet empire, particularly after the Red Army's dismal 
performance in Finland.1 4 1 
The point is that war plans alone do not imply aggressive intent. Rather, they 
simply are a part of contingency planning which is an important and perhaps even critical 
aspect of modern military efficiency and national defense. 
Between the Soviet rhetoric and operational doctrines favoring the offensive, the 
provocative military posture of the Red Army in 1940-1, and the existence of war plans 
1 3 9
 Pleshakov, Stalin's Folly, 13. 
1 4 0
 Peter Carlson, Raiding the Icebox (Washington Post, December 30, 2005), C01. 
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directing an attack upon Germany, it is easy to leap to conclusions. The fact remains that 
each of these arguments for Stalin's aggressive intent are baseless when one considers the 
other factors in Soviet military planning and Stalin's diplomatic strategy. 
In a postwar letter to General Gyer von Scheppenburg, German diplomat Gustav 
Hilger considered the idea of Stalin launching a war of aggression against Germany. He 
noted private wartime conversations in which he asked three captured Red Army generals 
if Stalin had any plans to break the nonaggression pact by a military invasion westward. 
All of the generals said that a Soviet attack against Germany in 1941 was out of the 
question. However, they were divided on their views as to whether Stalin intended to 
attack at a later date . 1 4 2 Certainly Hilger had nothing to gain by painting his former 
master Hitler as the aggressor. This letter adds one more layer of evidence in disproving 
the preemptive war theory. 
Preparations 
For Hitler and Stalin the idea of war between their two nations was only a matter 
of time. The reason for their mutual expectation of a conflict lay at least partially in their 
ideologies. Hitler's passionate hatred of communism and his desire to see Germany gain 
territory in the east at Russia's expense made war certain. Stalin, seeing in the Western 
nations the aggressive process of capitalist imperialism, viewed an attack on the Soviet 
Union as inevitable. Therefore their roles in the beginning of the 1941-5 conflict were 
Gustav Hilger, letter to Gyer von Scheppenburg (Munich: Insitut fur Zeitgeschechte Archiv, October 
10, 1958) 
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already written in their fundamental beliefs. Germany would be the attacker; the Soviet 
Union would be the defender.1 4 3 
At the end of July, 1940, barely weeks after the fall of France, Hitler announced 
to his generals his intention to invade the Soviet Union, 
Russia is the factor on which Britain is relying the most. Something must 
have happened in London. The British were completely down; now they 
have perked up again. With Russia smashed, Britain's last hope would 
be shattered. The sooner Russia is crushed the better. If we start in May, 
1941, we would have five months to finish the j o b . 1 4 4 
When Jodl informed his subordinates at OKW of Hitler's intention to attack the Soviet 
Union, many expressed concern at the prospect of a two front war and an hour long 
argument ensued. Jodl related Hitler's arguments, including his belief that war with the 
Soviet Union would come sooner or later and Germany was at that time in the superior 
position. Hitler has also stated that conquering the Soviet Union would be easy 
compared to the battle over France. 1 4 5 
The catalyst for Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union was the hope of 
defeating Britain and ending the war. This desire meshed well with his fervent anti-
communism and quest for German lebensraum. Guderian writes in his memoirs that 
Hitler had sounded him out on an attack upon the Soviet Union as early as October, 
1939. 1 4 6 The nonaggression pact for Hitler was an expedient way to ensure Soviet 
neutrality during the German war against Poland. When Britain and France failed to 
make peace, Hitler saw the value in a continuing relationship with the Soviet Union. 
' Overy, The Dictators, 441 -3. 
4
 Berthon, The Warlords, 31. 
5
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Hitler's decision to invade Russia was based on his traditional anti-Soviet views as well 
as his belief that knocking the Soviet Union out of the war would also force Britain to 
surrender. Here, Hitler's strategic view coincided with his ideology. 
By the end of 1940 many of Hitler's generals were convinced that Britain would 
be the target of a major military operation the following spring. Guderian proposed a 
logistically impossible scheme to send a massive army to North Africa in accordance 
with a larger Mediterranean strategy.1 4 7 Hitler's eyes were firmly fixed on Russia, 
however, and in a November war game in Berlin the German Army beat the Red Army in 
1 AO 
a quick, decisive campaign. On December 18 Hitler issued Directive No. 23, ordering 
the invasion of the Soviet Union for the following May. 1 4 9 
The initial planning for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, 
was made by OKH. 1 5 0 In a postwar conversation with B. H. Liddel Hart, General 
Blumentritt stated that Brauchitsch, Haider, and Rundstedt had opposed the invasion, 
citing their experiences in the First World War. Supply, movement, and reinforcement 
problems were major concerns for these officers.1 5 1 Nevertheless the leaders of OKH set 
aside their initial hesitation and diligently worked to create an operational plan to topple 
Soviet Russia. Haider himself came to believe that Russia would be conquered within 
eight to ten weeks. 
Hart, Guderian, 66. 
1 4 8
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While Hitler was considering war with the Soviet Union as both inevitable and 
the best way to defeat Britain, many of his military leaders did not necessarily agree. 
Both Brauchitsch and Haider believed it was better to keep Russia friendly while the war 
against Britain continued. Despite their own preferences, however, they did not oppose 
or even openly question Hitler's plan. By and large the leadership of the German Army 
shared Hitler's aversion to communism and was only too ready to justify an attack upon 
the Soviet Union. They no doubt shared Hitler's underestimation of the Red Army as 
1 CO 
well. Hitler began to intervene in operational planning. He was not trained for this nor 
had any real aptitude beyond that of an enthusiastic amateur. 1 5 4 He had offered 
occasional bursts of insight into operational thinking, such as the suggestion to take the 
Belgian fortress of Eben Emael and nearby bridges by means of glider troops, 1 5 5 but this 
reflected simply an inspired idea, not a thought out and detailed piece of war planning. 
Hitler's decision to invade the Soviet Union was born from a fusion of ideology and a 
strategic vision for ending the war. Sharing many of his ideological convictions, and 
believing in their own power to improvise, the generals agreed to the opening of a two-
front war. By this time, however, the generals were thoroughly cowed and, after the 
stunning victory over France, not about to object. 
Hitler spoke with over two hundred officers in March, 1941, to let them know of 
his intention to attack the Soviet Union. In this speech Hitler noted that the war with 
Russia was to be entirely different from that conducted in the West. He emphasized the 
' Kershaw, Fateful Choices, 68-70. 
1 5 4
 Kershaw, Hitler, 1936-1945, Nemesis, 344. 
1 5 5
 Len Deighton, Blitzkrieg, From the Rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk (Edison: Castle Books, 1979), 
201. 
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racial and ideological dimensions. He called for a war without mercy or pity, a war of 
annihilation. Soviet Commissars and agents of Red Army military intelligence were to 
be shot outright. He demanded that his officers set aside any personal distaste for such 
ruthlessness. "Harshness today means lenience in the future," he told them. 1 5 6 
The army itself was completely complicit in planning for this war of annihilation. 
On the eve of 'Operation Barbarossa' the army issued its official policy for soldiers in the 
upcoming campaign entitled 'Guidelines for the Conduct of the Troops in Russia.' A 
portion of it stated, 
This struggle requires ruthless and energetic action against Bolshevik 
agitators, guerrillas, saboteurs and Jews, and the total elimination of all 
active or passive resistance. The members of the Red Army- including 
prisoners- must be treated with extreme reserve and the greatest caution 
since one must reckon with devious methods of combat. The asiatic 
soldiers of the Red Army in particular are devious, cunning and without 
feeling.1 5 7 
With Hitler's apocalyptic vision the generals of the German Army went quietly along. 
Instead of speaking out against the prospect of such monstrous barbarity and methods 
that would have made their military predecessors cringe, they by and large prepared for 
the nightmare war by reading up on Caulaincourt's Memoirs. * How many would have 
stood in open revolt had they known then that the Wehrmacht would have no better luck 
than Napoleon's Army over a century earlier? 
Ibid., 355-6. 
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Stalin too predicted war in the future between Germany and the Soviet Union. 
After the fall of France Stalin expressed his fears that Hitler was going to turn on the 
Soviet Union. 1 5 9 In December of 1940 he told his generals, 
We know that Hitler is intoxicated by his victories and believes that the 
Red Army will need at least four years to prepare for war. Obviously, 
four years would be more than enough for us. But, we must be ready 
much earlier. We will try to delay the war for another two years. 1 6 0 
Even as late as May, 1941 Stalin was stating his belief in a future war between Germany 
and the Soviet Union. In an address to Red Army Academy graduates he said, "We must 
prepare for war. The enemy will be Germany."1 6 1 
As stated above, Stalin's prediction of war between the two European powers was 
based upon communist ideology. The nations of Western Europe including Germany, the 
United States, and Japan were viewed as simply different colors of the same imperialist 
rainbow. Within communist dogma, war was an essential feature of capitalist 
imperialism. The very nature of the competition for new markets through violence would 
eventually bring the war to the Soviet Union. 1 6 2 
For the Soviets, the idea of foreign invaders attempting to overthrow the 
communist regime was not merely a possibility. It was history. The 1918 military 
intervention of the United States, Britain, Japan, and others left a profound mark upon 
Russian thinking that still exists to this day. Perhaps the greatest propaganda tool Soviet 
communism ever received was from this Western military adventure. Soviet leaders 
could always point back to 1918 and state with a measure of truth that the imperialists 
1 5 9
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had tried to take over Russia and that they were waiting for another opportunity to do so. 
In Stalin's eyes the war between Britain and Germany was simply an imperialist civil 
war, a capitalist housecleaning before the great showdown with socialism. 
For Stalin, however, the war with the West was not imminent, but was always a 
few years off. Nevertheless Stalin prepared his nation, the Red Army, and his generals 
for the coming conflict that would decide the course of human history. The failure in 
Finland and Hitler's lightning victory in the West convinced Stalin of the necessity of the 
military technical specialist for these preparations. Georgy Zhukov was one such 
specialist. 
Zhukov has been compared to U. S. Grant as a general who fully understood the 
horror of modern warfare and psychologically was prepared for i t . 1 6 3 During the summer 
of 1939 the Red Army had been actively engaged in a shooting war with the Imperial 
Japanese Army. With Zhukov in command, the Red Army enjoyed significant 
advantages in infantry, machine guns, artillery, planes, and tanks- the very muscles of a 
modern fighting force. 1 6 4 For all of the Red Army's numerical superiority, Zhukov still 
presented himself as a master tactician as he employed over 60,000 soldiers and 500 
tanks in a classic encirclement battle. This engagement foreshadowed the massive battles 
that would be the hallmark of the Russian front from 1941 to 1945. The Soviets lost 
around 23,000 men, while Japanese casualties were almost three times as high. 1 6 5 
" David M. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus, The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1998), 43. 
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Zhukov's success in the Far East had profound implications for both the general 
and the Red Army as a whole. The Red Army victory over the Japanese no doubt 
emboldened Stalin's decision to embark on the Finnish adventure in December. It also 
ensured a place for Zhukov on Stalin's radar just at a time when the Soviet leader began 
to look for men of real military talent. The fact that Zhukov had not been tainted by the 
embarrassing setbacks in Finland also added to his prestige. 
Like the Germans a month before, the Soviet General Staff conducted a war game 
based on the premise of a German-Soviet war in December, 1940. In both scenarios the 
Germans came out the victor. While the German game revealed a short, sharp war in 
which the Soviet Union fell as easily as France had, however, the Soviet game revealed 
the fall of Russia only after initial Red Army gains, followed by devastation at the hands 
of the Wehrmacht. During this game Dmitry Pavlov, a Soviet armor specialist and later 
victim of the NKVD following the German invasion, played the part of the Red Army 
while the role of the German Army was played by Zhukov. The results were so 
unsettling that Zhukov hesitated to tell Stalin the truth. 1 6 6 
Fearing his generals were sugarcoating the results of the war game Stalin 
demanded to know how the actual game played out. In a meeting with the military 
leadership Stalin insisted on the truth and questioned the findings that man for man a 
Soviet division was the equal of its German counterpart, 
Perhaps the Ustav (regulations) do state with a certain propagandistic 
emphasis that one of our divisions in a meeting engagement can deal 
with one division of the German-Fascist forces, and that in the offensive 
one and a half divisions can break through the defense of one of their 
1 6 6
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divisions, but among this group of people assembled here, within the 
circle of present Front and army commanders we have got to discuss 
practical possibilities.1 6 7 
Stalin's insistence on hearing the truth and not allowing himself or his generals into 
buying a safer and more convenient fiction tells much about his military views at this 
time. Before the Finnish adventure Stalin was content to believe that the Red Army was 
a first-rate fighting machine, if not the equal of Hitler's army, then certainly not far 
behind. By early 1941, however, Stalin was no longer willing to risk the security of the 
Soviet state over matters of military preparedness. Propaganda had its place, to be sure, 
but not in the context of military planning. 
Rather than punishing Zhukov for his success as the German commander in the 
game, Stalin promoted him to Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. In this post he 
replaced Meretskov, who had been a voice of reason during the war with Finland. 
Meretskov had been promoted General of the Army and placed over the General Staff by 
Timoshenko in the military reforms of the previous year as recognition for his 
outspokenness before the Finnish war . 1 6 8 Zhukov, who had no General Staff experience 
requested to remain a field commander. Stalin increasingly valued the victor of the Far 
East and, despite the general's wishes, believed that his talents were needed in 
Moscow. 1 6 9 
Though at this time Stalin increasingly looked for merit over political toadying, 
he nevertheless maintained a climate of fear over his generals. Shortly after his 
promotion to Chief of the General Staff, Zhukov was ordered by Timoshenko to meet 
1 6 7
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with Stalin. When Zhukov asked what he and Stalin were to discuss Timoshenko replied, 
"Everything. But remember he won't listen to long reports. What it takes you several 
170 
hours to tell me, you'll have to tell him in ten minutes." - Zhukov later recalled that in 
1941 he feared Stalin and his secret police chief, Lavrentiy Beria, but he still believed in 
the Soviet leader, 
You have to consider exactly what it meant at that time to go against 
Stalin. We could all remember 1937 and 1938. To have said that he 
was wrong would have meant that, even before you got out of the 
building, you would land up in Beria's hands, and Beria was almost 
always present during my meeting with Stalin... And yet that is only 
one aspect of the truth. I'll tell you another. I didn't regard myself as 
cleverer or more far-sighted as Stalin, or that I had a better under­
standing of the situation than he had. Like everyone else, I had 
enormous faith in him, in his ability to find a way out of the most 
difficult situations. I sensed the danger of a German attack, the feeling 
was gnawing at my vitals. But my faith in Stalin, and my belief that 
in the end everything would come out the way he suggested, was 
stronger.1 7 1 
During an early 1941 meeting with his military leaders Stalin raged against the 
high casualties of the Air Force from training maneuvers. The thirty year old Lieutenant 
General Pavel Rychagov, the head of the Air Force, passionately defended the pilots and 
exploded at Stalin. "Of course we will continue to have many accidents," Rychagov said, 
"as long as you keep making flying coffins." Stalin let the heated statement hang in the 
air for a few moments before responding grimly, "You should not have said that." Soon 
• 172 
after the incident Rychagov was arrested. He was shot in October. 
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was gnawing at my vitals. But my faith in Stalin, and my belief that 
in the end everything would come out the way he suggested, was 
stronger. 171 
uring an early 1941 eeting ith his ilitary leaders Stalin raged against the 
high casualties of the ir Force fro  training aneuvers. he thirty year old ieutenant 
eneral Pavel ychagov, the head of the ir Force, passionately defended the pilots and 
exploded at talin. " f course e ill continue to have any accidents," ychagov said, 
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Throughout May other figures in the Red Army Air Force were arrested. Many of 
them were accused of conspiracies against the Soviet Union and sabotage of defense 
production.1 7 3 This was another flare up of the great military purges that began in 1937 
with the arrest of Tukhachevsky and never completely ended. This is in marked contrast 
to Hitler's approach to his military leadership at the same time. While the threat of 
Gestapo action hung over the German generals, none were actually arrested or shot. 
Rather, Hitler co-opted his military leadership by bribery. Stalin clung to fear as his 
primary weapon over his generals. The political and ideological inspiration that both 
dictators offered their armies was a key factor in their military relationships, but it 
certainly was not the only one. Hitler bribed his generals because the German Army 
remained in many respects an independent institution to which Nazism was allied. Stalin 
dominated his generals through threats of violence and murder because the Red Army 
was a creation and tool of the Communist Party, which he ruled. 
Roughly six weeks before the German attack Stalin took a major step on his road 
to becoming the Soviet Union's supreme warlord. On May 5 Stalin decided to take on 
the position of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, the post that Lenin had 
held after the October Revolution and essentially the post of Prime Minister. This was 
his first position in the Soviet government after holding only the post of General 
Secretary of the Communist Party since 1922, a position he retained. With an eye on the 
situation developing abroad as well as the desire to better harmonize party and state 
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organizations, Stalin believed that his time to take an active and public role in the Soviet 
government had come. 1 7 4 
Stalin's domination of the Red Army was now de jure as well as de facto. As 
head of the People's Commissars, Stalin now sat directly above the People's Commissar 
for Defense, Timoshenko, who in turn commanded the primary agencies of the Soviet 
Military including the General Staff under Zhukov. 
It was Stalin's conviction that war with Germany was inevitable. Despite this he 
did not believe that the war was imminent in early 1941. Stalin desired the peace 
between the Soviet Union and Germany to continue for as long as possible to give the 
Red Army time to prepare. However, Stalin's hope for continued peace while at the 
same time he attempted to prepare the Red Army for war led to mixed signals for the 
• • • 1 7 5 
military leadership, and was a principle factor in the disaster in June. The paradox 
between Stalin's diplomatic strategy of peace and his operationally offensive military is 
evident in his speech to military academy graduates in May, 1941, 
A good defense signifies the need to attack. Attack is the best form 
of defense.... We must now conduct a peaceful, defensive policy 
with attack. Yes, defense with attack. We must now re-teach our 
176 
army and our commanders. Educate them in the spirit of attack. 
The Soviet defense system grouped Red Army units into five geographical areas, 
or military districts, bordering Europe. These were Leningrad, Baltic, Western, Kiev, and 
Odessa. The Baltic, Western, and Kiev were considered special military districts as they 
were capable of operations without general mobilization or reserves for a short time. The 
Roberts, Stalin's Wars, 63-4. 
Glantz, When Titan's Clashed, 26. 
Service, Stalin, 407. 
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other districts were essentially military administration units with limited forces. As a 
precautionary measure in May-June, Stalin allowed 800,000 reservists to be put on the 
active list as well as twenty-eight divisions sent to the military districts in the west. The 
military districts were ordered to build new forward command posts and 40,000 troops 
178 
were sent to man them. 
Yet Stalin insisted that the Red Army do nothing to provoke Germany in the 
weeks leading up to June 22. The Germans made moves that the military leadership 
interpreted as hostile and most likely the prelude to an attack though Stalin refused to 
believe that war was at his doorstep. In line with his attempts at diplomatic solidarity 
with Germany, Stalin halted the Soviet recognition of Allied governments-in-exile and 
extended recognition to the new pro-German government in Iraq. These moves, in 
concert with his military movements into the western military districts, were intended to 
both bribe and threaten Germany into a continued peace. 1 7 9 For all that Stalin's desire for 
peace was at odds with his generals' fear of an impending attack. 
By mid-June German aircraft made no less than ten reconnaissance flights over 
Soviet territory every day. Timoshenko and Zhukov believed that this was strong 
evidence of an impending German attack. When the two generals brought this to Stalin's 
attention he said simply, "Let's talk about this later." When the generals later pressed the 
point Stalin exploded, telling them that putting the Red Army on alert would provoke the 
Germans. Earlier in the month Stalin had acquiesced to a German request to search for 
German soldiers fallen during World War One on Soviet territory. The Soviet leader 
1 7 7
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      l77 
     
  
      
were sent to man them. 178 
Yet Stalin insisted that the Red Army do nothing to provoke Germany in the 
weeks leading up to June 22. The Germans made moves that the military leadership 
interpreted as hostile and most likely the prelude to an attack though Stalin refused to 
believe that war was at his doorstep. In line with his attempts at diplomatic solidarity 
with Germany, Stalin halted the Soviet recognition of Allied governments-in-exile and 
extended recognition to the new pro-German government in Iraq. These moves, in 
concert with his military movements into the western military districts, were intended to 
both bribe and threaten Germany into a continued peace. 179 For all that Stalin's desire for 
peace was at odds with his generals' fear of an impending attack. 
By mid-June German aircraft made no less than ten reconnaissance flights over 
Soviet territory every day. Timoshenko and Zhukov believed that this was strong 
evidence of an impending German attack. When the two generals brought this to Stalin's 
attention he said simply, "Let's talk about this later." When the generals later pressed the 
point Stalin exploded, telling them that putting the Red Army on alert would provoke the 
Germans. Earlier in the month Stalin had acquiesced to a German request to search for 
German soldiers fallen during World War One on Soviet territory. The Soviet leader 
177 ad lingrad, 
178 , lin's , . 
179 Ibid., 64. 
66 
ignored Timoshenko and Zhukov's objections that this was just an intelligence gathering 
mission. 
The June 14 issue of the Soviet newspaper Izvestiya, mouthpiece of official 
policy, stated with certainty that Germany had no intention of breaking the non-
aggression pact. It blamed that current state of tension over the subject on lies and 
rumors. 1 8 1 On June 18, only four days before the German invasion, Zhukov again tried to 
impress upon Stalin the facts. Growing angry at what he insisted was his generals' desire 
to start a war, Stalin dressed him down sharply in front of the politburo, 
Have you come to scare us with war, or do you want a war because you 
don't have enough medals? If you're going to provoke the Germans on 
the frontier by moving troops there without my permission, then heads 
will roll, mark my words. 
Stalin also ignored the voice of Marshal Shaposnikov. Shaposhnikov who had argued 
against the attack on Finland, later demanded that most senior officers attend intense 
courses on the failures of that adventure. By 1941 he still clung to the idea that the 
main body of the Red Army should stand at the original border between the Soviet Union 
184 
and Poland, not the new border hundreds of miles to the west with Germany. 
Despite the warnings of his generals, as well as those of his intelligence services 
and border guards, Stalin failed to adequately prepare for the German attack. Recently 
discovered letters from Hitler to Stalin in the weeks leading up to Barbarossa seem to 
explain some aspects of Stalin's behavior during this period. These letters, which have 
Pleshakov, Stalin's Folly, 2, 7. 
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received critical attention but have not been completely authenticated, contain an entreaty 
from Hitler to the Soviet leader, asking him not give his generals in Poland any excuse to 
185 
launch their own attack against the Soviet Union independent of Nazi policy. 
Whether or not these letters are genuine, one thing is clear. In early 1941 Stalin's 
strategic desire to maintain the peace clashed with the operational military insight of his 
generals, to say nothing of the alarms bells from other sources. The future warlord 
refused to see the war coming. Zhukov later said, 
It appeared to us before the war that Stalin knew no less and even more 
than we did about matters of war and defense and had a deeper under­
standing and foresight. When we had to encounter difficulties in the war, 
however, we understood that our views about Stalin had been erroneous. 1 8 6 
The very essence of Stalin's rule over the Soviet Union, his elevation to an almost God­
like figure, ensured that even his generals were powerless to take appropriate military 
action in light of an obvious threat. This impotence among Stalin's military specialists, 
along with his own wishful thinking and failure to see the obvious, nearly led to the total 
destruction of the Soviet Union. 
Stalin Becomes Warlord 
The shock of the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 brought 
radical change to Stalin's command relationship with his military leaders. With the 
assumption of the Chairmanship of the People's Commissars six weeks earlier Stalin held 
his first government post. Over the course of the next two months Stalin consolidated his 
1 8 5
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de jure hold over the military and assumed ever greater government responsibilities. The 
German invasion represented the greatest crisis the Soviet Union had faced in its twenty-
four year existence and Stalin's rapid accumulation of posts shortly after sprang from his 
desire to control the war effort. No longer was the Soviet leader content to dominate the 
Red Army through a combination of inspiration and terror. With the Wehrmacht rapidly 
driving east Stalin inserted himself firmly at the top of the chain of command. 
During the reforms of 1938 a Main Military Soviet had been established to 
provide a combination of military and political leadership for the Red Army. In theory 
the Main Military Soviet was to take command during wartime but this did not prove to 
be the case in 1939 or 1941. As a council it lacked the decisive leadership that an army at 
war requires and so the Commissar for Defense remained the primary military 
commander for the Red Army. The Commissar for Defense's role was political as well 
as military, however. The one critical position that failed to materialize after the purges 
187 
or the Finnish war was that of Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army. 
While it is possible that the post of Commander-in-Chief failed to appear because 
of simple oversight by the Soviets, it is likely that Stalin, jealous of power and fearing the 
emergence of another Tukhachevsky, refused to allow it. Such a position would have 
ensured a rapid, though perhaps flawed, response to the German attack. Perhaps a Red 
Army Commander-in-Chief like Shaposhnikov would have had sufficient power to 
deploy the bulk of the Soviet defense in depth, thus robbing the Wehrmacht of many of 
its early victories. At any rate Stalin himself soon filled the void of supreme command. 
Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, 136; Winchester, Hitler's War on Russia, 27. 
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In late June the State Defense Committee (GKO) was formed with Stalin as 
chairman. The GKO's task was to oversee the general and political aspects of the war, 
188 
and essentially acted as the highest level of Soviet government during the war. Stalin's 
primary tool for exercising command was the Stavka, or supreme headquarters, which 
was created on June 23 and reorganized with wide responsibilities a few weeks later. It 
was through the Stavka that Stalin issued orders, received reports, and carried out the 
major strategic decisions of the war. Members of the Stavka included the cream of the 
Soviet military and political crop; Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Molotov, Zhukov, the 
cavalryman and Stalin crony Budenny, Admiral Kuznetsov and Stalin himself. Many 
held seats on both the GKO and Stavka simultaneously. On July 10 Stalin was elevated 
to the post of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and on July 19 he replaced 
Timoshenko as People's Commissar for Defense. 1 8 9 
The makeup of the Stavka is interesting. Primarily a strategic military council, it 
nevertheless included figures like Voroshilov and Budenny, who despite being Marshals 
had never proven themselves as military specialists. Indeed, they owed their rise and 
rank to their special relationship with Stalin and their Communist Party credentials. With 
Stalin and Molotov on the Stavka as well, the three men who actually were military 
technicians, Timoshenko, Zhukov, and Admiral Kuznetsov, were outnumbered. With the 
full input of Stalin's cronies in military matters the Stavka began its life with a decidedly 
political t i l t . 1 9 0 
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Stalin's assumption of the post of Defense Commissar while he maintained his position 
of head of government was not unique. Both Hitler and Winston Churchill served in the 
position of war minister even as they remained chancellor and prime minister. The dual 
posts undoubtedly allowed the leaders to better coordinate political and military policies. 
However, while Churchill's military authority ended with these two posts both Stalin and 
Hitler grasped further for more direct military authority. 
The sudden reorganization of the military command structure was a departure 
from Stalin's former mode of rule. Previously Stalin had preferred to exercise command 
indirectly, hence his remaining only the General Secretary of the party for so many years 
as opposed to the visible and active post of Chairman of the People's Commissars. The 
emergency forced Stalin to drop his humble facade and adopt the active responsibility for 
leadership of the Soviet Union. 1 9 1 Nor did Stalin merely accept one leadership role in the 
new wartime system, but many. Historian John Erickson called Stalin's accumulation of 
* 192 
power at this time a "withering blast of super-centralization." 
Three Military Directions were set up, under the General Staff, to command the 
various front commanders. Stalin routinely bypassed both the General Staff and the 
Military Directions and within a year the Military Directions were removed from the 
chain of command. The idea of Soviet Military or Strategic Directions appeared again, 
however, several decades later after nuclear weapons became an integral part of the 
193 • 
Soviet Union's defense establishment. Chaos resulted from the surprise and shock to 
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all levels of command in the wake of the German invasion. Inexperienced officers who 
had been promoted following the purges and a shortage of trained staff officers added to 
the Red Army's breakdown in the face of Hitler's troops. With the enemy advancing and 
the Red Army in a state of paralyzed confusion, Stalin called for greater party control 
over the military.1 9 4 
Political commissars were once again in fashion. On July 16 the on-again-off-
again practice of dual command returned, representing a powerful party intrusion into 
military affairs.1 9 5 An even greater intrusion into the Red Army's functions was Stalin's 
use of Stavka representatives. These representatives, often high ranking generals or 
senior political figures, were sent to bolster determination among the local commanders 
and act as Red Army fire brigades, moving from one hot spot to another. Additionally, 
these representatives ensured that operations were carried out in line with Stavka's 
strategy.1 9 6 It was not uncommon for the Chief of the General Staff to be sent to the front 
as a representative. Zhukov later estimated that he and General Aleksadr Vasilevsky, a 
later chief of the General Staff, had been sent as representatives 15 times each. 
Indeed, within the first few days of the crisis Timoshenko and Zhukov, Stalin's 
top military men, were sent on errands all over the front to stiffen morale and do what 
they could to salvage the situation. Soon Timoshenko took over the Western Front from 
General Dmitry Pavlov while Zhukov was brought back to Moscow to concentrate on 
Glantz, When Titans Clashed, 62-4. 
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overall strategy. The two other military Fronts that were hastily organized at this time, 
the North-We stern and the South-Western, were taken over by Voroshilov and Budenny, 
again stressing Stalin's insistence at the outset of political reliability in his commanders 
at the expense of military ability.1 9 9 
With Minsk threatened by the Nazi advance Marshal Shaposhnikov was 
dispatched to meet with the commander of the Western Military District, General Pavlov. 
After Shaposhnikov returned to Moscow Pavlov was visited by Marshal Grigory Kulik 
and then Marshal Voroshilov. In the middle of the crisis Pavlov had to deal with 
Stalin's envoys and their demands for regular reports even as he labored to halt the 
Germans . 2 0 0 
Pavlov, who had been one of Stalin's favorites before the war for his military 
aggressiveness, had been completely under the Soviet leader's spell in the weeks leading 
up to the German invasion. When warned of offensive-looking troop movements from 
across the western border Pavlov had shrugged it off and insisted that Stalin's assessment 
of Germany's intention was correct, "Never mind- those at the top know better than we 
do ." 2 0 1 Unwilling to lose Minsk to the Germans, Stalin ordered Pavlov to counter-attack 
and suggested that he would rather have the western front, (a front being roughly the 
equivalent of a German army group), surrounded inside Minsk than let the city fall. The 
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offensive was a disaster and many Red Army units were wasted against the battle-
hardened Germans. 
For his failure to hold the Byelorussian capital Pavlov was arrested and sent to 
Moscow where he faced harsh Soviet justice. Facing the military tribunal with Pavlov 
were his chief of staff, his signals commander, an army commander, and various division 
commanders and commissars. The official charge was that of "causing damage to the 
fighting capacity of the Red Army. They were all later shot. 
Under torture Pavlov had named Meretskov as an accomplice in an anti-Soviet 
military conspiracy. The general who had dared to express his doubts about the Finnish 
war and afterward rewarded by Timoshenko for his insight was quickly picked up by the 
NKVD, interrogated and tortured, though never formally charged as a conspirator.2 0 4 In 
August Stalin signed Order No. 270, a brutal command which called for the punishment 
of family members should soldiers fail to live up to the Soviet leader's conception of 
205 
duty. On July 20 Stalin directed Beria to create special NKVD units to deal with 
"unreliable elements" in the military and examine cases of Red Army soldiers who 
escaped the Germans. Circumstantial evidence and a malevolent interpretation of events 
ensured that many defeatists and others were shot. 2 0 6 
The next year, commenting on the fighting in Stalingrad, Soviet journalist Vasily 
Grossman commented on the harshness of Soviet military justice, "We didn't just receive 
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attacks, we had to attack. Retreat meant ruin. If you retreated, you'd be shot. If I did, 
I'd be shot . . ." 2 0 7 
By October, with the Germans pushing toward Moscow, the NKVD murdered 
around two hundred of its prisoners as it prepared to abandon the capital. Among those 
208 
shot were the wife of Tukhachevsky and the former head of the Air Force, Rychagov. 
This latest chapter of terror, that following the German attack, was for all its 
brutality less dramatic than it could have been. Only Pavlov and the other officers of the 
Western Military District, along with a handful of others, were arrested in connection 
with the German attack. The military as a whole was not punished. The Red Army saw 
no large scale purges to rival the years 1937-8. In Beria's opinion the failure of the Red 
Army to halt the Germans at the border was excuse enough for another wave of terror, 
but Stalin refused. 0 9 Stalin knew he needed military technical experts to fight the 
Germans and he wasn't going to sacrifice them simply to save face. The capable 
Meretskov, still imprisoned by the NKVD, was released in early September. The 
generals' reprieve came from Stalin with the words, "He's been cooling off long 
enough." 2 1 0 
For all of Stalin's drive in setting up agencies to help the USSR combat the 
enemy, the dictator suffered from severe fears of a Soviet collapse. Not long after the 
German invasion began Stalin remarked following a Politburo meeting, "Lenin left us a 
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no large scale purges to rival the years 1937-8. In Beria's opinion the failure of the Red 
Army to halt the Germans at the border was excuse enough for another wave of terror, 
but Stalin refused?09 Stalin knew he needed military technical experts to fight the 
Germans and he wasn't going to sacrifice them simply to save face. The capable 
Meretskov, still imprisoned by the NKVD, was released in early September. The 
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great inheritance and we, his heirs, have fucked it all up." A few days earlier Stalin had 
secluded himself at his country dacha. When Molotov and others arrived to prompt him 
to action Stalin asked warily, "Why have you come?"2 1 1- Upon returning form the front in 
July, 1941 Khrushchev met with Stalin in the Kirov Metro station in Moscow, 
The man sat there devastated and couldn't say anything, not even any 
words of encouragement which I needed.... What I saw before me was 
a leader who was morally crushed. He was sitting on a couch. His 
face was empty... he was at a complete loss and didn't know what 
to do . 2 1 2 
It is also important to note that during this period Stalin and the GKO were 
entertaining surrendering huge territories of the western USSR to the Germans in 
exchange for peace. The precedent of Brest-Litovsk had shown that territories ceded 
could be regained in time and at one point Stalin approached the Bulgarian ambassador to 
act as an intermediary with Hitler. 2 1 3 At the moment of crisis Stalin entertained 
abandoning much of the Soviet Union to maintain some of it. In any event the war 
continued without any serious offer of peace from Stalin. 
The military crisis had swung the pendulum back in favor of party domination of 
the military. Stalin's authorization of dual command, his support of party influence in the 
military, his elevation of party cronies Beria, Gerogy Malenkov and Lazar Kaganovich to 
the GKO, and his use of harsh justice meted out to old enemies and new scapegoats, all 
demonstrated his desire to subordinate the Red Army to the party during the crisis. His 
use of Stavka representatives illustrated his willingness to bypass the General Staff in the 
chain of command and interfere directly with military operations. As the pressure 
2 1 1
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2 , 2
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mounted, and defeat at the hands of Hitler's Wehrmacht looked like a real possibility, 
Stalin not only sought to command the Red Army, but once again, through the agency of 
the Communist Party, he intended to dominate it completely. 
The move to create a workable command and control system for the Red Army in 
the wake of the German invasion represented a critical combination of frantic 
improvisation, arbitrary leadership, and brutality that could only emerge in a totalitarian 
society in crisis mode. The last few weeks of the French Third Republic were 
characterized by military and political reshuffling, but nothing resembling the complete 
overhaul of the Soviet command apparatus or the brutal acts of a secret security force 
occurred. The events following June 22 1941 in the Soviet Union were unique in many 
ways. Never before, with the possible exception of Hitler, had a single ruler of a modern 
industrialized nation had so much power at the moment of attack. Stalin had no congress 
of any worth to answer to, the politburo was made entirely of yes-men, and the Red Army 
was thoroughly cowed. Keenly aware of his failure to see the attack coming, and for a 
time perhaps even fearing a coup, Stalin used his unparalleled authority, in conjunction 
with his generals and political cronies, to suddenly create an entirely new supreme 
military command structure with himself at the top. 
What is remarkable about Stalin's domination of the Red Army during the war 
was his respect for his generals. Unlike Hitler, who as the war drew on began to equate 
reluctance to attack with timidity and defeatism, Stalin valued his generals' input, even 
when he disagreed with it. A case in point is Zhukov's insistence of abandoning Kiev to 
the Germans in favor of a more defensible position. A heated argument followed as 
Stalin insisted that the capital of the Soviet republic not fall, and Zhukov returned the 
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Soviet leader's rage as he explained the dire military situation. The meeting ended with 
Zhukov being relieved of his post as Chief of the General Staff, but Stalin soon invited 
the general to tea and assured him that he would remain a member of the Stavka. 2 1 4 
Writing years later Zhukov paid tribute to the wartime Soviet leader for his role in 
the defense of Moscow, 
I am often asked about Stalin's role in the battle... Stalin was in 
Moscow, in control of the troops and weapons, preparing the enemy's 
defeat. He must be given credit for the enormous work in organizing 
necessary strategic, material and technical resources which he did 
as head of the State Committee for Defense with the help of the 
executive staff of the People's Commissariats. With strictness and 
• 215 
exactingness Stalin achieved the near-impossible. 
With Stalin at the top the Soviet wartime apparatus of command which was created in the 
weeks following the German attack began to pay dividends by the end of the year before 
the Soviet capital. 
Hitler's Drive to the East 
Unlike the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany had no supreme war agency to decide 
general war policy and coordinate resources for the war effort. Within the hierarchy of 
German military planning nothing comparable to the Soviet GKO or even the British War 
Cabinet existed. The supreme strategic decisions taken by Germany during the course of 
216 
the war ultimately came down to the personal inclinations of Hitler. Stalin's 
domination of the GKO and the Stavka was to an extent tempered by the fact that it was a 
Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, 177-9. 
Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov, 361. 
Evan Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, 4-5. 
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council in which various opinions were sought. Indeed as the war progressed Stalin came 
to listen to opposing opinions more and more, realizing his own military limitations. 
Though the British War Cabinet was small it contained-a distinctly democratic flair. Of 
217 
the five man board three were Churchill Conservatives and two were Labor. 
In June of 1939 Hitler had told Goring that in the event of war he intended a 
Reich Defense Council to be the premier war planning agency. After the outbreak of war 
in September such a council was created and included Deputy Fiihrer Rudolf Hess, 
Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick, Reich Chancellery Chief Hans Lammers, General Georg 
Thomas, Keitel and Goring as Chairman. After a handful of meetings in which few 
attended Goring decided he could better handle questions of war resources through his 
218 
Four Year Plan agency, and the Reich Defense Council effectively vanished. Shortly 
after the Stalingrad crisis in early 1943 Josef Goebbels and Albert Speer attempted to 
revive the Reich Defense Council, nominally under Goring, to act as a Nazi civil 
government while Hitler was occupied with military matters. The resurrected Reich 
Defense Council never materialized in the face of the political machinations of Bormann 
and Himmler and the fact that Goring's star continued to fall with Hitler after heavy 
01 Q 
Allied bombing. Had this council succeeded, and had Hitler been a less egomaniacal 
figure, a more rational approach to war planning may have guided Germany through the 
conflict. 
2 1 7
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The problem of this lack of supreme coordination in strategic planning is 
illustrated by the fundamental differences in strategic ideas between Hitler and OKH. 
Hitler's conception of modern war rested on economic and political factors where OKH 
stressed the elimination of the opposing army. With three army groups Barbarossa 
launched three separate directional offensives. Army Group North under Field Marshal 
Ritter von Leeb drove northeast through the Baltic States toward Leningrad, Army Group 
Centre under Field Marshal Fedor von Bock drove east through Byelorussian in the 
general direction of Moscow, and Army Group South under Field Marshal Gerd von 
Rundstedt moved east toward Kiev. 
For Hitler the drives toward Leningrad and Kiev were more important that the 
drive on the Soviet capital. As the cradle of Bolshevism and named for the founder of the 
Soviet Union, Leningrad held a special place in Soviet mythology. Its loss would be a 
major blow to Soviet morale, as well as denying the Red Army a major manufacturing 
center. Hitler viewed the Ukraine with its vast farmlands, coal mines, and proximity to 
Caucasian oil as the major economic engine of the Soviet Union. To deny this resource 
rich region to the Soviet Union was to savagely curtail its war making potential. For 
Hitler's generals the drive on Moscow was the vital axis of advance. They argued that 
the Red Army would pull out all of the stops to defend the Soviet capital and give the 
German Army the chance to destroy the Red Army in good order. Additionally, they 
Manstein, Lost Victories, 176-8. 
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reasoned, the loss of such an important rail hub would fatally cripple Soviet military 
traffic.2 2 1 
There are arguments for both lines of reasoning; Certainly the destruction of an 
opposing army is the ultimate goal before the imposition upon the enemy of one's 
political will can be achieved. The difference between Hitler and his generals emerged 
from their conceptions of how best to achieve this. Hitler sought an indirect destruction 
of the Red Army by denying it the means to wage modern war. OKH believed that a 
direct, head on clash would best bring this about. Hitler's conception was no doubt 
colored by his reading of history and knowledge that past Russian armies, when 
threatened with invasion, could always retreat and deny the invader its victory. In this 
sense, Hitler displayed a truly strategic view of the invasion of the Soviet Union that his 
generals, fixated on the military destruction of the Red Army through direct battle and the 
obvious target of the Soviet capital, did not. 
The invasion began relatively smoothly for the German military chain of 
command. By August of 1941, however, Hitler was issuing orders contrary to 
established army and General Staff methods. Traditionally officers in the field had been 
given wide latitude within the operational objectives. The judgment of the man on the 
spot had been deemed of supreme importance in a campaign. As the Russian campaign 
intensified, however, Hitler began giving detailed orders to field officers instead of the 
broader 'outline instructions' that the army was used to. He also began dealing with 
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Haider directly, bypassing Commander-in-Chief of the Army Brauchitsch. By 
November Hitler was dealing directly with Army Group and Army commanders, 
• 223 
completely circumventing the chain of command. 
The division of strategic opinion between Hitler and OKH, which perhaps never 
would have occurred had the Reich Defense Council succeeded in its mandate, proved to 
be a major point of contention between Hitler and his generals over the summer months. 
By August Hitler was ordering units from the drive on Moscow to support the flanking 
army groups. With Hitler ill for a few days Brauchitsch and Haider created a 
compromise strategy that satisfied no one and earned the Fiihrer's further hostility toward 
them. 2 2 4 
By late September, with Kiev in German hands and Leningrad virtually 
surrounded Hitler at last agreed to a major commitment against Moscow. When his 
generals now told him that it was too late in the season for an offensive against the Soviet 
capital he responded with more disdain for his military leadership, 
Before I became Chancellor, I used to think the General Staff was 
like a mastiff which had to be held tight by the collar to keep it from 
attacking anyone in sight.... (However) It is I who have always had 
to goad on this mastiff. 
'Operation Typhoon' was launched on the last day of September with aim of taking 
Moscow. 
The sudden turn for the worse of the Russian weather slowed the operation 
significantly. Much more important factors in the slogging German advance however 
Macksey, Why the Germans Lose at War, 142. 
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were the fierce Red Army resistance and the length of the German supply lines. The 
German Army maintained its lethality at this time. The numbers through the end of 
December show that the ratio was one to twenty between Germans and Soviets soldiers 
killed.2 2 By mid-December, with a decision not reached before the gates of Moscow and 
facing fanatical Soviet counter-attacks, the German Army began pulling back to more 
defensible lines. When von Bock requested a general retreat Hitler refused and issued his 
'Stand Fast' order to hold the army in place. The order undoubtedly saved the 
Wehrmacht from annihilation and ensured a strong defensive position to hold off the 
Soviets. 2 2 7 
Hitler issued the 'Stand Fast' order with the following words, 
General withdrawal is out of the question... the idea of preparing rear 
positions is just driveling nonsense. The only trouble at the front is that 
the enemy outnumbers us in soldiers. He does not have any more artillery. 
His soldiers are not nearly as good as ours. 
It is unfortunate that the successful use of this order in late 1941 was later used by Hitler 
to justify similar orders under much different, and more fatal, circumstances for the 
German Army. Nicolaus von Below, Hitler's Luftwaffe adjutant, later wrote of Hitler's 
growing mistrust and antipathy toward his generals. Hitler's belief in his superior 
military ability led him to overrule them on smaller tactical matters. 
Stalin too displayed firmness in his decision to remain in Moscow. The Soviet 
leader had told Zhukov and General Ivan Konev, the officers tasked with the defense of 
2 2 6
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the city, "If you surrender, both your heads will roll." At the end of November Stalin 
ordered Zhukov to launch a massive counter-attack. Zhukov protested by phone, and 
then finally went to see Stalin himself at the Kremlin. Showing Stalin his plans for a 
more modest attack the Soviet leader agreed, illustrating his growing faith in his military 
technicians.2 3 1 Indeed, Stalin's decision to remain in Moscow, though no doubt tinged 
with political considerations, was a major expression of faith in Zhukov and the Red 
9^9 
Army leadership. 
At the same time Hitler's faith in his generals was falling even further. Hitler's 
dismissal of Brauchitsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army on December 19, 1941 had 
profound implications for the army leadership and General Staff. Hitler simply did not 
replace Brauchitsch, he assumed the office for himself in the same way he had taken over 
Blomberg's job three years earlier. Hitler's contempt for Brauchitsch, and indeed all his 
generals, was evident in a statement he made on the justification of assuming the post, 
Anybody can do that bit of operational planning. The task of a 
Commander-in-Chief is to educate the Army in a National Socialist 
sense. I don't know a single general in the Army who is capable of 
doing that in the way I want it done. That is why I have decided to 
assume command of the Army myself.2 3 3 
This decision inserted Hitler directly into the operational sphere of military planning and 
execution. While Hitler had interfered with operations almost as a matter of course 
before assuming this new post, he now had the ultimate command responsibility for 
them. Hitler did indeed have a strong sense of grand strategy, but he was simply not 
Anfilov, Zhukov (From Stalin's Generals), 351. 
2 3 1
 Overy, Russia's War, 118. 
2 3 2
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competent for this latest role. The ex-corporal from the Western Front had absolutely no 
training in the realm of military science. 
The Chain of Command now went from Hitler as Head of State, to Hitler as Chief 
of the Wehrmacht, to Hitler as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, to Haider as Chief of 
the General Staff. Officially Haider now had direct access to the Fiihrer and it is possible 
that the Chief of the General Staff saw in the new arrangement something approaching 
the former status that his office enjoyed. Perhaps the new system would resurrect the 
traditional imperial relationship of the Chief of the General Staff to the Head of State. It 
was not to be. Theoretically, the war in Russia would be handled by OKH while all other 
theaters fell within the purview of OKW. 2 3 4 The authority of the General Staff, already 
waning, had been savagely and officially curtailed. 
With Hitler now in the role of Commander-in-Chief of the Army Haider was left 
to 'carry on the business functions' of the war in Russia while the Chief of Staff of the 
Wehrmacht Keitel handled the administrative duties. This confirmed a partial merging of 
OKH and OKW that had already informally existed. Before long, Haider found himself 
bypassed in the same way that Brauchitsch had been. Hitler, weary of the army chain of 
command, preferred to issue his increasingly detailed orders through his personal military 
staff, OKW. 2 3 5 
Despite Hitler's arbitrary command style which ran counter to the interests of the 
General Staff, Haider began to attend Hitler's military conferences daily. During the 
period from the start of the war to Brauchitsch's dismissal he had attended only fifty-
2 3 4
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four. Now Haider would usually spend two hours a day in transit from his HQ in 
Angerburg to Hitler's HQ in Rastenburg, East Prussia- time no doubt the Chief of the 
General Staff could have put to better u se . 2 3 6 
As a prisoner of the British after the war, Haider expressed to Lieutenant-General 
Heim his contempt for Hitler's military ability and his lust for blood. While sincerely 
looking for signs of genius in the Ftihrer, Haider remarked that he utterly failed to find 
any. Heim told Haider of a conversation in which Hitler expressed to General von 
Reichenau delight that the SS formation Leibstandarte took such heavy losses in battle. 
237 
Hitler said at the time, "Losses are never too high; they sow the seeds of greatness." 
Operation Barbarossa, the campaign that began with such great triumphs and 
ended in the frozen battlefields before Moscow started a process that put Hitler and the 
OKH/General Staff in almost constant crisis mode for the next four years. The generals 
at OKH found themselves fighting not only against the Soviet enemy, but against the 
increasingly intrusive operational orders from Hitler and the yes-men at OKW. 
Convinced of his own superior judgment in all matters, Hitler allowed his intuition and 
personal preferences dictate operations. At times, such as with the 'Stand Fast' order, he 
proved correct. More and more often, however, his unwillingness to face facts and his 
blatant contempt for his generals ensured military inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and 
ultimately defeat. 
Hitler's obstinacy was born of the setbacks in Russia, but it couldn't have 
occurred at a worse time. Even as Hitler was relying more and more on his own 
2 3 6
 Leach, Haider (From Hitler's Generals), 121. 
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judgment over that of his generals his greatest adversary, Josef Stalin, was coming to rely 
more and more on the advice of his military specialists. Both men often flew off the 
handle and berated their military leaders, but Stalin's pretensions to military 
understanding could be curtailed by the defeat of his plans. Hitler always found 
scapegoats. 
Both Hitler and Stalin were military amateurs who controlled the largest armies in 
the greatest war in human history. At the critical moment, however, one was learning 
to trust his military specialists while one was growing consistently more disgusted with 
his own. This difference in command style and military outlook proved to be a major 
factor in the Soviet victory over Germany in 1945. 
Overy, The Dictators, 496. 
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CHAPTER 5 
IN THE BALANCE 
Ebb and Flow 
The battle of Moscow at the end of 1941 marked the end of the immediate crisis 
that had begun on June 22 with the launch of Operation Barbarossa. The successful 
defense of the city gave the Soviet Union its first major victory over the Nazi invaders 
and disproved the theory of German military invincibility. It also blunted for several 
months Germany's strategic initiative though not its tenacity and its ability to hold onto 
its gains of the previous months. 
Stalin, overly confident after his first victory, insisted on counter-attacks in the 
hope that the German Army was on its last leg and would soon retreat out of Soviet 
territory all together. In the final hour of the crisis he had turned to his generals and they 
had given him a success at Moscow. He now discarded their advice and again relied 
upon his own intuition and wishful thinking. For Hitler, the failure before Moscow was a 
setback, a temporary reverse that would be rectified in 1942. His opinion of his generals, 
never high, suffered further after Moscow and ensured that he too would engage in his 
own brand of wishful thinking. The dictators had little use for their military specialists at 
the dawn of the new year. The amateurs had their own plans. 
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Stalin's awareness of his reliance on his generals during the battle of Moscow left 
him of two minds. On one hand he was elated that the military technicians had ended the 
immediate crisis and given the Soviet Union a victory, on the other hand he was jealous 
of their accomplishment and felt the need to reassert his personal authority. Zhukov's 
name was conspicuously absent from a list of officers to receive honors for the defense of 
the capital. Indeed, Stalin had insisted that he be left out even as Zhukov's top 
commanders, Kuznetsov, Rokossovsky, and Vlasov were being lauded in the pages of 
Pravda. Stalin's desire to outgeneral his generals led him to create a plan for a general 
offensive. In early January he revealed his strategy for the relief of Leningrad, a bold 
thrust against the German center before Moscow, and a drive into the Ukraine. Zhukov 
argued against the scheme, which was to begin shortly, while most other generals 
remained silent. 
Zhukov instead pressed for a single, powerful blow at the German center. 
Countering this argument, Stalin said, 
The Germans are now in a state of confusion after their defeat at 
Moscow.... They are badly prepared for winter. This is the time for 
launching a general offensive.... We must grind up the Germans more 
quickly so that they will not be able to attack in the spring. 2 4 0 
Marshal Shaposhnikov and other generals agreed to the attacks largely because they saw 
the futility of argument when Stalin's mind was set on a course of action. Following the 
meeting he spoke with Zhukov, "You argued in vain... the directives have already been 
given out to almost all army groups."2 4 1 Zhukov exclaimed exasperation to 
Overy, Russia's War, 122; Winchester, Hitler's War on Russia, 65. 
Berthon, The Warlords, 129-30. 
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Shaposhnikov, his successor as Chief of the General Staff, at why Stalin would call a war 
council and ask for advice for an operation already planned and ready to go into effect. 
Indeed it was Stalin, and not the General Staff, who planned the three pronged 
offensive.2 4 2 
This meeting illustrates Stalin's desire to interfere in the operational sphere as 
well. As head of government and Supreme Commander, Stalin undoubtedly had a major 
role to play in Red Army strategy, and many times, like Hitler, he made correct decisions 
that benefited his military and nation. Like Hitler, Stalin also had no professional 
military training and his understanding of operations was poor. His insistence on holding 
Minsk and Kiev lead to disastrous results the previous year. In early 1942 Stavka 
contained proven military personnel, but they were either still cowed or overruled by 
Stalin. 2 4 3 
It is possible that Stalin's desire to take the offensive was based in part on his 
reading of his new allies. In December the United States had joined the war, giving new 
hope to both Britain and the Soviet Union in their fight against Germany. Stalin's 
offensives were perhaps based on the hope that Britain and the United States would soon 
launch a cross-channel attack on France. While the complexity of such an attack was 
enormous, Stalin's military amateurishness probably viewed such an attack as within the 
capabilities of his two allies by early 1942. His hope for such an attack in the West by 
his allies probably sparked his desire to make significant gains in the East . 2 4 4 
Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, 298. 
Glantz, Colossus Reborn, 616-8. 
Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad. 340. 
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Events surrounding the assault on the forces besieging Leningrad were typical of 
the Soviet failures along the line. The recently rehabilitated Meretskov was placed in 
command of the newly formed Volkov Front and ordered to attack before sufficient 
supplies had been brought up. Stiff German resistance foiled Meretskov's ill prepared 
attacks and by early March little progress had been made. Stalin dispatched Voroshilov 
and Malenkov as Stavka representatives to discover the cause. By late April the 
complete failure of the front to make any significant dent in the German line, and the 
threat to General Andrey Vlasov's 2 n d Shock Army determined the matter. The Volkov 
Front was disbanded and the armies were placed under General Mihail Khozin, 
commander of the Leningrad Front. By late June the 2 n d Shock Army was surrounded 
and lost. From January to June the Volkov Front and the units later detached from it lost 
over 120,000 men. 2 4 5 
All three attacks proved to be colossal military blunders. The failure to liberate 
Leningrad or retake Kharkov or the Crimea only illustrated Stalin's inability to 
realistically assess the situation and make operational plans accordingly. The attacks 
resulted in nearly half a million Soviet casualties for less than 100,000 German 
casualties. Soviet manpower was not lacking, but widespread access to modern weapons 
and equipment within the Red Army, to say nothing of troops with poor offensive 
experience, doomed the attacks. During the offensives, Stalin didn't hesitate to 
telephone army commanders and issue orders over the heads of the General Staff and 
Victor Kamenir, Slaughter Before Leningrad, World War II Magazine (Leesburg: Primedia, February, 
2002), 51-6. 
2 4 6
 Overy, Russia's War, 122. 
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front commanders. 2 4 7 Even with the supposedly superior military direction of Stalin the 
attacks achieved little. 
It was in mid-March, when the offensives had been all but spent, that 
Shaposnikov and his deputy Vasilevsky convinced Stalin to adopt a general strategic 
posture of defense. Stalin reluctantly agreed, but only after hammering home his 
opinions of the value of attack, 
Don't let us sit down in defense, with our hands folded, while the Germans 
attack first! We must ourselves strike a series of blows to forestall them 
on a broad front and upset enemy preparations... 
Eventually, a compromise was reached in which smaller attacks were still carried out 
248 
within the larger framework of general defense. 
In May the battles in the Crimea gave Stalin the opportunity to define the 
responsibilities of the Stavka representative. Mekhlis, serving as Stavka representative to 
the Crimean Front, severely disagreed over operational matters with the front's 
commander, General Vasily Kozlov. When Mekhlis wrote to Stalin, detailing his opinion 
of Kozlov's decisions and distancing himself from responsibility, the Soviet leader issued 
a sharp rebuke, 
You are adopting the strange position of a detached observer who accepts 
no responsibility for the affairs of the (Crimean Front). This is a very 
comfortable position, but is one which absolutely stinks. On the Crimean 
Front, you- you- are no detached onlooker but a responsible representative 
of the Stavka, responsible for all the success and failures of the Front and 
obliged to correct errors by the command on the spot.... Your task in the 
Crimea is not complicated and you should be able to deal with it.. . 2 4 9 
Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, 335. 
Ibid, 336-8. 
' Ibid., 348. 
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For Stalin the Stavka representative served as a co-commander in the greatest traditions 
of the practice of dual command. The representative was the ultimate political 
commissar and ensured not only party oversight, but Stalin's direct line to the front 
commanders. 
Stalin's sudden optimism and faith in his own abilities following the victory over 
the Germans at Moscow was nearly his undoing. In competing with his generals for 
military glory and seeking a quick defeat over his enemies instead of a longer, more 
calculated and careful approach, Stalin failed to capitalize on the Moscow victory. By 
husbanding his forces and launching a single, powerful attack as Zhukov pushed for, 
Leningrad, Kharkov, or the Crimea could have been taken from the enemy. Instead 
Stalin grasped for all three and came up with nothing, his position significantly weaker in 
June than it had been in January. 
The victory at Moscow had given Stalin and his generals breathing room and the 
Soviet leader chose to reassert his command position. While at the height of the crisis he 
had turned to his military technicians in desperation, the respite once again saw him 
attempting to dominate the Red Army leadership. Most of his military remained cowed, 
the memories of Tukhachevsky's fate still forefront in their minds. Those who did object 
were ignored. Stalin's power was absolute. As his failed operational plan illustrated 
however, his military judgment and had yet to be developed. 
After the failure to take Moscow Hitler and the German Army leadership had two 
goals for 1942. The first was to defend the vast areas of the Soviet Union that had been 
taken during the previous year's campaign, and the second was to prepare for a second 
great offensive to damage the Soviet Union beyond its ability to recover. With these two 
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critical missions to perform logic dictated that the best and most experienced German 
military minds be put to the challenge. Instead, Hitler decided to punish scapegoats. 
Even as Soviet newspapers were celebrating many Red Army officers for the 
successful defense of Moscow, Hitler was looking to make negative examples of those he 
blamed for 'Operation Typhoon.' As mentioned above, when Army Commander-in-
Chief Walter von Brauchitsch requested to be relieved of his duties owing to ill health he 
was replaced by Hitler himself. Also in December Field Marshals Rundstedt and Bock 
were sacked from their posts as commanders of Army Group South and Army Group 
Centre, to be replaced by Walter von Reichenau and Gunther von Kluge. This period 
also saw the dismissal of generals Guderian, Leeb, Erich Hoepner, Helmiith Forster, Hans 
Graf von Sponeck, and Adolf Strauss. 
The dismissal of so many of his generals following the failure to take Moscow no 
doubt reflected Hitler's need place blame at the army's doorstep. Hitler's personality was 
such that he could not admit his responsibility for the failure. Despite Hitler's reasons, 
however, it is possible that other factors had something to do with the late 1941/early 
1942 reshuffling. Guderian's memoirs are filled with vitriol toward von Kluge and the 
panzer general recorded an argument between them shortly before his dismissal. Indeed, 
2^2 
Guderian almost certainly blamed von Kluge rather than Hitler for his removal. " Out 
of those fired Rundstedt was the only one who returned to Germany by a special train 
with an honor guard. Hitler later apologized to the field marshal for his dismissal and 
Karl-Heinz Janssen, Walter von Brauchitsch- Der uberforderte Feldherr (From Die Militdrelite Des 
Dritten Reiches), 94-5. 
2 5 1
 Winchester, Hitler's War on Russia, 65-6; Kershaw, Hitler, 1936-1945, Nemesis, 455. 
2 5 2
 Guderian, Panzer General, 270; Hart, Guderian, 80. 
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blamed the incident on a simple misunderstanding. * Whatever the reasons for the 
dismissals the public message was clear- the generals, not the fiihrer, was to blame for the 
failure to take Moscow. • -
The circumstances surrounding Rundstedt's dismissal illustrate Hitler's contempt 
for even his most valued military technicians. Rostov, the gateway to the Caucasus, had 
been captured by units of Army Group South in late November. Fearing encirclement by 
Soviet forces a week later, Rundstedt prudently ordered an evacuation of the city and a 
thirty mile retreat. When Hitler heard of the retreat he countermanded Rundstedt's order 
and commanded that Rostov be held. Rundstedt quickly replied, 
It is madness to attempt to hold. First the troops cannot do it and second 
if they do not retreat they will be destroyed. I repeat that this order must 
be rescinded or that you find someone else. 2 5 4 
Hitler was enraged by the ultimatum. Rather than discuss the situation with von 
Brauchitsch, still at this time Army Commander-in-Chief, Hitler fired Rundstedt with the 
simple reply, "I am acceding to your request. Please give up your command." 
As these events illustrate, Hitler now had no time for the chain of command. It 
was the direct responsibility of OKH to hire and fire army group commanders, not the 
head of state nor even the defense minister. For Hitler the legal rights and responsibilities 
of the higher command were inconsequential. He was in charge and he would make the 
decisions. When Brauchitsch asked to be relieved of his post Hitler only confirmed in 
theory what had been taking place in fact: Adolf Hitler was the Commander-in-Chief of 
the German Army. 
2 5 3
 Ziemke, Rundstedt (From Hitler's Generals), 197. 
2 5 4
 Toland, Adolf Hitler, 689. 
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The dismissal of at least one of the generals had an unexpected consequence for 
Hitler. Erich Hoepner was relieved after his 4 t h armored corps retreated following a 
severe Soviet counter-attack near Moscow. Infuriated at Hoepner's withdrawal, Hitler 
not only fired him but forbade him to wear a uniform or collect his army pension. 
Hoepner later successfully sued the state for his pension rights and proved Hitler's lack of 
total control at this time over the military and the German courts. Because of his 
treatment at Hitler's hands Hoepner soon became active in the anti-Nazi military 
conspiracy.2 5 6 
The failure to take Moscow was an intolerable event for Hitler. It was the first 
time the German Army had stopped short of its objective since the war began nearly two 
and half years earlier. It also represented the greater fact that the Soviet Union had not 
altogether collapsed after repeated military setbacks in the previous months. Hitler had 
treated his generals poorly enough when they were winning, how much more derision he 
would heap upon them now that victory refused to come as easily. 
Hitler pulled the reins of the OKH tighter. He even forbade the General Staff 
from playing war games to prepare for probable military scenarios. The reorganization 
of command on the Eastern Front was Hitler's reaction to this disaster. On one hand it 
absolved himself from blame before Germany and the rest of the world. On the other it 
allowed him to place in positions of command officers he felt more closely lived up to his 
version of the National Socialist ideal. To Hitler this ideal was the simple belief that 
willpower, courage, and determination alone could bring victory. Though his strategic 
2 5 6
 Robert Wistrich, Who's Who in Nazi Germany (New York: Bonanza Books, 1982), 152-3; Kershaw, 
Hitler, 1936-1945, Nemesis, 507. 
2 5 7
 Winchester, Hitler's War on Russia, 63-4. 
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astuteness had not completely abandoned him by this point, the era of the Fuhrer's 
wishful thinking had begun. 
Stalingrad 
The battle of Moscow had temporarily taken the strategic initiative out of 
Germany's hands. Stalin's clumsy attempts to wrest control of the strategic initiative by 
simultaneously attacking in three directions earned for the Soviet Union the results they 
merited. The Red Army offensives were beaten back all along the line and the German 
Army was able to consolidate its position, re-supply itself, and prepare for a second grand 
offensive against the Soviet Union. Red Army soldiers could take a measure of 
confidence in their victory at Moscow, even if subsequent operations had failed. German 
soldiers were aware that they were not as strong as they had been the previous summer, 
but neither were the Soviets. One more great push was sure to win the war. 
'Case Blue' was the name given to the German Army's grand offensive against 
the Soviet Union. In line with Hitler's view that the best way to defeat the Soviet Union 
was to rob it of its resources, the aim of the offensive was the conquest of the Eastern 
Ukraine and the oilfields of the Caucuses. Hitler now formally enjoyed the direct 
command of the army and he was determined that his total control bring military victory. 
The campaign initially saw great German success. General Rudolf Schmundt, 
Hitler's army adjutant, kept track of the advance on a map at Hitler's headquarters, 
impressing civilians who happened to be present. Intoxicated by the early victories, 
Hitler again railed against his generals' timidity and hailed his own military insight. 
While OKH had wished to maintain the army's largely defensive posture and straighten 
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out the front line, Hitler had insisted upon attack. Three weeks into the campaign Hitler 
transferred his headquarters deeper into the Ukraine near the town of Vinnitsa. 
The early gains soon provided new challenges. This in turn only exacerbated the 
tension between Hitler and his Chief of the General Staff. Manstein wrote that in the 
summer of 1942 he was appalled to find that the relations between Hitler and Haider had 
become so strained. In characteristic tantrums Hitler would heap scorn upon the soldiers 
after military setbacks. When Haider attempted to defend them Hitler turned his wrath 
upon him. In utter shock at what was for him a considerable breach of the respect due the 
General Staff and the army, Manstein took Schumndt aside and told him that the head of 
state simply could not speak to the Chief of the General Staff in such terms. He 
demanded that Haider's advice be listened to respectfully. 
Haider's war diary entry of July 23, 1942 illustrates the strained feelings between 
he and Hitler as victory in Russia proved ever more elusive: 
This chronic tendency to underrate the enemy capabilities is gradually 
assuming grotesque proportions and develops into a positive danger. 
The situation is getting more and more intolerable.... This so called 
leadership is characterized by a pathological reacting to the impressions 
of the moment and a total lack of any understanding of the command 
machinery and its possibilities. 
On August 24 the two men had a major argument which devolved into a shouting 
match over Hitler's unwillingness to allow the Ninth Army to retreat from Rzhev. Hitler 
accused Haider of being unable to make the tough decisions. With this display most 
Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, Memoirs by Albert Speer (Richard and Clara Winston, Trans.), 
(New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1970), 236. 
2 5 9
 Manstein, Lost Victories, 261-2. 
2 6 0
 Kershaw, Hitler: 1936-1945, Nemesis, 529. 
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officers saw that Haider would soon be on his way out. With the looming threat of the 
Stalingrad crisis in September Haider would prove to be another convenient scapegoat for 
the Fuhrer. 2 6 2 
On the 24 t h , when Haider continued to press his concerns on Hitler that the 
German flank at Stalingrad was dangerously exposed, Hitler dismissed him. Citing their 
numerous disagreements and the stress which the General Staff had caused him, Hitler 
went on to state that what the army needed was the "glow of National Socialist 
conviction," something that Haider and other 'old school' officers could not bring to the 
table. Count Ciano, Italy's foreign minister, felt that Haider's dismissal was a 'bad 
263 
sign.' Haider wrote in his diary: "My nerves are worn out; also his (Hitler's) are no 
longer fresh.... He is determined to enforce his will also on the army." 2 6 4 
Walter Gorlitz noted that Haider's dismissal marked the end of German military 
success and the beginning of its military defeats. 2 6 5 Both Haider and his predecessor 
Beck had been products of the German military tradition. They both had been selected 
by Hitler, but only after careful recommendations made within the established army chain 
of command. Both men, extremely technically competent, had the bad luck to have 
served during the Third Reich where Hitler's power games and increased meddling in the 
operational fields of war ensured the marginalization of the General Staff. 
About this same time Hitler fired the commander of Army Group A, Field Marshal 
Wilhelm List, for failing to advance rapidly enough. With his contempt for his generals 
2 6 1
 Ibid., 531-2. 
2 6 2
 Leach, Haider (From Hitler's Generals), 121. 
2 6 3
 Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff 418. 
2 6 4
 Macksey, Why the Germans Lose at War, 168. 
2 6 5
 Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff 418. 
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Walter Garlitz noted that Halder's dismissal marked the end of German military 
success and the begim1ing of its military defeats.265 Both Halder and his predecessor 
Beck had been products of the German military tradition. They both had been selected 
by Hitler, but only after careful recommendations made within the established army chain 
of command. Both men, extremely technically competent, had the bad luck to have 
served during the Third Reich where Hitler's power games and increased meddling in the 
operational fields of war ensured the marginalization of the General Staff. 
About this same time Hitler fired the commander of Army Group A, Field Marshal 
Wilhelm List, for failing to advance rapidly enough. With his contempt for his generals 
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continually on the rise, Hitler himself took command of the army group despite the fact 
that his headquarters was 700 miles away. 2 6 6 He eventually relinquished the position to 
Field Marshal Ewald von Kleist in early November when the Soviets began their 
counterattack at Stalingrad.2 6 7 
Haider's successor as Chief of the General Staff, Kurt Zeitzler, had first caught 
Hitler's eye when he had served as Chief of Staff to Kleist's panzer army in Russia. His 
efforts in repulsing the Allied raid at Dieppe, France won him Hitler's further admiration 
and the order to replace Haider. This was an unusual appointment as Zeitzler had 
269 
never been part of the 'leading clique' within the Troop Office or the General Staff. 
It was Zeitzler's 'drive, energy, and fighting spirit' that Hitler appreciated in his 
970 
new Chief of the General Staff. No doubt Zeitzler's relative youth accounted for much 
of the new dynamism that he brought to the position. With the exception of Hans Krebs, 
the ineffectual last Chief of the General Staff who served a bare month before the end of 
the Third Reich, every Chief of the General Staff had begun his tenure while in his mid-
fifties or older. By contrast Zeitzler was only forty-seven when Hitler appointed him to 
the post. 
About the same time as Zeitzler took over for Haider, Hitler, rapidly losing his 
already depleted faith in the General Staff, relived that organization of the responsibility 
for the staff personnel appointments. This allowed Hitler to maintain direct control over 
Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, 402-3. 
Samuel W. Mitcham, Jr., Kleist (From Hitler's Generals), 255. 
Hart, The German Generals Talk, 57-8. 
Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff 419-20. 
Kershaw, Hitler: 1936-1945: Nemesis, 649-50. 
   lf    
 ?66    
       
 talingrad.267
l '   i f   
    i f  ff   
t        
 l 268   
never been part of the 'leading clique' within the Troop Office or the General Staff.
 '  fi     
new Chief of the General Staff.2 o No doubt Zeitzler's relative youth accounted for much 
of the new dynamism that he brought to the position. With the exception of Hans Krebs, 
the ineffectual last Chief of the General Staff who served a bare month before the end of 
the Third Reich, every Chief of the General Staff had begun his tenure while in his mid-
fifties or older. By contrast Zeitzler was only forty-seven when Hitler appointed him to 
the post. 
About the same time as Zeitzler took over for Halder, Hitler, rapidly losing his 
already depleted faith in the General Staff, relived that organization of the responsibility 
for the staff personnel appointments. This allowed Hitler to maintain direct control over 
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the selection of General Staff officers.2 7 1 Hitler exercised this new authority not through 
OKW, but through his adjutant, Schmundt. Also, in an attempt to further indoctrinate the 
army with National Socialist ideology, Hitler created the National Socialist Leadership 
272 
Organization to act as spies and Nazi propagandists within the officer corps itself. 
By the beginning of the Stalingrad crisis Hitler was no longer taking meals with 
OKW or OKH officers. Instead it was his military adjutants like Schmundt who began to 
exercise more and more influence upon h i m / / J This new clique of adjutants represented 
yet another power group within Germany's military, to say nothing of other agencies 
competing for the Fiihrer's time and favor like the Nazi Party and SS. 
Despite Hitler's growing impatience with the army leadership Zeitzler's tenure as 
Chief of the General Staff began with the full confidence of the Fiihrer. Zeitzler worked 
quickly to delineate the responsibilities between the General Staff and OKW. Having 
once worked under Jodl, Zeitzler had been a strong proponent of the idea of a unified 
armed forces command. Now that he himself commanded the army under Hitler, 
however, he resented OKW intrusion into what he believed was his sphere. For Zeitzler, 
the Russian front was the exclusive province of OKH and the General Staff and he 
274 
tenaciously opposed any attempt made by OKW to assert its authority there. 
As the Stalingrad crisis worsened and Zeitzler began to realistically appreciate the 
dire straits of the German army, his relations with Hitler rapidly deteriorated. By 
October, 1942 the friction between the two men was evident. Zeitzler held Hitler's desire 
1
 Guderian, Panzer Leader, 275. 
2
 Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff, 421. 
3
 Macksey, Why the Germans Lose at War, 168. 
4
 Ibid., 161, 168. 
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to make the battle lines on maps more ascetically pleasing in justified contempt. Hitler 
came to believe that Zeitzler, whose initial drive he had so admired, was not the 'General 
of the Revolution' he had believed him to be. To make matters worse, Zeitzler would not 
accept the bribes that Hitler offered to tie his generals to him. 
Though by December, 1942 Goebbels was writing in his diary that "The 
appointment of Zeitzler has done a lot of good," the situation between the Fiihrer and his 
Chief of the General Staff was anything but . 2 7 6 Zeitzler and Hitler argued over the fate of 
the Sixth Army at Stalingrad, the Chief of the General Staff insisting that it be allowed to 
attempt escape. He went so far as to tell Hitler that it was a crime to leave the Sixth 
977 
Army stranded there. Hitler was also annoyed by Zeitzler's attempt to dramatize the 
suffering of the Sixth Army when he ordered that he and his staff be limited to the same 
rations as the trapped army. When he began to visibly lose weight, Hitler countermanded 
978 
the order and insisted that he eat. 
Shortly after his appointment to Chief of the General Staff, Zeitzler recommended 
that the Stalingrad offensive be abandoned. The commander of the Sixth Army, General 
Friedrich Paulus, whose command was mired in urban fighting and deprived of tactical 
maneuver, initially agreed. When Schmundt intimated Paulus' star would rise with Hitler 
if he took the city, the commander of Sixth Army showed a new enthusiasm for the 
Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff, 424. 
2 7 6
 Joseph Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943 (Louis P. Lochner Ed. & Trans.), (New York: Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., 1948), 253. 
2 7 7
 Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff, 424-6. 
2 7 8
 Dupuy, A Genius for War, 277-9. 
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With the crushing Soviet blows against the German flanks that ensured the 
encirclement of Sixth Army, Hitler ordered Paulus not to break out. This was no vague 
order simply telling Paulus to hold his position. Hitler ordered precisely where each of 
his divisions should defend the pocket. 2 8 0 Manstein, now commanding the newly created 
Army Group Don and Paulus' immediate superior, refused to order a breakout for the 
Sixth Army even as he tried futilely to break through to it. Manstein did let Paulus now 
that he would support Paulus' decision if the Sixth Army commander himself decided to 
attempt a breakout. Despite their knowledge of the Sixth Army's hopeless position at 
Stalingrad, neither general would order a breakout. Fear of facing the Fiihrer's wrath was 
more powerful than avoiding military disaster. 
Hitler elevated Paulus to the rank of field marshal in the hopes of stiffening his 
resolve or inducing him to commit suicide. The day after his promotion Paulus 
surrendered to the Red Army. Upon hearing the news Hitler bellowed, 
In peacetime Germany, about 18,000 or 20,000 people a year chose to 
commit suicide, even without being in such a position. Here is a man 
who sees 50,000 or 60,000 of his soldiers die defending themselves 
282 
bravely to the end. How can he surrender himself to the Bolshevists! 
Later, 
What hurts me most, personally, is that I still promoted him to field 
marshal. I wanted to give him this final satisfaction... a man like 
that besmirches the heroism of so many others at the last moment. 
He could have freed himself from all sorrow and ascended into 
T O T 
eternity and national immortality, but he prefers to go to Moscow. 
John Erickson, The Road to Berlin, Stalin's War with Germany, Volume Two (London: Cassell, 1983), 
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 Overy, Russia's War, 185. 
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 F. W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles (Trans. H. Betzler), (Old Saybrook: Konecky & Konecky, 1956), 
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Paulus' actions only further blighted the officer corps in Hitler's eyes. If a field marshal 
could not be trusted at the critical hour then who could? 
The failure to take Stalingrad illustrates Hitler's reach far exceeding his grasp. In 
the attempt to take the city while also investing significant resources in the Crimea and 
throughout the Eastern Front, the German Army had extended itself too far consequently 
and left its lines vulnerable. When asked after the war why the battle for Stalingrad had 
ended in disaster Haider replied, "Because we had only a fraction of the forces which 
were needed." 
The replacement of Haider with the younger and more dynamic Zeitzler had soon 
lost its charm and the failure of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad was too large a defeat to 
simply write off as the cost of doing business on the Eastern Front. The prospect for total 
victory over the Soviet Union had died in the snows of Stalingrad and Hitler ensured the 
blame fell squarely upon the army. Hitler's constant meddling in the operational and 
tactical realms proved as disastrous for the German Army as Stalin's interference had 
been to the Red Army earlier in the year. 
Late spring of 1942 found a more sober Stalin and his generals preparing for the 
German offensive. The Red Army leadership had convinced Stalin of the need for 
retreats in the face of German military superiority. Perhaps humbled by his failure with 
the winter and spring offensives the Soviet leader was more willing to listen to the advice 
of his generals. This new willingness on Stalin's part of authorizing limited withdrawals, 
Franz Haider, secretly taped conversation with Lieutenant-General Heim, (London: Interrogations of 
Captured German Officers, Public Record Office). 
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though within the larger framework of a general no-retreat policy, allowed the Red Army 
to gain valuable experience in avoiding encirclement. While the Red Army suffered 
many casualties with the launch of Hitler's 'Case Blue' they were significantly less than 
those suffered the previous summer. To the Germans the fact that they were taking fewer 
prisoners was interpreted to mean that the Red Army was on its last leg. 
Like Hitler two years later believing that the cross-channel attack was due to land 
at the Pas de Calais instead of the Normandy beaches, Stalin refused to believe that the 
Nazis would attack anywhere but Moscow for their summer offensive. The rapid 
advance of the German Army in the Ukraine was written off as an elaborate ruse to draw 
men and resources away form the Soviet capital. Even when the actual operational plans 
of 'Case Blue' found their way by chance into the hands of Soviet intelligence, Stalin 
wrote them off as disinformation and berated his intelligence officers. 
Stalin was not alone in his belief that Moscow would be the main target of the 
German offensive. Many of his generals shared this view and advocated strengthening 
the capital's defenses at the expense of other operational sectors. By late August it 
became apparent to both Stalin and his generals that Moscow was not Hitler's aim. 
Realizing its miscalculation with growing dread, the GKO summoned Zhukov to the 
Kremlin, conveyed to him its concerns, and dispatched him as Stavka representative to 
the Stalingrad sector. Stalin told Zhukov that it was duty to defend the city to the last and 
Roberts, Stalin's Wars, 126-7. 
Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, 342. 
Overy, Russia's War, 157. 
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in one great show of faith promoted him to Deputy Supreme Commander under Stalin 
himself.2 8 8 
Zhukov arrived in Stalingrad with the charge to oversee a major counter-attack. 
Finding Red Army units nowhere near ready for the fight Zhukov called Stalin and 
persuaded him to hold up the attack for a few days. Nervous, Stalin called his Chief of 
the General Staff, Vasilevsky, and asked the position of German units. When Stalin 
learned that German tanks were in position in Stalingrad's suburbs, he raged at his 
generals, 
What's the matter with them, don't they understand that if we surrender 
Stalingrad, the south of the country will be cut off form the centre and 
will probably not be able to defend it? Don't they realize that this is 
not only a catastrophe for Stalingrad? We would lose our main waterway 
and soon our oil, too! 2 8 9 
Stalin realized the strategic implications of the loss of the city, and once again he 
desired to meddle in the operational sphere by forcing a premature attack. 
As the Germans continued to bludgeon their way into Stalingrad and its environs, making 
repeated attacks in an attempt to reach the Volga River, General Vasili Chuikov and his 
62 n d Army held fast. Aware of the Wehrmacht's use of operational maneuver in order to 
encircle the enemy, Chuikov ordered his units to fight close and negate the German 
advantage in mobility. "Grab them by the belt," was a common expression Chuikov used 
as the combatants fought a street by street, building by building struggle.2 9 0 
In Moscow, Stalin was desperate to save the city which bore his name. For Stalin 
this meant to give Chuikov whatever he needed to hold the enemy back and to launch 
2 8 8
 Overy, The Dictators, 531. 
2 8 9
 Antony Beevor, Stalingrad, The Fateful Siege, 1942-1943 (London: Penguin Books, 1998), 117. 
Dennis Showalter, Stalingrad, World War II Magazine (Leesburg: Primedia, January, 2003), 35. 
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local counter-attacks when possible. In mid September Zhukov and Vasilevsky met with 
the Soviet leader and offered a bold plan. The two had worked out a scheme to hit the 
German flanks in a series of great, crushing blows. Stalin was critical, as it meant 
husbanding resources that Chuikov desperately needed, but the plan was accepted and 
preparations for offensive, named 'Operation Uranus' began. The buildup of forces tor 
the operation included one million men, 1,000 tanks, 1,400 planes, and 14,000 heavy 
292 
guns. 
Zhukov and Vasilevsky were charged with visiting front and army commanders in 
the Stalingrad sector. Together they surveyed the geography of the area and consulted on 
the general military realities of the situation, though Stalin forbade them to discuss in 
detail the coming offensive. The operation was prepared secretly. Stalin allowed the 
front and army commanders, once they were brought into the loop, time to prepare. All 
were properly briefed and each unit commander thoroughly knew his responsibilities. 
The days of hurried preparations and uncertain orders were passed. This operation was 
not going to be rushed as had those of the previous winter. 2 9 4 
The operation launched in late November and was a major success, trapping 
Paulus' Sixth Army inside the city and ensuring its eventual surrender. German attacks 
to relive Paulus came to nothing and the pocket proved to be impossible to supply from 
air. The Sixth Army surrendered on February 2 n d . 
1
 Overy, Russia's War, 168-9. 
2
 Showalter, Stalingrad, 36. 
3
 Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad, 426. 
4
 Roberts, Stalin's Wars, 149; Overy, Russia's War, 177. 
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Stalin's inclination had been to hold the city by sending everything he could spare 
to Chuikov. Holding Stalingrad had been his overriding passion. Yet he was willing to 
listen to his military experts and favor their judgment over his own. After the Sixth 
Army had been surrounded Stalin was eager to crush it, using 2 n d Guards Army under 
General Rodion Malinovsky. Malinovsky convinced Stalin that the Sixth Army could 
wait while he turned to meet elements of Manstein's Army Group Don, then attempting 
to relieve Paulus. Malinovsky blunted the German attack and ensured that no German 
breakthrough occurred.2 9 5 Once again Stalin's general willingness to defer to the 
judgment of his military technicians ensured Soviet success. 
This new deference to his military leadership was not total, however. 
Occasionally Stalin felt the need to make operational decisions without consulting 
Zhukov or the General Staff. One such episode was Stalin's decision to make 
Rokossovsky the front commander during the operation. Zhukov, who had spent the 
preceding weeks selecting commanders for the various positions, was taken aback as 
Stalin had generally agreed with Zhukov's preparations across the board. 2 9 6 Despite his 
deference to his military technicians, Stalin still insisted on having a hand in the 
operational sphere. 
As the crisis intensified before the Soviet attack, dual command was once again 
abolished on October 9. Officially this move reflected the state and party's faith in 
military units which had proven their loyalty in blood since the previous year. In reality 
this was another acknowledgement of the importance of the military technician and the 
John Erickson, Malinovsky (From Stalin's Generals), 120. 
Service, Stalin, All. 
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folly of second guessing him. The move was controversial, as many commissars felt that 
morale would fall without their political guidance. In any case some commissars were 
transferred to work as military propagandists while others were taken into the Red Army 
as junior officers.2 9 7 
In the wake of the victory at Stalingrad morale in the Soviet Union improved 
tremendously and Stalin basked in this latest Red Army victory. The press hailed the 
'great captain of the Soviet people' and 'the great organizer of our victories.' The hated 
symbol of rank from Tsarist days, gold shoulder boards, returned. Indeed, British 
officials became angry at consignments of gold braid taking up space on shipments to the 
Soviet Union, despite the fact that the return of such emblems noted a marked shift for 
the better in Red Army command and control, and hence better fighting efficiency.2 9 9 
A series of promotions followed, among them Vasilevsky's elevation to full 
general and Rokossovsky's to colonel-general. Zhukov was promoted Marshal of the 
Soviet Union. 3 0 0 At this time Stalin allowed himself to be promoted to Marshal as well, 
having never previously held military rank. This is very telling. With the latest 
victory, one which held off a major enemy attack and devoured an entire German army, 
Stalin felt confident enough to identify himself as a member of the Red Army, not merely 
its master. For all of his supposed military genius, Hitler never deigned to join the 
German officer class by accepting the title of field marshal. Even in the glory following 
Roberts, Stalin's Wars, 133-4. 
Beevor, Stalingrad, 404. 
Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 40. 
Ibid., 38-9. 
Overy, Russia's War, 185. 
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the French surrender when twelve generals were elevated to the rank, Hitler preferred to 
remain apart from and above the German Army. 
The military relationship between Stalin and his generals changed after 
Stalingrad. The Soviet leader increasingly listened not only to senior generals and 
marshals like Zhukov, but also front and divisional commanders. 3 0 2 Stalin had so looked 
down upon the General Staff a year earlier that he planned his three offensives virtually 
without them. Now he had a new respect for the war planning organization and 
witnessed first hand its contribution to the victory at Stalingrad. The General Staff began 
to take on the role of the Stavka's engine, driving the Red Army toward victory. 
Zhukov later stated that it was during the battle of Stalingrad that the Soviet leader finally 
began to grasp the fundamentals of military planning and execution of operations.3 0 4 
The new trust Stalin placed in his generals, however, may have been lost by a 
second, unsuccessful attack made by the Red Army around the same time as 'Operation 
Uranus.' Zhukov planned and commanded another offensive, code named 'Operation 
Mars', which sent the Western and Kalinin Fronts to attack the German Ninth Army in 
the Rzhev-Sychevka region. If possible, the attack was to drive on and destroy all of 
Army Group Centre. Stiff German resistance repelled the attack and Soviet casualties 
mounted. The Red Army broke off the attack at roughly the same time that Paulus' army 
surrendered at Stalingrad. 
3 0 2
 Roberts, Stalin's Wars, 159. 
j 0 3
 Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, 208. 
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'Operation Mars' represented another unrealistic operational plan not dissimilar in 
scope from the disasters of early 1942. Instead of dwelling on the failure of 'Operation 
Mars,' however, Stalin basked in the victory at Stalingrad, seeing there the benefits of his 
cooperation with his generals and learning the lesson of practical military goals. 
After eighteen months Stalin had finally begun to work with the Red Army leadership in 
a constructive and effective way. In a service that had largely discouraged individual 
initiative before the war those mavericks that now spoke up to Stalin and explained 
military realities were rising to the top. Stalin's promotion of so many top officers 
following Stalingrad was a sign of his faith in their collective ability to achieve victory. 
By contrast, Hitler's promotion of Paulus just before the Sixth Army surrender was 
cynical and negative. Hitler had offered it simply to stiffen Paulus' resolve or to 
encourage his suicide. 
When Stalin had undertaken the planning and overall operational command of the 
early 1942 offensives he failed miserably. Out of desperation he had turned to his 
military technicians who convinced him to adopt a general defensive posture. Though he 
was loath to step back from the attack he did and was able to conserve men and resources 
for the next great German attack. It was again during the darkest hours of the battle of 
Stalingrad when he agreed to listen to Zhukov and Vasilevsky. Their plan brought with it 
ultimate victory in the battle and changed significantly the balance of power between the 
Soviet Union and Germany. 
Stalingrad was the turning point of the war in the East, the furthest German 
advance into the Soviet Union and the point from which total German victory became 
virtually impossible. It was also a turning point between Stalin and his generals as the 
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Soviet leader came to appreciate the necessity of working with his military technicians. 
Henceforward Stalin listened to his generals and truly appreciated their judgment. The 
days of simply pronouncing himself correct and ignoring their advice was over. 
Kursk 
The balance of the war shifted significantly after Stalingrad. The Germans were 
no longer in the position of strength that they had been in 1941 and 1942, while the 
Soviet Union's military and industrial power, with aid from the United States and Britain, 
continued to grow. After Stalingrad a total German military victory over the Soviet 
Union was no longer possible, though the Wehrmacht was still a lethal adversary that 
perhaps could inflict enough damage to force a negotiated peace. 
Though Hitler was aware of the German Army's serious reverses and mounting 
danger from the Soviet Union, he refused to believe in anything other than total victory. 
What strategic insight this military amateur had shown in previous years had now 
abandoned him, his relationship with his military leadership continuing to decline. 
Conversely, Stalin and his senior generals had achieved a modus operandi. Though 
Stalin continued to exercise personal command of the Red Army, his political watchdogs 
had been called off. Victory had created a new trust and respect between the Soviet 
leader and the General Staff. 
By this time Stalin was being briefed by an officer of the General Staff at least 
three times a day either in person or by telephone. These briefings usually were made by 
either Vasilevsky, the head of operations Aleksei Antonov, or his deputy Sergey 
Shtemenko. After the final briefing, usually late at night, the directives of the Stavka 
111 
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would be created, Stalin referring to a military unit by the name of its commander. Such 
became the close working relationship of Stalin and his General Staff following the 
victory at Stalingrad.3 0 6 
Early 1943 saw much ebb and flow on the Eastern Front. Kharkov was retaken 
by the Germans in March and the lines more or less stabilized by late spring. A large 
bulge appeared, protruding into the German lines centered on the Russian city of Kursk. 
Any casual glance at a military map early in the summer of 1943 showed the importance 
to both sides of the salient. 
As always Stalin preferred to attack the German units massing before Kursk. 
Zhukov later wrote, 
The Supreme Commander himself was not yet certain whether it was 
better to counter the enemy with defensive operations or to deal a 
forestalling blow at him. Stalin was afraid that our defenses could not 
take the German forces' blow, as had been the case several times in 
1941 and 1942. At the same time, he was not sure that our troops 
• • • • 307 
were in a position to defeat the enemy in offensive action. 
Stalin feared a repeat of the disasters of the previous two summers. Both the defensive 
victories at Moscow and Stalingrad had taken place in winter, giving the season an 
almost mystical quality to the Red Army. The prospect of warm weather and clear skies 
no doubt filled the Soviets with dread as this had traditionally been the weather of 
German victories. At the same time Stalin was reluctant to attack for the same reasons, 
the memories of early 1942 still fresh. Offense, however, had the advantage of giving the 
attacker the initiative, something Stalin had always valued greatly. 
' Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 74-5. 
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In the preparations for defense of Kursk Stalin listened carefully to his front 
commanders and valued their input. Zhukov favored strategic defense at Kursk in the 
hopes that the German Army would break upon Soviet defenses as a wave upon the 
rocks. Then, when the German offensive was spent, the Red Army could attack. Stalin 
polled his senior generals and found that most agreed with Zhukov. The May 1 s t Order of 
the Day called for the need to consolidate the gains of the previous winter. In short, 
1 AO 
attack in the immediate future was off the table. 
In preparing for the battle Stalin left nothing to chance and made good use of his 
military technicians. His Stavka representatives included Zhukov and Vasilevsky, proven 
military specialists. Gone were the days of dispatching political cronies like Voroshilov 
and Mekhlis to sensitive areas. The sector did indeed have political oversight in the form 
of Malenkov who had been dispatched as a representative of the GKO, but his authority 
did not extend to operational or command questions. His brief was to ensure supply and 
distribution of resources to military and civilian officials.3 0 9 
The German attack began on July 5 t h from the north and the south of the salient. 
310 
The Red Army had assembled 1.3 million men to meet it. Prepared defenses and 
experienced commanders ensured that the attack made little headway after promising 
initial gains over the first few days. As the attack commenced, again Stalin inserted 
himself into the operational level of command. On July 6 t h he telephoned the commander 
of the 5 t h Guards Tank Army and ordered his unit advance in the direction of 
Roberts, Stalin's Wars, 156-9. 
Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 74. 
Humpert, Swan Song of the Panzers, 55. 
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Prokhorovka when Waffen-SS units appeared to be making headway. Stalin and 
Zhukov had many heated discussions over the telephone, the Soviet premier demanding 
local counterattacks and heaping scorn upon Zhukov for-not acting quickly enough. 
Zhukov was able to calm Stalin and assure him of ultimate success despite the 
in 
reproaches. 
When the German attack petered out and Hitler recalled his forces the myth of the 
unstoppable German summer offensive was put to rest. The Soviets had withstood the 
worst the Nazis could muster. The Red Army launched its counterattack in the direction 
of Orel, north of Kursk and by August 4 t h it was in their hands. Kharkov was retaken on 
313 
August 23 and Smolensk one month later. 
The first great crisis since Stalingrad had been weathered successfully and once 
again the working relationship between Stalin and his military technicians had been at the 
heart of the victory. The battle of Kursk represented a realistic approach on behalf of 
Stalin and his military leadership to the situation. Operational objectives were not 
intended to throw the German Army out of Soviet territory altogether, as had the early 
1942 offensives. Rather, the emphasis was placed on winning the battle by successfully 
defending the salient and launching counter-attacks to place the Red Army in 
advantageous positions for the next round of fighting.3 1 4 
For Hitler the decision to attack at Kursk was based on political as much as 
military factors. In mid-May Guderian, in his capacity as Inspector of Armored Forces, 
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met with Hitler in Berlin to discuss the forthcoming offensive. According to Guderian's 
account, when he asked why any offensive was planned in Russia at all that summer 
Hitler and Keitel replied that it was necessary for domestic morale as well as to reassure 
Germany's allies. Hitler also noted that it would act as a large-scale spoiling attack, 
ensuring no major Soviet offensives later in the year. Like the Red Army General Staff, 
the German General Staff had only modest operational goals for the offensive. 
'Operation Citadel' was not intended to win the war, along the lines of previous summer 
campaigns in Russia. Guderian pressed the point, insisting such an attack, even 
successful, would make no appreciable difference to Germany's population or its allies. 
Hitler responded, "You're quite right. Whenever I think of this attack my stomach turns 
over." 3 1 5 
The date for 'Operation Citadel' was pushed back repeatedly from early May to 
early July. This was to allow the deployment of heavier German panzers coming off the 
production line, though perhaps also reflected Hitler's growing nervousness regarding the 
operation. Whatever the reason, it allowed the Soviets more time to prepare and increase 
their manpower. Differences in opinion pervaded at OKH. Guderian called for delays to 
ensure a greater quality and quantity of panzers for the battle. Manstein, tasked with 
commanding the operation, and his subordinate Kluge both insisted that the attack launch 
at the earliest possible moment to preclude any further Red Army preparations. Hitler 
ultimately decided to launch the attack on July 5 t h , believing enough new tanks were 
available. Jodl instructed the military propaganda office to give the impression that the 
, 1 5
 Guderian, Panzer Leader, 308-9; Mawdsley, Thunder in the East, 269. 
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Kursk attack was only a limited operation, fearing comparison with the much larger 
operations of the previous two years. 3 1 6 
Indeed Jodl argued that a local success was all that could be expected from the 
operation, fueling further Hitler's doubts. Nor was OKH enthusiastic about the plan. 
Zeitzler and many army commanders attempted to dissuade Hitler from the adventure. 
Both Manstein and Kluge believed in the operation with its massive pincer movement 
317 
over a battlefield the size of Wales. 
The repeated delays of the operation are commented upon by Goebbels in a May 
7 t h diary entry, intimating that perhaps a Soviet attack was forthcoming, 
In the East the Fiihrer will soon start a limited offensive in the direction 
of Kursk. He may, however, delay it to see whether the Bolsheviks want 
to beat us to it. That might offer us an even more favorable chance than 
if we took the initiative. Be that as it may, we are prepared in every way. 
There are arms and soldiers aplenty, so that we need not worry very 
much. 3 1 8 
Hitler's vacillation may have had to do with his belief that the Red Army would attack 
the Wehrmacht first, placing the advantages of defense with the Germans. In any case 
Goebbels' entry notes the smaller scale of the military objectives. 
Hitler announced his decision for the attack date on July 1 s t from his headquarters 
in East Prussia. He stated his fears regarding security for the operation, "This time we 
must be absolutely sure that nothing of our intentions is betrayed again either through 
<J 1 Q 
carelessness or neglect." Despite the tension pervading the air at Hitler's headquarters 
3 1 6
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and in the battlefield, morale among the troops was h igh/ 2 " They were no doubt thinking 
what their opposite numbers were thinking: The Wehrmacht had never been beaten in a 
summer campaign. 
The heavy German Tiger tanks, a small number in the overall German panzer 
formations, proved more deadly than the Soviet T-34s, but significantly less 
maneuverable. The Tigers were often surrounded and pummeled. The July 12t h heavy 
fighting around Prokhorovka, where General Hoth's SS divisions were halted by the 5 t h 
Guards Tank Army, included point-blank engagements which negated German 
advantages in armor and gunnery. 
On July 13 t h Hitler summoned Manstein and Kluge to his headquarters in East 
Prussia where he announced that 'Operation Citadel' was to be called off. The Fiihrer 
cited the landing in Sicily of Allied troops and the need for strong German formations to 
stiffen the resolve of the unreliable Italians. The only formations capable of dealing with 
the crisis were those already engaged at Kursk. Manstein argued vainly for a 
continuation of the battle, not wishing to give the Red Army any time to regroup and 
rally. Hitler was adamant and demanded that all units return to their positions of July 
c t h 322 
Kluge argued against the move as well. When Hitler informed Kluge that he 
would have to transfer some of his SS divisions to Manstein to make up for the units 
transferred to Italy, Kluge warned of disaster. He told Hitler that the loss of the divisions 
Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 219. 
1
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left the German position in Orel untenable. Hitler responded, "Even so, Herr 
Feldmarshall: we are not master here of our own decisions." 
It is doubtful that even had the operation been allowed to continue it would have 
succeeded. The Red Army had been given plenty of time to prepare its defenses, and had 
superior numbers on their side from the beginning. The Soviets had a 2 to 1 advantage 
over the Germans in manpower, not mention significantly more tanks, planes, and heavy 
324 • • 
guns. The Soviets proved tenacious defenders of the Kursk salient and, though fears of 
the German summer offensive myth were real, unit commanders didn't make confused 
radio calls asking for instructions as they had the past two summers. 3 2 5 The defenders of 
Kursk were now veteran fighters. They were led by a system of astute military 
technicians and a General Staff becoming much more capable than its German 
counterpart.3 2 6 
Unlike Stalin, Hitler dealt with a second war in the West. While OKH and field 
commanders in the East correctly began to see Russia as the decisive theatre of the war, 
Hitler, along with Jodl and OKW, placed as much emphasis on fighting the Western 
Allies. This is illustrated by Hitler's willingness to abandon a campaign against the Red 
Army, mid-engagement. It is illustrated again two years later when, with the Red Army 
on the eastern frontiers of Germany, Hitler ordered a major attack against the British and 
American Armies in Belgium. 
Kershaw, Hitler: 1936-1945, Nemesis, 597. 
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The resources of the Third Reich were limited and shrinking, while those of the 
Allies were growing. If Kursk had been even a limited success perhaps Hitler would 
have seriously sought peace negotiations with Stalin. Such a victory would have given 
Hitler the illusion of negotiating from a position of strength. In any case the attack was 
called off ostensibly to support the war effort in Italy. This reflects the growing divide in 
operational thinking between OKH and OKW and Hitler's failure to make painful 
strategic decisions. Hitler wanted to save Southern Italy from Allied invasion, thus 
ensuring continued alliance with Italy. By mid-1943, however, settling accounts with 
Russia had become much more important than saving Italy. 
Those closest to Hitler, his military and political advisors, attempted to goad him 
into appointing a new Commander-in-Chief of the Army not long after the battle. 
Guderian, Zeitzler, and Albert Speer believed that a new army leader, unburdened by the 
increasingly erratic decisions of Hitler, could make a real difference in the war in the 
East. The generals believed that Keitel and Jodl at OKW did not speak for the army as 
an institution to Hitler. The army, they feared, was being treated as a second-class 
organization as Hitler heaped favor and resources upon OKW, the SS, the Party, and 
other agencies permeating the Third Reich. The result of having no lobbyist at 
headquarters with sufficient clout to represent the army was contributing to the worsening 
situation in Russia. Both Kluge and Manstein had already broached the subject with the 
Hart, Guderian, 93. 
      
       
        
       .   
 f    rt .   
    '   
t t i  i i . itl  t  t   t  t l   lli  i i , t  
i  ti  lli  it  t l .  i , , ttli  t  it  
i      i t t t  i  t l . 
      
  r-i - hief    r 
,         
    e  
327  I      
  ,  
      , 
       
 i nt    
 .    t  
327 t, erian, . 
120 
Fiihrer. Despite the pleas of his most capable generals, Hitler refused to relinquish direct 
command of the army. 
The strategic disaster suffered by the Germans-at Stalingrad was completed at 
Kursk. The battle represented the last great German offensive on the Eastern Front in the 
war and the permanent surrender of the strategic initiative to the Red Army. By late July 
Goebbels was lamenting Stalin's order of the day to the Red Army in which the Soviet 
leader claimed that the German offensive had been a failure and that the Red Army, not 
the German Army, had gained ground. Geobbels wrote, "I suppose we can't possibly 
change the situation by offensive operations as has been the case the past two 
summers." 
Following the Kursk campaign Hitler pulled further and further away from 
concepts of what was possible and what was not possible. Unlike Stalin, who had 
learned to let his military technicians do their job with only minimal interference, Hitler 
continued to view himself as indispensable to the operational realm of the war. His 
unwillingness to give up direct command of the army and his continued interference in 
operations ensured further problems for the OKH and the German army engaged in the 
colossal battlefield of Russia. 
Dan van der Vat, The Good Nazi, The Life and Lies of Albert Speer (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1997), 159. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DOWNFALL AND TRIUMPH 
Bagration and July 20 t h 
June of 1944 saw the Red Army stronger than it had ever been at any time since 
the German invasion. Three years to the day that Germany launched 'Operation 
Barbarossa' the Red Army tore the heart out of Germany's Army Group Centre with its 
own massive operation. The blow placed Russian troops just to the east of Warsaw and 
ensured the final Soviet victory a year later. Success resulted from veteran troops and 
commanders led by an efficient military command system in which Stalin and his 
generals worked together in confidence. 
For Germany, with the Wehrmacht virtually expelled from Soviet soil, the defeat 
was an unmitigated disaster. The Red Army success was the result of many factors; 
occurring only weeks after the Western Allies had successfully landed in France, and 
opened up a two-front land war against the Reich. The division of Germany's military 
strength as well as the continued schism between OKW and OKH played important parts, 
as did faulty intelligence and Hitler's overconfidence. The friction between the Fiihrer 
and his generals would come to a head at this time as well when the military plot to 
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profound consequences for the German Army, its relationship with Hitler, and for 
Germany itself. 
By the spring of 1944 Stalin was no longer a frightened, erratic figure throwing 
men and material to the wolves in a desperate attempt to stave off the invader. He had 
learned the arts of patience, cooperation with his generals, and the setting of realistic 
operational goals. The Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts were engaged with a 
reconstituted German Sixth Army in Romania, ultimately achieving victory in 
September. The Balkan adventure was a sideshow compared to the massive operation 
Stavka was planning to drive the Germans out of Byelorussia once and for a l l . 3 3 0 
In preparation for the major offensive against the German Army that summer Stavka 
ordered front commanders to submit their ideas. Stalin himself had long telephone 
discussions with the officers after reading their recommendations. He badgered them 
with questions, wishing to learn every detail of the terrain, the men, and probable enemy 
responses. He paid particular attention to General Rokossovsky and his 1 s t Belorussian 
Front. The General Staff began an exhaustive study of the entire front. By April Stalin 
wished to go onto the immediate attack and rejected a Stavka recommendation to go onto 
the general defensive. Soon after he relented and agreed that the North-Western and 
Western Fronts should consolidate and prepare for an eventual offensive. To ensure that 
his troops remained in a state of readiness, and perhaps to impose his preference on the 
' Pat McTaggart, Red Storm Over Romania, World War II Magazine (Leesburg: Primedia, March, 2001), 
46-7; David M. Glantz, Red Storm Over the Balkans, The Failed Soviet Invasion of Romania, Spring, 1944 
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Stavka, Stalin ordered that the directives to go on the defensive should be considered 
"preparatory moves for an offensive." 
'Operation Bagration' was named for Georgian General Pyotr Bagration, the hero 
of the Napoleonic Wars who died from wounds suffered at the battle of Borodino. The 
allusion to Russia's military past was not new to this offensive. Since the earliest days of 
the German invasion Stalin co-opted Russia's traditional heroes in the quest to rally the 
Soviet peoples against the enemy. In those frantic first months of the war Stalin invoked 
these figures in speeches. Lenin and the Revolution often took a backseat to such 
notables as past military leaders Alexander Nevsky, Dmitri Donskoi, Aleksandr Suvorov 
and Mikhail Kutuzov. Stalin remarked in one speech, "Let the manly images of our great 
T O T 
ancestors... inspire you in this war!" 
Indeed, in the uncertain days of October, 1941, as Stalin was debating evacuating 
the capital for the relative peace of Kuibyshev, he read a biography of the hero of 1812, 
Kutuzov. 3 3 4 Figures such as Kutuzov and Suvorov had been officially recognized as 
liberators of the Russian people from the tyranny of the Napoleonic French since the mid-
1930s, but with the German invasion these figures took on a whole new propaganda 
importance. While perhaps many Soviet citizens had little regard for ideology or 
Revolutionary intellectualism, most could identify with Russia's past military glories and 
the parallels, particularly of the Napoleonic invasions, with the current war. The naming 
3 , 1
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of the great 1944 Soviet offensive 'Bagration' was another way in which the Soviet 
Union sought to mobilize the masses to defeat Germany. 
The use of history for propaganda was hardly confined the Soviets. Since the 
beginning of the war Germany trumpeted its own past military achievements as proof of 
German military strength. Hitler often held up Frederick the Great as the epitome of 
German heroism. With a possible dig at his own generals Hitler remarked, "Prussia owes 
its rise to the heroism of one man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to 
capitulation. Everything depended on Frederick the Great." 3 3 6 As the war began to go 
badly for the Third Reich, German propaganda offered parallels between the current 
position and that of Prussia during the Seven Years' War. The idea that providence had 
saved Frederick the Great then was rehashed to assure the German people that providence 
would not abandon Hitler. 
Indeed, so important was invoking Germany's military past that in late 1944 
187,000 soldiers were taken from the front lines in order to participate as extras in the 
film Kolberg, an exorbitantly expensive propaganda piece that recreated the Pomeranian 
town's resistance to Napoleon's forces in 1807. 
On May 22-3 r d Stavka held a major conference to coordinate and prepare for the 
operation. Attendees included Zhukov and Vasilevsky who were to act as Stavka 
coordinators for the offensive, the front commanders including Rokossovsky and 
Hovhannes Bagramyan, as well as other top level military personal representing the air 
force, artillery, signals, rear services, and engineers. In submitting his plan for engaging 
3 3 6
 Kershaw, Hitler: 1936-1945, Nemesis, 277. 
3 3 7
 H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), 49-50. 
3 3 8
 Burleigh, The Third Reich, 788. 
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German positions around Bobruisk, Rokossovsky included an attack from two directions, 
meant to envelope and destroy the enemy. Stalin disagreed with this notion, believing a 
single, powerful blow against the position would be the better tactic. He cited previous 
operational triumphs in which a single blow led to victory. Rokossovsky was not 
deterred and continued to call for the double attack, even after being warned by political 
cronies Molotov and Malenkov who asked of the general, "Do you know who you are 
arguing with?" Rokossovsky flatly told Stalin that if a single attack was insisted upon, he 
would ask to be relieved of his command. Stalin, convinced by Rokossovsky's faith in 
his plan, yielded and allowed the double attack to go forward, stating that he liked 
generals who knew what they wanted to accomplish. 
A similar disagreement broke out between Stalin and 1 s t Ukrainian Front 
commander Marshal Konev during the planning of the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive. This 
operation, with the aim of pushing the German Army out of the Western Ukraine and 
South-Eastern Poland, was intended to compliment 'Operation Bagration' taking place to 
its north. Again, Stalin relented and said to Konev, "You are a very stubborn fellow. 
Very well, go ahead with your plan and put it into operation on your own responsibility." 
At the same time, General Meretskov's Karelian Front was to attack German and Finnish 
forces near Leningrad. After scolding him in front of the Stavka, Stalin reluctantly 
agreed to reinforce Meretskov's troops with an additional rifle corps, despite objections 
from Zhukov and Vasilevsky.3 4 0 Stalin's appreciation for the judgment of front 
commanders had grown considerably since the dark days of 1941, and the Soviet leader 
3 , 9
 Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 202-3. 
3 4 0
 Ibid., 207, 328. 
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1
 Ibid., 199. 
2
 Roberts, Stalin's Wars, 199. 
began the 1944 operations with concessions to their wishes, sometimes contrary to those 
of the General Staff. 
The influence of the political cronies in military affairs was visibly on the wane 
by this point. When during the lead up to the operation Mekhlis denounced General Ivan 
Petrov, commander of the 2 n d Byelorussian Front, Stalin listened and fired the general. 
Within weeks however Petrov had been placed in command of the 4 t h Ukrainian Front. 3 4 1 
The apparatchiks still had important roles to fill within the Soviet Union, and perhaps 
they were still to be humored when offering suggestions in the military field. Stalin knew 
who he had to thank for the victories at Stalingrad, Kursk, and countless smaller 
operations since, however, and it wasn't his political cronies. 
The four fronts which made up the primary assault force for 'Operation 
Bagration' were the 1s t , 2 n d , and 3 r d Byelorussian and the 1 s t Ukrainian, representing a 
considerable show of strength for the Red Army. Altogether this force contained nearly 
two and half million men, twice as many troops as their German opponents. The force 
342 
also had significant advantages in the number tanks, planes and artillery pieces. The 
Stavka intended this operation to be a hammer blow across the line, not a series of 
pinpricks designed to wrest away control of strategic points. 
A few days before the offensive began Soviet partisans began attacking 
transportation hubs and railway lines. Air attacks followed on the night of June 21-22 n d 
and the ground assault began the following day. Rokossovsky began his phase of the 
offensive on the 2 3 r d and, after a few confused movements, assaulted Bobruisk from two 
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directions on the 26 t h . On July 2-3 r d Minsk, the first capital city of a Soviet republic to 
fall to the Germans, was recaptured. In Lithuania, Vilnius fell on July 13 t h . By early 
August elements of the 47 t h Army were just east of Warsaw, prompting Polish 
nationalists to rise against their German occupiers in one of the war's great tragedies. 3 4 3 
Heavy casualties and severe losses in planes, tanks, and guns meant that the Red 
Army offensive petered out after making significant gains and reaching northern and 
central Poland. Nearly 700,000 Soviet troops were killed, wounded, or went missing. 
Still, in conjunction with supporting maneuvers like Konev's Lvov-Sandomierz 
operation, 'Operation Bagration' had destroyed over thirty German divisions and placed 
the Red Army, albeit an over-extended Red Army, on the Vistula River. 3 4 4 Additionally, 
Soviet combat experience was giving the Red Army an edge. When the Germans had 
invaded in 1941, the ratio of Soviet tanks destroyed to German was about 6 to 1. By mid-
late 1944 the losses in tanks were even. 3 4 5 
Stalin was generally in a good mood during the offensive, realizing his 
advantages and plainly expecting victory. He remained in contact with his commanders 
and Stavka coordinators during the offensive and consulted with Zhukov about the 
practicality of moving into Poland before he issued orders to drive toward Warsaw. 3 4 6 
Supreme military decisions continued to rest with Stalin, but during 'Operation 
Bagration' his trust in the Stavka and fighting officers led him to spend more time on 
Glantz, When Titans Clashed, 204, 207-9, 213. 
Ibid., 214-5. 
Overy, Russia's War, 191. 
Ibid., 243-4. 
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non-operational dimensions of the offensive such as improving morale and supply. In 
early June Stalin intervened in a dispute between the General Staff and the head of the 
railways and rear services. Vasilevsky charged that the fronts were not ready because 
supplies had not been arriving fast enough. Stalin put pressure upon the railway and 
348 
supply administrations and soon the matter was resolved. 
'Operation Bagration' demonstrated again the close working relationship between 
Stalin and his generals. Though he occasionally argued with them, like the exchanges 
over the double-attacks with Rokossovsky and Konev, or even berating them, like when 
Meretskov requested reinforcements, Stalin ultimately appreciated the judgment of the 
commander on the ground. Additionally Stalin left the higher planning largely to the 
General Staff and Stavka, backing them up when necessary against the Soviet 
bureaucracy and his own political cronies. 
Stakva 'representatives' were now referred to as 'coordinators,' denoting their 
role not in dictating policy to front commanders, but synchronizing it with them. The 
synchronicity of the Red Army and civilian war agencies played a big role in Soviet 
success in the later stages of the war and this is due largely to Stalin's willingness to 
delegate, rather than micromanage. Even as Hitler still insisted on maintaining direct 
control over the German Army and directing even tactical movements to his troops, 
Stalin was content to be a major player in general war direction, but leave details to his 
military technicians. Though he still occasionally issued operational orders, this became 
more and more rare. Stalin was the Supreme Commander, and although he would later 
Roberts, Stalin's Wars, 203. 
Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 208, 211. 
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take on the role of Stavka coordinator himself, he had no illusions about being a field 
commander. 
For the German Army the Soviet offensives were a disaster greater than the loss 
of Stalingrad a year and a half earlier. The Wehrmacht lost 350,000 troops and 31 
generals to the Red Army. 3 4 9 Though Soviet losses were considerably higher, the 
Germans simply could not replace the men and equipment. Just as Soviet power began to 
grow in military prowess and war-making potential, German abilities were significantly 
shrinking. 
Army Group Centre was commanded by Field Marshal Ernst Busch at the time of 
the Red Army attack. Busch's appointment owed more to his unswerving loyalty to 
Hitler than to his military abilities. Yet even his faith in the Fuhrer counted for little 
when he requested a shortening of his line. Hitler, still very much involved in all 
operational questions, denied the request. Eventually he blamed Busch for the dire 
military setbacks and along with General Hans Jordan, commander of the Ninth Army, he 
was relieved of his post. Busch was replaced by Field Marshal Walter Model, another 
officer whose military aptitude was overshadowed by his perceived political 
orthodoxy.3 5 0 
By 1944 Hitler had completely abandoned realistic strategic objectives and 
increasingly relied upon wishful thinking and fanciful goals. On January 4 t h Manstein 
asked permission for elements of Army Group South to retreat from their positions along 
the Dnieper. Hitler forbade the move with fantastic reasoning, "There are so many 
3 4 9
 Jonathan W. Jordan, The Wehrmacht's Worst Defeat, World War II Magazine (Leesburg: Weider 
History Group, July/August, 2006), 43. 
3 5 0 Ibid. , 36-42. 
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disagreements on the enemy side that the coalition is bound to fall apart one day." 
Hitler's strategic objective was now to hold out until the alliance between the 
Soviet Union and the Western Allies fell apart. While certainly the two camps diverged 
following the Second World War into the superpower blocs of the Cold War, what Hitler 
failed to realize was that their mutual hatred for Nazi Germany was greater than their 
differences. As long as Hitler ruled Germany there could be no split in the Allied 
coalition. 
This was one delusion among many, however. In arguments with Zeitzler over 
the fate of the Crimea Hitler said, "Just wait and see. We've lived through a couple of 
those cases when everyone said that things were beyond repair. Later it always turned 
out that things could be brought under control after a l l ." 3 5 2 As late as June 6 t h , Hitler told 
Goebbels that Britain was as good as finished and only awaited Germany's final blow 
ICO 
before collapsing altogether. 
Rifts at the Fiihrer's headquarters continued to widen. Zeitzler requested to resign 
when Hitler fired two of his most capable Field Marshals, Manstein and von Kleist, in 
March. 3 5 4 The breach between the army leadership and OKW also continued with 
Zeitzler and his staff refusing to remain in conferences as OKW officers gave their 
reports to Hitler. Finally, after nearly two years in the position, Zeitzler insisted he was 
1
 Berthon, The Warlords, 228. 
2
 Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 272. 
3
 Berthan, Warlords, 240. 
4
 Manstein, Lost Victories, 544. 
     U ay.,,35l 
      
   -   
        
      
.     
. 
    
        
    
   r 11.,,352 ,  
    '  
before collapsing altogether. 353 
Rifts at the FUhrer's headquarters continued to widen. Zeitzler requested to resign 
when Hitler fired two of his most capable Field Marshals, Manstein and von Kleist, in 
March.354 The breach between the army leadership and OKW also continued with 
Zeitzler and his staff refusing to remain in conferences as OKW officers gave their 
reports to Hitler. Finally, after nearly two years in the position, Zeitzler insisted he was 
° 5  
J s , .
352 , zer ttles, 
°5° 
J J  r s , .
354 , t i s, . 
131 
too ill to continue. Hitler accepted the resignation of his Chief of Staff in early July, by 
o r e 
which time the two men had grown thoroughly disgusted with one another. 
Lacking the 'intellectual brilliance' of his predecessors and appointed on the eve 
of the worst military disaster the German Army had known up to that point, Zeitzler 
found himself in the position of a fireman fighting as much for his generals against Hitler 
as against the Russian enemy. 3 5 6 Suffering from a breakdown after his dismissal, Zeitzler 
would later be humiliated by Hitler when the Fiihrer ordered his expulsion from the army 
and loss of the right to wear a uniform or draw a pension. 
The double blow of 'Operation Bagration' and the Allied landing in Normandy 
highlighted the growing contempt between Hitler and many of his officers. Officers 
continued to press for a reorganization of command in the eastern theater, which Hitler 
rejected. Rundstedt, now Commander-in-Chief in the West, was beside himself with 
rage when he called to inform the Fiihrer that the Allied invasion was underway and told 
that Hitler was sleeping and not to be roused under any circumstances. As Hitler held 
ultimate command over panzer forces in France this severely hampered the German 
Army's ability to respond to the invasion. The following year, when Soviet tanks were 
rolling through the streets of Berlin, Zhukov had no trouble rousing Stalin to inform him 
of events unfolding in Germany. The Soviet situation in May of 1945 was nowhere 
near as precarious as that of Germany in 1944. 
Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff, 452-3. 
Dupuy, A Genius for War, 211. 
Kershaw, Hitler: 1936-1945, Nemesis, 649-50. 
Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff, 452-3. 
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Overy, Russia's War, 215. 
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The military conspiracy against Hitler, which had existed in various forms for 
years, came to a head on July 20 t h when Colonel Clause von Stauffenberg planted a bomb 
in the Fiihrer's East Prussian headquarters and attempted to oust the Nazi regime. The 
explosion killed several officers and wounded a few more, but Hitler walked away with 
only slight injuries. In the wake of the bomb and the failed coup, Hitler's disdain for the 
officer corps reached new heights and ensured the total subservience of the German 
Army to the Nazi Party for the remainder of the Third Reich. 
Stauffenberg, like many army officers, rejoiced at Hitler's accession to the 
Chancellorship in 1933. 3 6 1 After years of war and rumors spread of atrocities in the East, 
however, his enthusiasm for the Nazi regime waned. Stauffenberg began to believe that 
Hitler's direction of the war was "foolish and criminal," and that he had to be stopped 
before he dragged Germany into an abyss. In these sentiments Stauffenberg was not 
alone and the conspiracy counted among its numbers former Chief of the General Staff 
Ludwig Beck, second in command of military intelligence Colonel Hans Oster, and 
General of Infantry Friedrich Olbricht, to name but a few. 
Leading officers like Stauffenberg were quickly shot while other members of the 
conspiracy, both military and civilian, were tried by the notorious Nazi People's Court 
under the contemptible direction of Judge Roland Freisler. Hitler seized the chance to 
pull the army yet closer to him in an attempt to stamp out lingering conservative 
sentiment. From this point forward the German Army was to be a National Socialist 
, 6 1
 Gellately, Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler, 290. 
3 6 2
 Peter Hoffman, Stauffenberg, A Family History, 1905-1944 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University 
Press, 2003), 151. 
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organ more than a mere institution of the state. Goebbels noted in his diary entry of July 
23 r d , 
The Fiihrer is furious with the generals, especially those from the General 
Staff.... He is determined to make a bloody example of them, and root 
out a freemason's lodge which has always been ill-disposed to us and 
was only waiting for the moment when in the Reich's critical hour it could 
stab us in the back. 3 6 3 
Goebbels' reference to the stab in the back is telling. For the Nazi mentality the July 20 t h 
plot was analogous to the various forces that conspired to rob Germany of its victory in 
World War I. The reference to the freemason's lodge implied that the current conspiracy 
had the same internationalist bent as that earlier conspiracy. The difference this time was 
that the German officer corps lay at the heart of this imagined worldwide plot to rob Nazi 
Germany of victory. 
Heinz Guderian, who was conveniently incommunicado as the events of July 20 t h 
played out, was selected as Chief of the General Staff. His appointment owed as much to 
chance as it did to his apparent political suitability. Hitler's intention was to appoint 
General Buhle to replace Zeitzler as Chief of the General Staff, but Buhle had been 
severely wounded in the July 20 t h bomb. Guderian was therefore the closest officer at 
hand with essential experience on the Russian front and who also had no direct 
connection to Stauffenberg's plot. Even as Hitler railed against the General Staff as a 
hotbed of mutiny, he promoted this 'reliable' officer to be its chief.3 6 4 
Acutally Hitler appointed Guderian to be its temporary chief. The official title 
Guderian held was now Acting Chief of the General Staff. Perhaps Hitler didn't trust 
3 6 3
 Berthon, The Warlords, 250. 
j 6 4
 Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff, 475-6. 
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Guderian as fully as he let others believe, or perhaps this was another way that Hitler 
attempted to accrue more military authority for himself without actually appointing 
himself Chief of the General Staff.3 6 5 In fact, Guderian was appointed Acting Chief of 
the General Staff even as he maintained his office of Inspector of Panzer Forces. 3 6 6 
Perhaps the Fiihrer had so little faith in the office of Chief of the General Staff that he felt 
Guderian could handle both with little difficulty. 
At any rate, in the aftermath of the bomb plot Guderian was expected to put the 
best National Socialist face on his office. In fact Guderian himself was expected to be a 
National Socialist Leadership Officer writ large in the German military. At the time of 
his appointment he stated, "There is no future of the realm without National Socialism," 
("Es gibt keine Zukunft des Reiches ohne den Nationalsozialismus.") Guderian, along 
with Rundstedt, served on the court of inquiry that expelled those involved in the bomb 
plot from the army. Additionally, Guderian required that the traditional military salute 
used by the army be replaced with the party salute and stated that all officers must be 
National Socialists.3 6 8 
With Guderian's ascension we see the complete fall of an army independent of 
politics. Guderian, who had always promoted himself as a pro-Hitler officer, now 
hammered the point home. Was this an attempt to deflect suspicion over his role in the 
bomb plot? Or was his new drive to Nazify the army a legitimate belief that only a 
3 6 5
 Hart, Guderian, 102. 
~'
66
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, 6 7
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fanatical devotion to the Fiihrer could save Germany. A combination of both seems the 
most likely answer. 
Hitler's anger at his generals prompted him to remark that he now understood 
Stalin's reasons for having Tukhachevsky shot. Military justice was often suspended in 
favor of improvised tribunals run by a hodgepodge of Gestapo, SD, and military 
policemen. Political figures like Martin Bormann and Heinrich Himmler were invited to 
attend Hitler's military conferences daily. 3 6 9 In fact Himmler was elevated to many new 
military roles including command of the Replacement Army. Under his command the SS 
would dominate over a quarter of the German Army. 
Himmler's hatred for the officer corps was exceeded only by Hitler's. The 
Reichsfuhrer-SS saw in the aftermath of July 20 t h the opportunity to recreate the German 
Army into a National Socialist 'People's Army,' the very thing Rohm had wished for the 
SA ten years earlier. To this end Himmler was determined to destroy the power and 
371 
prestige of the officer corps. In this he was aided by German public opinion and even 
the lower ranks of the army. For most Germans the thought of generals turning against 
^ 7 9 
the Fiihrer in the critical hour was shocking to say the least. Guderian later wrote, 
Only one fact seems beyond dispute: at that time the great proportion of 
German people still believed in Adolf Hitler and would have been 
convinced that with his death the assassin had removed the only man 
who might still have been able to bring the war to a favorable conclusion. 
The odium thus created by his death would have been attached primarily 
to the corps of officers, the generals and the general staff... 
Winchester, Hitler's War on Russia, 186. 
0
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A German military victory in 1944 was not possible. The battle of Kursk the 
previous year had robbed the Wehrmacht of the strategic initiative in the war against the 
Soviet Union and it was never to return. Hitler's great hope was that in wearing down 
both the Red Army and the forces of Britain and the United States he could create an 
animosity between them and exploit it. As stated above, this was wishful thinking. 
Hitler's Reich was the glue that held the Allies together. 
Those officers that were aware of Hitler's unrealistic strategic goals decided to 
act. The result was the fiasco of July 20 t h . In the attempted assassination and failed 
coup, Hitler saw the confirmation of all of his doubts, suspicions, and frustrations toward 
his army leadership that he had nursed for years. The continued loyalty of officers like 
Keitel and Jodl ensured the position of the OKW command, though it too had its traitors. 
For Hitler the army was the chief culprit. It was the same army whose leadership had 
warned him against adventures in Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia in the mid-
thirties. It was the same army leadership that counseled against attacking Poland and 
France. It was the same army leadership that failed to take Moscow and then lost an 
army at Stalingrad. It was the same army leadership that had been scheming to take away 
his command of the Eastern Front for over a year. Now that same army leadership 
stepped out of the shadows and revealed its true face. It was a nest of traitors. 
It was impossible for Hitler to accept responsibility for the military defeats in both 
Russia and France just as it had been impossible for him to believe that Germany had 
militarily lost the First World War. Sinister forces were working to sabotage Germany's 
war effort just as they had in 1918. The July 20 t h plot gave Hitler another scapegoat. The 
result was increased Nazification of the army. Greater control of military decisions by 
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political organizations like the SS and the Party ensured decreased power and influence 
of the officer corps. The General Staff was placed under a general with solid and vocal 
Nazi credentials and the continuing split between OKW and OKH only further 
diminished the German Army as an institution. 
As Stalin was increasingly ignoring political attack dogs like Mekhlis, Hitler was 
relying more and more upon cronies like Bormann and Himmler. Stalin was supporting 
his officers in their requests and consulting with them on operational and strategic 
questions. Hitler was beginning the process of murdering officers associated with the 
bomb plot and continued to micromanage the war.. As the conflict entered its final year 
Stalin and his military leadership set realistic operational goals within the framework of a 
long-term strategy. Hitler had no strategy and simply hoped for an improbable political 
victory that would settle the war. For this reason his military leadership held him in 
justifiable contempt. 
In the military realm Stalin had learned a degree of humility while Hitler's hubris 
knew no bounds. 
The Drive to Berlin 
In early November, 1944, the Stavka decided that the drive from Warsaw to 
Berlin would constitute the Red Army's primary axis of advance for the coming 
offensive, scheduled to being sometime in mid-January. Marshal Zhukov had been 
placed in command of the 1 s t Byelorussian Front which would be the principal unit in the 
assault. In contrast to Bagration, there was no central planning meeting with all of the 
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front commanders. Rather, the officers met independently with Stalin and the General 
Staff to give input and receive orders. 
A profound shift in the military relationship between the Stavka and the front 
occurred at this time. Zhukov, who had served in a variety of positions throughout the 
war and wielded military authority second to Stalin's own, was given command of the 
front tasked with taking the German capital. This no doubt reflected Stalin's faith in 
Zhukov's ability to get the job done, but also perhaps to reward the military technician 
who had saved Moscow and Stalingrad, and handed the Red Army many other victories. 
The capture of Berlin, however, was not only going to be the triumph of any front 
commander, however exalted he may be. Stalin decided that the ultimate victory over 
Hitler's Reich, symbolized by the fall of its capital, would be his victory as well. To that 
end the operation would be commanded by the Stavka directly. The front commanders 
were to maintain constant communication with the Kremlin and Stalin, now inserting 
himself into the role of Stavka coordinator for the offensive, was in operational 
command. 
Stalin became effectively the supreme field commander for the drive on Berlin. 
This decision, however, was not taken arbitrarily. Relying as always on the judgment of 
Zhukov, Stalin consulted the marshal by phone and asked whether this new arrangement 
was feasible. Zhukov pointed out that the Red Army's shorter line overall made this the 
command relationship practical . 3 7 6 Zhukov's reasoning made sense from a military 
standpoint as previous Stavka coordinators had to walk a balancing act between the needs 
, 7 4
 Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 449. 
, 7 5
 Overy, Russia's War, 255; Geoffrey Jukes, Vasilevsky (From Stalin's Generals), 284. 
3 7 6
 Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 426. 
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of the various fronts and the orders of Stavka. Now that the Red Army was projecting 
itself into the narrower corridor of Central Europe, this was no longer necessary. Perhaps 
Zhukov also realized the value, indeed the necessity, of Stalin's participation in the final 
campaign of the war. For political and propaganda purposes, Stalin's conspicuous 
leadership in the final defeat of Hitlerism was a must. 
Stalin's decision to take on the role of Stavka coordinator was a political move 
much more than a military one. Stalin had to be seen to be in overall command of the 
final act of the war, but aside from major operational decisions his military technicians 
maintained their authority.3 7 7 In his new position as Stavka coordinator Stalin refrained 
from the operational micromanagement that characterized Hitler's command style. 
Vasilevsky, the capable Chief of the General Staff who had been an integral part of 
planning so many Red Army triumphs, was initially shuffled off to the side as Stavka 
coordinator for the 1 s t and 2 n d Baltic Fronts. When the commander of the 3 r d 
Byelorussian Front, General Chernyakhovskii was killed in action, Stalin appointed 
Vasilevsky to take his place. 3 7 8 The role of Chief of the General Staff fell to Aleksei 
Antonov, with S. M. Shtemenko as his Chief of Operations. These two officers worked 
closely with Stalin during the drive to Berlin and ensured close coordination between the 
3 79 
General Staff and the operation as it unfolded. 
Stalin also intervened directly, with negative consequences, in the assault on 
Budapest. On November 3 r d the commander of the 2 n d Ukrainian Front, General R. 
Malinovsky, requested more time to prepare his forces and bring up reserves before 
'
7 7
 Glantz, When Titans Clashed, 288. 
3 7 8
 Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 428-9. 
3 7 9
 Roberts, Stalin's Wars, 256. 
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Stalin also intervened directly, with negative consequences, in the assault on 
Budapest. On November 3rd the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, General R. 
Malinovsky, requested more time to prepare his forces and bring up reserves before 
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attacking the city. Stalin responded coldly, "You do not understand the political 
necessity of mounting an immediate attack on Budapest.... I categorically order you to 
go over the offensive tomorrow." Malinovsky attacked on November 4 t h but failed to 
make headway. Another assault on the 11 t h also ended with little favorable result. 3 8 0 The 
city only fell to the Red Army after weeks of intense fighting and was the scene of many 
atrocities against civilians. The levels rape and pillage in Budapest were unprecedented 
381 
by the Red Army and foreshadowed events to come after the fall of German capital. 
Stalin's pressuring of Malinovsky appears to be a throwback to his earlier habit of 
insisting on an offensive regardless of unit readiness and realistic goals, like his 
badgering of Meretskov before Leningrad in early 1942. Despite Stalin's insistence on 
the political reasons for the attack, however, the assault upon Budapest had important 
military implications. Budapest was a secondary objective that Hitler was evidently 
bound to defend ruthlessly. The continued pressure on Budapest ensured that German 
units were not transferred further north to defend the approaches to Berlin, the primary 
objective. Stalin was acting perfectly in his role as Stavka coordinator. 
The failure to take Budapest in a timely manner still grated upon Stalin, however, and he 
rarely mentioned the action later. 
Over two million men were assembled for the assault into Germany, nearly ten 
thousand aircraft. This represented an incredible Red Army advantage in terms of 
numbers, with eleven times as many soldiers as their German adversaries and several 
Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 396-7. 
1
 Merridale, Ivan's War, 305. 
2
 Erickson, Malinovsky (From Stalin's Generals), 121. 
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more factors of tanks and artillery guns. February and March saw the Red Army 
sweep across East Prussia and Central Poland, virtually destroying German Army Group 
A and Army Group Centre, and delivering crushing blows on its flanks to Army Group 
Vistula and Army Group South. Over four hundred miles had been crossed, bringing the 
Red Army to within forty miles of Berlin. 
The Stavka began planning the coup de grace against Berlin on April 1 s t , just as 
Zhukov and Rokossovsky were finishing their operations in Pomerania and Konev was 
clearing Upper Silesia. The failures of the Russian approach to Berlin in the Seven 
Years' War and the campaign aimed at Warsaw in 1920 were both heavily analyzed. The 
Stavka intended to destroy all resistance before Berlin, take the city, and link up with the 
Western Allies on the Elbe River. Stalin remained skeptical that Britain and the United 
States would stick to their agreements and leave Berlin to the Soviets. This fear lit a fire 
under the General Staff and the front commanders to reach Berlin as soon as possible. 
Zhukov and Konev were recalled to Moscow for consultations with Stalin in preparation 
for the assault on Berlin. Stalin asked, "So, who is to capture Berlin, we or the 
Allies?" Konev assured Stalin that his front could take Berlin, to which the Soviet 
leader berated him, mockingly asking him how he could reorient his front to take Berlin 
when it was firmly committed in the south. Zhukov quickly replied that his front was in 
position and ready to push toward the city. 
Roberts, Stalin's Wars, 254. 
Glantz, When Titans Clashed, 254-5. 
Ibid., 258-9. 
Oleg Rzheshevsky, Konev (From Stalin's Generals), 99. 
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Stalin played the two generals off of each other, believing their rivalry would 
produce results. The previous November Stalin had stated that Zhukov's 1 s t Byelorussian 
Front would operate in the Berlin sector, and he was careful in the April meeting not to 
negate that order. He left open, however, room for Konev to maneuver and possibly take 
the city himself. Antonev presented the general plan for the assault followed by the plans 
from the two front commanders. Wishing to be intentionally vague about lines of 
advance between the two fronts, Stalin suggested that Konev's front should swing and 
take Berlin from the south, should Zhukov encounter fierce resistance and be held up. 
Stalin said to the two generals, "Whoever breaks in first, let him take Berlin." 
Stalin maintained the rivalry as the two fronts pressed toward Berlin. When Zhukov 
phoned the Soviet leader to inform him of stiff German resistance before Berlin, Stalin 
replied that Konev would have to redirect his tank units to attack from the south. This 
was no doubt intended to light a fire under Zhukov and force the commander to prod his 
front into action. 
Stalin ruthlessly exploited both the fear among the Red Army leadership that the 
Western Allies might take Berlin first and the personal rivalry between Zhukov and 
Konev. These factors ensured that a mass of Red Army units converged upon the 
German capital. The three fronts of Zhukov, Konev, and Rokossovsky suffered 
causalities much higher than expected, illustrating the Red Army leadership's relative 
indifference to the lives under their command. Nearly 80,000 Red Army soldiers were 
killed and nearly 275,000 were wounded in the assault on the city. Many of the 
, 8 8
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casualties were the results of friendly fire, with Soviet soldiers attacking from different 
directions.3 9 0 
For Stalin the taking of Berlin was the all important symbol of Soviet victory. He 
drove his generals relentlessly and allowed them to spend soldiers' lives generously in 
the quest to claim the German capital. By taking upon himself the mantle of Stavka 
coordinator, Stalin did not forget the lessons of the past four years. Though he certainly 
played a military role as Stavka coordinator, such as in the prodding of Malinovsky 
before Budapest, by and large his role was political. For propaganda purposes Stalin felt 
he needed to be seen leading the charge, though if fact he directed the campaign from the 
Kremlin. Even as he played Zhukov and Konev off against each other in their race to 
Berlin, there was no doubt as to who commanded their fronts. Stalin limited himself to 
general mission directives and let his subordinates command their armies. 
Since the battle of Stalingrad, Stalin had leaned on the advice of his military 
technicians and Berlin was no different. Antonov proved a capable Chief of the General 
Staff; planning operational details that Stalin had neither the time nor the inclination to 
bother with. The assault on Berlin, with all of its time pressures, proved a better planned 
and executed operation than Stalin's ill-advised adventures in early 1942. Where those 
attacks had squandered Red Army resources in three directions in a vain attempt expel 
the Germans from Soviet territory, the Berlin offensive showed the power, for all of its 
faults, of military concentration. 
Beevor, The Fall of Berlin 1945, 424. 
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In military matters Stalin trusted the team assembled around him. Gone were the 
days when political generals like Voroshilov and Budenny dominated military affairs. 
Gone were the days when apparatchiks like Mekhlis shared responsibility with front 
commanders. Through trial and error the top level chain of command for the Red Army 
had been worked out and by 1945 it operated more efficiently and effectively than its 
enemy's. The reason for this was Stalin's eventual recognition that his military judgment 
was inferior to professional military officers. Though he maintained overall command 
throughout the war he gradually allowed his senior officers more and more latitude to 
exercise their authority without interference. 
The Wehrmacht's last great offensive was directed not at the Soviet enemy, but 
against the Western Allies in the Ardennes forest. The final attack of the offensive, 
named 'Operation North Wind', was launched on the first day of 1945 and only 
penetrated about twelve miles into the American lines. The offensive was soon halted 
and the Allied line stabilized.3 9 1 
When the Ardennes offensive had opened two weeks earlier Hitler was already a 
broken man. One officer commented on his appearance, and in so doing perhaps offers a 
deeper glimpse of the German dictator's state of mind, "Hitler was a stooped figure with 
a pale and puffy face. He sat hunched in his chair. His hands trembled. His left arm 
392 
twitched. When he walked he dragged one leg behind him. A sick man. 
The decision to husband military resources and launch an attack in the West, despite the 
Soviet colossus barreling down on Germany from the East, can be attributed to the 
3 9 1
 Kershaw, Hitler: 1936-1945, Nemesis, 745. 
3 9 2
 William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of Adolf Hitler (New York: Scholastic Book Services, 1961), 161-
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antagonism between OKW and OKH, as well as Hitler's failing military logic. A 
consummate yes-man, Jodl quickly agreed with Hitler when the later stated that Germany 
• 393 
could still afford to lose land in the east, but not in the west. A tug-of-war began to 
play out between Jodl and Guderian over units and resources. 3 9 4 Hitler ordered the 
powerful Sixth SS Panzer Army to Hungary after the failure of Ardennes offensive. 
Though Guderian was delighted that the powerful unit was transferred east, he objected 
to its placement so far to the south. 3 9 5 The result of this competition between western and 
eastern commands was watered down efforts on both the Western and Eastern Fronts. 
As Acting Chief of the General Staff, Guderian was given a mandate by Hitler to 
limit his concerns to the Russian front. This suited Guderian who tended to downplay the 
war in the west and constantly demanded that the east have priority for resources and 
troops. Where Zeitzler had been much more confrontational with OKW, Guderian had 
no interest in expanding the powers of the Chief of the General Staff at the expense of 
OKW, though he jealously guarded OKH prerogatives.3 9 6 
In January of 1945 Hitler authorized the creation of Army Group Vistula to keep 
the Red Army out of German territory. Convinced that only proper leaders with National 
Socialist convictions could stem the Soviet tied, Hitler appointed Heinrich Himmler to 
command it. Guderian was horrified at the idea of this amateur general commanding 
such a vital formation. The Chief of the General Staff insisted that General Weichs, a 
capable army officer, be made Himmler's Chief of Staff. Hitler initially refused, 
' Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff 486. 
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believing Weichs to be a disloyal officer, but eventually Guderian got his way. Hitler 
397 
remarked, "The Chief of the General Staff has won a battle today." 
Hitler's statement is telling. It illustrates the very real feeling of war that existed 
between Hitler and the German Army generals. This war had been raging since the 
earliest days of the Nazi regime, but now with the attempted assassination of Hitler and 
the subsequent execution of General Beck it took on a deadly dimension. Guderian, 
along with most other officers, was no longer allowed to carry his sidearm to meetings 
with Hitler. His briefcase was always examined for fear of another bomb. In mid-
January Hitler said to Guderian, 
It is not you I am after, but the General Staff. It is intolerable to me that 
a group of intellectuals should presume to press their views on their 
superiors. But such is the General Staff system and that system I intend 
i 399 
to smash. 
On January 2 1 s t Hitler again ordered that all "operational movements" be brought to his 
attention without delay. "In future I shall impose draconian punishment on any attempt 
at concealment, whether deliberate or arising from carelessness or oversight."4 0 0 
The war between the Fiihrer and the Acting Chief of the General Staff intensified 
when Guderian went behind Hitler's back to the foreign minister, von Ribbentrop. 
Guderian proposed that Ribbentrop attempt to seek peace without waiting for instructions 
Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff 491. 
Kershaw, Hitler: 1936-1945, Nemesis, 769. 
Berthon, Warlords, 278. 
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from the Fiihrer. When Hitler learned of this exchange from Ribbentrop he told Guderian 
that his actions were treasonous; another threat in the deadly game. 4 0 1 
As Acting Chief of the General Staff, Guderian was responsible for several 
operationally successful, though ultimately futile maneuvers. Perhaps the greatest was 
his spoiling attack against the Russian buildup in March which delayed their attack on 
Berlin by one month. 4 0 2 
Hitler's delusions continued as the military situation continued to fall apart. 
Unlike Stalin during the Soviet crisis of summer, 1941, Hitler was unwilling to seriously 
consider peace feelers. His strategy remained the hope that his enemies would have a 
falling out among themselves. In September, 1944, Hitler had said, 
If necessary we'll fight on the Rhine. It doesn't make any difference 
where. We will continue this battle until, as Frederick the Great 
said, one of our... enemies gets too tired to fight any more. I live 
only for the purpose of leading this fight.403 
The comparison with Prussia's position in the Seven Years' War became a point of faith 
with Hitler. Fate had intervened for Frederick, it would intervene with him. 
In January Hitler allowed German troops in Courland to be cut off by Red Army 
assaults, despite Guderian's pleas to evacuate it by sea. 4 0 4 In April the Ninth Army under 
General Busse was denied permission to retreat, and subsequently destroyed.4 0 5 The 
decision to place Himmler in command of Army Group Vistula proved a disaster and in 
Gorlitz, History of the German General Staff 492. 
Hart, Guderian, 111. 
Shirer, The Rise and Fall of Adolf Hitler, 161. 
Speer, Inside the Third Reich, 420-1. 
Erickson, The Road to Berlin, 579. 
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mid-March Hitler berated the Reicshfuhrer-SS for his failure to stem the Russian tide. 
Hitler desired to defend every corner of his faltering empire and disaster resulted. Even 
Nazi loyalists like Himmler became scapegoats. To the last Hitler maintained his 
unswerving belief in his own superior military judgment, seeing in his generals weak and 
cowering figures, tainted by the treason of their brother officers. 
The afternoon of April 22 saw Hitler raging against those whom he felt had 
betrayed him. Waffen-SS General Felix Steiner had not attacked Red Army units as 
ordered and the Soviet ring was tightening around Berlin. His generals were all traitors, 
responsible for defeat after defeat. Hitler finally saw reality and declared the war was 
lost, Germany was doomed. He also announced his intention, over the protests of his 
generals, to remain in Berlin to the very end. 4 0 7 With his enemies closing in Hitler 
appointed General of Infantry Hans Krebs to the post of Chief of the General Staff. 
Hitler stated that this was because of Krebs' total devotion to the Fiihrer and went on to 
dismiss Haider, Zeitzler, and Guderian as idiots.4 8 This appointment, however, was an 
empty gesture as Colonel-General Jodl was running virtually everything by this point 
from his OKW Operations Staff. At this time Jodl finally realized his decade long dream 
of OKW surpassing the army once and fall as the premier military command authority 
under Hitler. On April 25 he wrote in his diary that "the Fiihrer signs the order for the 
command organization and the centralization of the staffs."4 0 9 
Peter Padfield, Himmler, (New York: MJF Books, 1990), 569. 
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Hitler's micromanagement of the operational level of warfare and his 
unwillingness to properly delegate military authority had sewn bitter fruit for Germany 
by 1945. The ongoing antagonism, fostered by Hitler and his divide-and-rule command 
style, between OKW and OKH only led to confusion and dissipation of resources. Hitler 
cared little for combined strategy. The General Staff, whose abilities and efficiency had 
been steadily on the decline since the beginning of the war, paled in comparison to its 
much more dynamic Soviet counterpart. 
In the last months of the war the Red Army General Staff served as an 
indispensable operational planning agency which Stalin relied on heavily. The German 
General Staff had become an impediment to Hitler's fantastic military delusions. Stalin's 
front commanders like Zhukov, Rokossovsky and Konev had served in high positions 
throughout the war and were trusted voices in all phases of operational planning and 
execution. Hitler had long ago fired his most able Army Group commanders like 
Manstein and Kleist and had placed his faith in military incompetents like Himmler. For 
the battle of Berlin Stalin had nominally assumed operational command but had allowed 
his officers full authority over their units. Hitler continued to meddle in even the smallest 
operational matters. 
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On April 30 , 1945 Adolf Hitler killed himself as the Soviets advanced on his 
headquarters in Berlin, the German Army a shattered shell of its former self. Two 
months later Josef Stalin accepted the rank of Generalissimo, the Red Army a gigantic 
colossus standing astride all of Eastern Europe. 
Both dictators were military amateurs who commanded the greatest military 
machines in modern history. Hitler's Wehrmacht put into practice prevailing military 
theories that followed the stalemate of World War I. The result was a new war of 
maneuver where tanks and planes played the spearhead to conventional infantry-oriented 
armies. The success of the German Army in the early years of World War II owes much 
to the German mastery of such theories and Hitler's backing of military innovators. 
Hitler's relationship with his military leadership evolved over the course of his 
dictatorship. The traditionally conservative officer corps welcomed the advent of the 
Nazi leader for their shared desire to rearm, to cast off the humiliation of the Treaty of 
Versailles, and to make Germany a world power once again. The German Army needed 
a political focal point for their military program. Wishing to avoid the odium of a 
military dictatorship, the German Army found in National Socialism a party capable of 
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other German conservatives felt that Hitler's radicalism could be contained or mitigated 
with the day to day necessities of wielding political power. Hitler knew that the backing 
or at least the neutrality of the German Army was necessary for any government. As 
Hitler's political aims required acquiesces of the officer corps, a political alliance was 
forged and proved the basis for German military power in the Second World War. 
Historian Trevor N. Dupuy states that "Prusso-German military successes were 
based upon a transitory technical mastery of war ." 4 1 0 The key word is transitory. The 
Germans lost this edge largely because Germany's military technicians were increasingly 
hampered in their operational art by an absolute ruler who believed he understood the 
situation better than they. Hitler had his moments of military brilliance, such as his input 
into and backing of Manstein's plan for the Ardennes assault in 1940. Hitler's hold order 
for the German Army after the failure to take Moscow in 1941 almost certainly saved the 
situation in Russia. However, as the war ground on without decision these moments of 
brilliance became increasingly rare before finally disappearing all together. 
Hitler's micromanagement of the German Army is evident from his repeated 
assumption of military positions lower on the chain of command. As Fiihrer Hitler 
exercised command over Germany's armed forces as Commander-in-Chief. In 1938 he 
took upon himself the position of Defense Minister after the fall of Blomberg. During the 
drive on Moscow Hitler sacked Brauchitsch and made himself Commander-in-Chief of 
the Army. Hitler's hubris reached its peak when he temporarily appointed himself 
commander of Army Group A in 1942. 
Dupuy, A Genius for War, 292. 
 
       
    itical    
  rr  -  
'  l   r   
   t  i    ilit   i  t   l  . 
     
   war.,,410  sitory. 
   '    
      
  .       
  '     '  
  r    
        
      
 t     
        u  
   '  er-in-Chief. 
lf     r   
    lf er-i hief  
      
r   
4 10  nius/or 
152 
Throughout Hitler's management of the war he continually flaunted the army 
chain of command. He came to rely on OKW as a personal command staff, bypassing 
OKH in issuing orders to field commanders. The original concept for OKW as imagined 
by Jodl and Blomberg, that of an interservice command staff, never fully materialized 
thanks to Hitler's divisive practices of command. For the most part the Russian front was 
given priority for units and resources, but the fight against the Western Allies continued 
to demand its share. The sudden breaking off of the offensive at Kursk and transport of 
crack units to Italy foreshadowed more ominous developments for the German Army in 
the Soviet Union. OKW increasingly battled the General Staff in the quest for Hitler's 
favor. By late 1944 the division between it and OKH became a seriously liability. 
Germany lacked any coordinated military strategy and both sides were reduced to 
begging for Hitler's support. Additionally, OKW's championing of Hitler's decision to 
launch the Ardennes offensive ensured that the more critical Russian Front was robbed of 
essential resources. 
Had Hitler not applied his divide and rule leadership methods to the military, he 
would have been wise to reorganize the armed forces system along entirely different 
lines. The Great General Staff of the Army should have been dramatically downsized, 
(with the officer corps going along with Hitler's other political and military outrages they 
would have accepted this). Instead the creation of OKW should have included a 
combined Greater General Staff that made use of staff officers from all branches. This 
Greater General Staff for OKW should have been the supreme military strategy and 
command authority, independently led, under Hitler. The Great General Staff of the 
Army should have been reduced in authority and scope to deal with the technical and 
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organizational issues for which officers like Beck, Haider, Zeitzler, and Guderian would 
have been better suited. 
Hitler's micromanagement of military operations from hundreds of miles away, 
such as his insistence on directing the defense of the Stalingrad pocket, inevitably caused 
disaster and flew in the face of Prusso-German military tradition. Just as important in 
explaining the failure of the German Army, however, is Hitler's refusal to take 
responsibility for his own bad decisions. After Stalingrad his officers continued to call 
for a Commander-in-Chief for the Russian front, and Hitler continued to refuse. For 
Adolf Hitler the General Staff, the German Army and Wehrmacht leaderships, and 
officers in the field from army group to divisional commanders were institutions and 
positions for carrying out the orders of the Fiihrer. Their judgment and advice was of 
little importance. 
It is ironic that the man so remembered for his paranoia and suspicion of those 
around him came to trust absolutely, in military matters at least, his military technicians. 
In the late 1930s Stalin had no qualms about murdering thousands of Red Army officers 
when he suspected that the officer corps was rife with potential rebellion. Lacking the 
long tradition of the German Army, the Red Army was entirely a creation of the Russian 
Revolution. Unlike Hitler, Stalin had to make no compromises with his military. As 
absolute master of the Communist Party, Stalin's ultimate leadership over the Red Army 
was a point of fact. 
From the mid thirties until the end of the war Stalin's relationship with his 
military was a balancing act. Constantly fearing the Red Army's potential power as a 
nucleus of counter-revolution, Stalin's inclination was to place the military under intense 
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political oversight. Political commissars shared military responsibilities with Red Army 
commanders. Traditional ideas of rank of privilege were discouraged. Political cronies 
like Voroshilov and Budenny held the highest military positions. Party apparatchiks like 
Mekhlis flooded the Red Army with communist propaganda. 
When military efficiency became a real priority for the Soviet leadership, 
however, political controls were relaxed. In the aftermath of the Finnish debacle and the 
witnessing of German success in the summer of 1940, unitary command was restored to 
Red Army officers. Officers like Shaposhnikov conducted courses critical of Red Army 
failures. The capable Timoshenko replaced Voroshilov as Commissar for Defense. 
Military necessity very obviously began to outweigh political considerations in Stalin's 
mind. 
The political controls returned following the German invasion in 1941. Dual 
command was reintroduced, giving political commissars tremendous powers at the very 
moment when Red Army officers needed their military authority more than ever. Stavka 
representatives acted as super-commissars among the front commanders, ensuring loyalty 
and compliance with Stalin's wishes. The Stavka representatives ranged from militarily 
able officers like Shaposhnikov, Timoshenko, and Zhukov, to Stalin's political cronies 
Voroshilov and Mekhlis. 
The tide returned during the Stalingrad crisis when unitary command was again 
established, the military rank of general reappeared, and gold braid became an important 
symbol of command for the first time since the downfall of the Tsar. Stakva 
representatives became Stavka coordinators, working with various front commanders in 
order to ensure victory. This time Stalin had struck upon the right formula to create the 
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best conditions for achieving victory within the Red Army. This formula held until the 
end of the war but not long after. With victory over the fascists achieved Stalin proved 
quick to humble his military leaders once again. 4 1 1 • -
Where Hitler increasingly took upon himself positions lower and lower in the 
German chain of command, Stalin centralized his hold on military power quickly after 
the German invasion. Six weeks before 'Operation Barbarossa' began Stalin formally 
became head of government, giving him his first legal position to command the Red 
Army. In the weeks following the German attack the Soviets created agencies to 
administer the Soviet Union in wartime. The State Defense Committee (GKO) served as 
the Soviet Union's wartime government while the Stavka served as the military high 
command. Stalin served as the chairman of the GKO and, after brief leadership under 
Timoshenko, was named the Supreme Commander of the Stavka. Stalin also took upon 
himself the traditional role of Defense Commissar. 
After the shock of the German invasion Stalin slowly came to rely on his military 
technicians. The first great turning point was the halt of the German advance before 
Mosocw in late 1941. Stalin had called upon Zhukov, the victor of Khalkhin Gol and the 
former Chief of the General Staff who had argued for abandoning Kiev, to defend the 
Soviet capital. The victory impressed upon Stalin the value of military professionals, 
though he was not yet convinced that their military judgment was superior to his own. 
The Red Army had always been offensively oriented and this reflected Stalin's 
preference. Without help from the Stavka's principal operational planning agency, the 
4 1 1
 Service, Stalin, 528. 
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Red Army General Staff, Stalin planned the disastrous offensives of early 1942. As the 
German Army advanced on Stalingrad later in the year, Stalin again called upon his 
military technicians and again his faith in them was rewarded. As the war continued 
military figures gained importance in Stalin's eyes and political cronies were allowed to 
meddle less and less in military affairs. Zhukov, Konev, Rokossovsky, Vasilevsky, and 
Antonov took center stage in the military struggle as Voroshilov, Budenny, Mekhlis, 
Malenkov and others increasingly served the war effort in supporting roles. 
Though Stalin believed he could never publicly take responsibility for Red Army 
failures like those following the German invasion in 1941 or the disastrous early 1942 
offensives, he nevertheless gradually changed his outlook. The military technician 
replaced the political apparatchik in the operational running of the war. Though Stalin 
served as a Stavka coordinator during the drive on Berlin, his faith in his commanders 
and military planners remained strong. Stalin's fear of being associated with failure 
would never have allowed him to take upon the role of a Stavka coordinator if he was not 
absolutely convinced that the Red Army would accomplish its objectives.4 1 2 
The relationships of Hitler and Stalin with their military leaderships were 
processes. As absolute rulers of their nations both dictators dominated their militaries. In 
both the German Army and the Red Army they were the supreme authority. The 
dictators exercised their authority in different ways over time. Though Hitler had little 
love for the German officer class, he was content with their political alliance through the 
first few years of his reign, even sacrificing radical elements of his own party to appease 
2
 Glantz, When Titans Clashed, 288. 
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it. As war approached Hitler felt the need to take on more and more military authority. 
Though his authority continued to increase throughout the war Hitler patently refused to 
accept the contingent responsibility. The result was the destruction of the German Army 
and the downfall of the Third Reich. 
Like Hitler, Stalin held the Red Army officer class in contempt, and for many of 
the same reasons. Both dictators viewed their militaries as potential hotbeds of 
conservative reaction. With the Soviet bureaucracy firmly in place, Stalin did not require 
the goodwill of the Red Army the way Hitler needed the approval of the German officer 
class. Beginning in 1937 Stalin dealt with his suspected officers though arrest, torture, 
and murder. There would be nothing comparable to it in Nazi Germany until the 
exposure of the July 20 t h bomb plotters. Once the war with Germany began, however, 
Stalin slowly came to rely on his military professionals. In Stalin's eyes they virtually 
ceased to be a threat to Soviet power and indeed gradually became its saviors. 
Over time Stalin learned to work effectively with his military technicians. After 
the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler's ability to work with German military 
technicians began to wane. The effective German relationship between dictator and 
military leadership, like the German technical mastery of warfare, was transitory. The 
effective Soviet relationship between dictator and military leadership was slow in 
coming, but proved a key factor in the Soviet victory in the Second World War. 
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